Cs-137 Event - Release in Spain

["JAMES E. BENNETT" <BENNEJE@GWSMTP.NU.COM>]

I asked on of the Chemistry Instructors here at the Millstone Nuclear Training
Center to brush off his high School and College Spanish Memory tracks and give
us an English translation on the CSN Press Release from Spain. After about 20
minutes he gave me a rough draft and disappeared for two hours. It seems his
good grades in Spanish were also the basis for starting a family and the
information that follows is his spouse's version.
Hope it helps.
I would still like to know how many Curies were melted ?? 
What and how did the Cs-137 source enter the melting pot ???


 Chronological Facts

9th of June

The Acerinox enterprise tells CSN that they have detected radioactive
contamination per cesium-137 in the steam filtration system, in the number one
oven in their Algeciras plant.  The CSN initiated a technical evaluation of the
situation and has given their first instructions to the enterprise on what
measures to take.

10th and 11th of June

A CSN inspector travels to Algeciras.  The inspection verifies the
situation of the plant, and confirms the presence of contamination in the steam
filtration system.  Measures have been taken to isolate and control access.

12th of June

Instructions given to the plant.  The CSN, through complete inspection and
evaluation, sends official written instructions to the enterprise about the
characterization of the situation and decontamination.  Also, instructions have
been given to take measures to examine personnel, specifically those who work
in the affected area.

International notification.  Notification is send to the International
Organization of Atomic Energy, the UE Commission, Environmental Administration
of Portugal and the Institute of Nuclear Security and Protection of France. 
The OIEA and UE, in turn have distributed information to those countries who
are members. 

The first information is received about the increments of cesium
detected in France.

Information to the institutions: communication of the incident is sent to the
Administration of General and Civil Protection, Administration of Industry and
Energy, Environmental Administration, The Assembly of Andalucia, Government
Delegation of Andalucia, and the Subdelegation of the Cadiz Government. As the
advisor of the Environmental Assembly the
president of CSN personally informed the government delegate in
Andalucia.

Information to the Public:  two memos were sent to all communication mediums,
national, local, and international as well as Greenpeace, at their request.

Actual situation and hypothesis regarding the incident.

Since the notification by Acerinox, CSN has not detected increments of cesium
in the atmosphere nor in any of the automatic stations in the other countries
(nor in the CSN, nor in the Administrations of General Civil Protection). It
has been discarted that the incident in Algeciras would have provoked an
environmental contamination with some radiological incident.

To attain a precise estimate of the impact of the incident, the prior data is
being analyzed by the red national laboratories, who have the capability of
measuring very low levels of radiation.  They can test these levels from the
25th of may to the actual date. The data received until now has only shown
increments of cesium in the Palomares (Almeria) station, lower than the ones
detected in France.

The evaluation of this data, together with reasonable fundamentals from France
and Italy, and the information given by the National Institute of  Meteorology
in respect to the meteorological conditions and the dominant winds in the
analyzed period, permit to establish a hypothesis that the detected cesium in
France eluded the peninsular territory according to the trajectory outline. 
This hypothesis is re-enforced by the fact that the laboratory of high
precision station in Madrid, came up with the same detection of cesium as the
one done in France.  It did
not register any increments.  That is to say, neither the laboratory in Madrid,
nor the Red Espanola detected increments of cesium because the diffusion of
isotopes happened outside the Espanola Coast. 

Suggested hypothesis by France's Retrotrjectories, calculated by the INM 

Foreseen Measures

The proceedings by CSN have been continuous and investigations are being
carried out:
to determine the origin of the source and dispersion to determine if possible
breach might have occurred Algeciras has been the only explicable cause that so
far has been investigated

For that, the following actions are in progress:
The CSN has disperse an inspection team to the plant in Acerinox in Algeciras.

Tomorrow, Monday, a mobil unit will carry out an exam for the workers who
might've been affected.

Two mobil units, with a team who specializes in detection, have been
disperse to carry out certain measures in the plant and in the
environment.

Continue the analysis and registered measures in the red laboratories.

By assignment from CSN, Enresa is going to study the possible
contamination of scoria (slag, scum) produce in the factory with hopes of
giving appropriate treatment.

Madrid, 14th of June 1998
********

Jim Bennett
Technical Trainer HP & Waste Services
Northeast Utilities @ Millstone Nuclear Power Station
benneje@gwsmtp.nu.com 
ph  860-437-2844
fax 860-437-2748