Re: More on DU

[Philip Hypes <phypes@lanl.gov>]

At 12:08 PM 6/8/99 -0500, you wrote:
>
>That's for an annual limit of 50mSv. I think the occupational limit in UK
>is 20mSv. As you point out, I've calculated it for members of the public,
>which in the UK have a limit of 1mSv/y. In the US, I believe dose limits to
>members of the public are even more stringent, 0.15mSv/y for EPA regs on
>the nuclear fuel cycle. Anyway, this is what I wanted to get to the bottom
>of. I'm not actually interested in this from the Gulf War Syndrome angle.
>

Fine, then discuss the data from Oak Ridge and Los Alamos occupational
exposure studies.  These studies, by the way, include exposures much
than were calculated for the friendly fire survivors, and there are none of
the
horror tales we are seeing in the media today.

However, to apply occupational safety regulations to a combat environment
is utter foolishness.  It's a warm and fuzzy goal, but utter ridiculous and 
counterproductive in battle.  Occupational safety regulations are designed
to protect against chronic, LONG term exposures and hazards.  No one
spends 20 years in a tank or APC that is being hit by DU rounds.  Soldiers
accept that they may not survive battle.  They are willing to make that
sacrifice when it has been deemed necessary.  And yes, we should do
everything possible to see that they come back alive, safe, and healthy.
That does not mean that an IH or HP should be assigned to every platoon.
It simply means that we do a risk-benefit analysis when selecting the
weapons soldiers will use, and thereby give them the best tools we can
to do their jobs.  The services did all this when they decided to use DU.
The problem is, no one discussed it with the troops.  In the clear view of
hindsight, that was a bad decision.  I'm sure the folks at TMI would be glad
to comment on how useful such retrospective knowledge is.  As anyone
with an hour's risk communication training can tell you, it's a lot easier to
convincingly tell someone "you might get exposed, but it won't constitute a
significant risk" than "you already have been exposed, but it won't constitute
a significant risk."  Saying things like "Oh, and if you do it again, we want
you to wear this moon suit" only makes the situation worse, even if it is
the best policy from an ALARA standpoint.

All in all, this whole issue is an excellent case study on the dos and
don'ts of risk communication and dealing with activists.
___________________________________________________________
Philip Hypes
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Safeguards Science and Technology Group (NIS 5)
(505) 667-1556  phypes@lanl.gov

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