Re: Cs-137 Event - Release in Spain

[Mike Mckenzie-Carter <Mike_Carter@cpqm.saic.com>]

FYI:  The original CSN report states that the Cs came from scrap metal which was
being recycled and that for some reason was not detected by the plant's system of
normally checking all incoming scrap for radioactivity.

JAMES E. BENNETT wrote:

> I asked on of the Chemistry Instructors here at the Millstone Nuclear Training
> Center to brush off his high School and College Spanish Memory tracks and give
> us an English translation on the CSN Press Release from Spain. After about 20
> minutes he gave me a rough draft and disappeared for two hours. It seems his
> good grades in Spanish were also the basis for starting a family and the
> information that follows is his spouse's version.
> Hope it helps.
> I would still like to know how many Curies were melted ??
> What and how did the Cs-137 source enter the melting pot ???
>
>  Chronological Facts
>
> 9th of June
>
> The Acerinox enterprise tells CSN that they have detected radioactive
> contamination per cesium-137 in the steam filtration system, in the number one
> oven in their Algeciras plant.  The CSN initiated a technical evaluation of the
> situation and has given their first instructions to the enterprise on what
> measures to take.
>
> 10th and 11th of June
>
> A CSN inspector travels to Algeciras.  The inspection verifies the
> situation of the plant, and confirms the presence of contamination in the steam
> filtration system.  Measures have been taken to isolate and control access.
>
> 12th of June
>
> Instructions given to the plant.  The CSN, through complete inspection and
> evaluation, sends official written instructions to the enterprise about the
> characterization of the situation and decontamination.  Also, instructions have
> been given to take measures to examine personnel, specifically those who work
> in the affected area.
>
> International notification.  Notification is send to the International
> Organization of Atomic Energy, the UE Commission, Environmental Administration
> of Portugal and the Institute of Nuclear Security and Protection of France.
> The OIEA and UE, in turn have distributed information to those countries who
> are members.
>
> The first information is received about the increments of cesium
> detected in France.
>
> Information to the institutions: communication of the incident is sent to the
> Administration of General and Civil Protection, Administration of Industry and
> Energy, Environmental Administration, The Assembly of Andalucia, Government
> Delegation of Andalucia, and the Subdelegation of the Cadiz Government. As the
> advisor of the Environmental Assembly the
> president of CSN personally informed the government delegate in
> Andalucia.
>
> Information to the Public:  two memos were sent to all communication mediums,
> national, local, and international as well as Greenpeace, at their request.
>
> Actual situation and hypothesis regarding the incident.
>
> Since the notification by Acerinox, CSN has not detected increments of cesium
> in the atmosphere nor in any of the automatic stations in the other countries
> (nor in the CSN, nor in the Administrations of General Civil Protection). It
> has been discarted that the incident in Algeciras would have provoked an
> environmental contamination with some radiological incident.
>
> To attain a precise estimate of the impact of the incident, the prior data is
> being analyzed by the red national laboratories, who have the capability of
> measuring very low levels of radiation.  They can test these levels from the
> 25th of may to the actual date. The data received until now has only shown
> increments of cesium in the Palomares (Almeria) station, lower than the ones
> detected in France.
>
> The evaluation of this data, together with reasonable fundamentals from France
> and Italy, and the information given by the National Institute of  Meteorology
> in respect to the meteorological conditions and the dominant winds in the
> analyzed period, permit to establish a hypothesis that the detected cesium in
> France eluded the peninsular territory according to the trajectory outline.
> This hypothesis is re-enforced by the fact that the laboratory of high
> precision station in Madrid, came up with the same detection of cesium as the
> one done in France.  It did
> not register any increments.  That is to say, neither the laboratory in Madrid,
> nor the Red Espanola detected increments of cesium because the diffusion of
> isotopes happened outside the Espanola Coast.
>
> Suggested hypothesis by France's Retrotrjectories, calculated by the INM
>
> Foreseen Measures
>
> The proceedings by CSN have been continuous and investigations are being
> carried out:
> to determine the origin of the source and dispersion to determine if possible
> breach might have occurred Algeciras has been the only explicable cause that so
> far has been investigated
>
> For that, the following actions are in progress:
> The CSN has disperse an inspection team to the plant in Acerinox in Algeciras.
>
> Tomorrow, Monday, a mobil unit will carry out an exam for the workers who
> might've been affected.
>
> Two mobil units, with a team who specializes in detection, have been
> disperse to carry out certain measures in the plant and in the
> environment.
>
> Continue the analysis and registered measures in the red laboratories.
>
> By assignment from CSN, Enresa is going to study the possible
> contamination of scoria (slag, scum) produce in the factory with hopes of
> giving appropriate treatment.
>
> Madrid, 14th of June 1998
> ********
>
> Jim Bennett
> Technical Trainer HP & Waste Services
> Northeast Utilities @ Millstone Nuclear Power Station
> benneje@gwsmtp.nu.com
> ph  860-437-2844
> fax 860-437-2748