IAEA safeguards

["Michael C. Baker" <mcbaker@lanl.gov>]

At 08:34 AM 1/14/99 -0600, Franz wrote: 

> That the reactor grade plutonium will not work
> to produce a
> nuclear chain reaction after all the efforts is another funny story, but
> it
> can keep us smiling at this "science fiction" story and prevent
> us from
> worrying about it. 

Reactor grade plutonium can be used to produce a nuclear weapon. 
This 
has been well documented.


> There are international treaties and it should
> be
> known, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a
> large
> division for Safeguards and that it simply is not possible to
> produce
> enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium which will be unaccounted
> for
> and not be detected in countries which have signed this treaty. To me
> it
> seems that the activities of the IAEA are very little known in the USA.

North Korea was a signatory of the NPT and under IAEA safeguards, but
the IAEA has been unable to verify that the North Koreans have given up
their weapons program. Iraq was running a covert program to acquire
the material for nuclear weapons that was unlikely to be detected 
if
there had been no Gulf War.  It seems that you may be over
confident
in the IAEA safeguards system.

Many people have a great misunderstanding of what the IAEA does and 
how they carry out their safeguards mission.  First, they only
serve
to verify that DECLARED nuclear activities are not used for 
anything
other than peaceful purposes.  Only in the last couple of years
have
they started to look into the detection of covert activities and
this
program is in its infant stages.  Second, the ability for IAEA
inspectors
to detect diversions of nuclear materials is severely limited by 
international politics and the fact that they are working in
sovereign
nations.  For example, at most facilities, that are delcared and
under
IAEA safeguards, inspectors are limited in the number of days they 
can spend at the facility.  The IAEA has no authority for
enforcement 
with the exception of reporting violations to the security council.
With enforcement coming from such a political body, infractions
would
likely have to be gross for action.

Another thing to keep in mind is that the IAEA only prevents diversion
of nuclear material through the threat of detection.  This is a
rather
weak means of prevention since they can only take action after the 
diversion of material has already happened.  The detection of covert
uranium enrichment or plutonium production is much more likely to be
made by non-UN intelligence assets and through the extensive export 
control system.

Mike

        

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Michael C. Baker

Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Team

Environmental Science and Waste Technology Group

Mail Stop J594, Los Alamos National Laboratory

P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (USA)

email:  mcbaker@lanl.gov            

Phone: (505) 667-7334        Fax: (505) 665-8346                

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