Sandy and Bill (and others)
At the risk of appearing defensive on behalf of BNL (even though I am now
officially retired and was out of my direct environmental monitoring
responsibilities prior to the apparent onset of the "leakage", it seems to
me that Senator D'Amato, Rep. Forbes and even you are demonstrating 20/20
hindsight in stating that "the Laboratory allowed an environmental release
to occur for so long before taking any action". Now that the release and its
source has become clearly apparent, it's all to easy to pontificate (as a
number of our politicians, greens and other have done) on what should have
been done. But, I assure you that at the time they first occurred, the
early indications were subtle and confusing.
In my earlier persona, I was employed for about a decade as a ground
operations agent for a major airline. Obviously, we were concerned above
all about safety.
Yet there were minor lapses which could have had serious consequences. Human
being (even health physicists) are not perfect, witness that serious
accidents attributable to human failure do occur. When they do, no one
calls for permanently shutting down the involved carrier. Rather, measures
are taken to protect the system against these lapses. What's so different
about the nuclear enterprise, except that it has an abundance of noisy
critics/enemies who want to shut it down lock, stock and barrel for
extraneous reasons that have little, if anything to do with safety? (Maybe,
I've answered my own question).
At 02:41 PM 9/3/97 -0500, you wrote:
>Bill Lipton said the following:
>
>> The problem is not the actual dose, but that the Laboratory allowed an
>> environmental release to occur for so long before taking any action. We
have
>> lost the public trust, and it will take a lot of work to start to get it
back.
>
>> Before this situation can begin to improve, we must recognize the errors,
and
>> find ways to correct the problems and prevent any recurrence.
>
>Bill is absolutely correct. The public, the regulators, the workers
>themselves, when they look at a situation, don't really care that the
>problem encountered didn't pose a serious, or even a moderate
>radiological event. The concern has to do with the fact that it
>occurred in the first place. The regulators will still cite a facility
>for the "potential to have caused" a release, an exposure that
>exceeds the regulatory limit, an abnormal situation, a transient,
>etc. This is what Bill was pointing out. The fact that it happens,
>and happens again is the real issue. In my opinion, too many of us
>take the course that if the results of the incident are minimal, no
>real action is necessary to prevent recurrence. This is a serious
>mistake.
>
>Too many issues out there; the BNL environment, the fact that the
>Japanese Reprocessing facility had been leaking for 30 years, the
>Hanford site and its history of leaks, Rocky Flats, an environment
>where it seems that management is just not interested in fixing
>problems .. this is what the public sees.
>
>We are our own worse enemy, and the public is reacting to our
>displayed insensitivity to what the real issues are. We tend to fix
>the symptoms, and not worry about the root causes. Then we wonder why
>the same problems keep happening, over and over again...
>
>------------------
>Sandy Perle
>Technical Director
>ICN Dosimetry Division
>Costa Mesa, CA 92626
>Office: (800) 548-5100 x2306
>Fax: (714) 668-3149
>
>mailto:sandyfl@ix.netcom.com
>mailto:sperle@icnpharm.com
>
>ICN Dosimetry Website:
>http://www.dosimetry.com
>
>Personal Homepage:
>http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/1205
>http://www.netcom.com/~sandyfl/home.html
>
>"The object of opening the mind, as of opening
>the mouth, is to close it again on something solid"
> - G. K. Chesterton -
>
>