[ RadSafe ] ALARA
howard.long at comcast.net
howard.long at comcast.net
Wed Jul 2 11:36:04 CDT 2008
If NCRP did reject Rockwell as Jacobus writes, its incest of ideas misapplies
Rockwell's (and others') classic shielding data (which is still a guide for ALARA).
Insofar as NCRP meetings may be for self-perpetuation, we learn more from Rockwell and others who actually did the tests and present data (instead of ignorant edicts).
Howard Long
-------------- Original message --------------
From: John Jacobus <crispy_bird at yahoo.com>
> At the NCRP meeting an NRC presentative indicated that they were not going to
> eliminate there ALARA requirements in their regulations. So it goes.
>
> I thought that it was interesting when the monitor at one question session told
> Ted Rockwell that if he did not a valid question of the panel to sit down. Sad
> but true.
>
> Sorry you could not make it Dr. Long.
>
> +++++++++++++++++++
>
> -- John
> John Jacobus, MS
> Certified Health Physicist
> e-mail: crispy_bird at yahoo.com
>
> --- On Tue, 6/24/08, HOWARD.LONG at comcast.net wrote:
>
> From: HOWARD.LONG at comcast.net
> Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] ALARA
> To: NeilKeeney at aol.com, radsafe at radlab.nl
> Date: Tuesday, June 24, 2008, 7:40 PM
>
> ALARA Supporters,
> You have strong help from Ted Rockwell in,
> Creating the New World: Stories and Images from the Dawn of the Atomic Age.
> Therein, Ted relates the value of submariner perfectionism in selling and
> making the first nuclear power plants safely.
>
> However, now that instrumentation and evidence that up to 20 rem/year actually
> promotes longevity and reduces cancer, isn't it time to draw that line?
> Prompt energy increase depends on it.
> All would agree that great pains must be taken to assure there is no repeat of
> Chernobyl.
>
> Howard Long
>
> -------------- Original message --------------
> From: NeilKeeney at aol.com
>
> >
> > Gary or Joe et al:
> >
> > In direct response to your question, we unquestionably 'get
> something' from
> > ALARA. I've primarily been associated with planning and implementation
> of
> > major projects at commercial nuclear facilities around the country for the
> last
> > couple of decades. My observations and conclusions closely align with what
>
> > Dr. Lipton has indicated.
> >
> > To take it a couple of steps further, the depth and degree of planning and
>
> > preparation necessary to achieve some of the key objectives of ALARA,
> which,
> > in the aggregate result in reduced collective dose may be summarized in a
> few
> > points:
> > 1. There is generally less rework necessary to be performed across our
> > major project tasks because:
> >
> > a. We have workable plans that were compelled to be developed in detail
> > in part as the result of ALARA considerations. Some of these go so far as
> to
> > specify the exact tools, parts and pieces necessary to perform the work.
> In
> > some cases they call for backup equipment or components. These variables
> are
> > based on the lessons-learned for the activity. I have often observed, in
> > the 'old' days, a work group exiting the work areas because they
> had the wrong
> > bolt, forgot a wrench, the tool broke, the wrong gasket; on and on. That
> > doesn't happen anymore at a facility with a good ALARA program. It
> simply
> > results in greater efficiency all around which, in turn, optimizes the
> activity
> > in terms of collective dose expenditure.
> >
> > b. We have superior scheduling that takes into consideration work
> > sequences that result in avoiding unnecessary exposure. For example, if it
>
> > were not
> > for the ALARA concept, there would be nothing preventing any particular
> > project management team from draining the Steam Generator shell of
> secondary
> > water (shielding) thus exposing the workforce to 30,000 manhours of
> increased
> > dose-rates on the order of 2 - 3 times that of a filled shell. An extreme
> > example but I've seen the results of premature drain-down.
> >
> > c. Via this concept, we have been able to reconcile internal and external
> > exposure via TEDE ALARA precepts. This took thousands of people out of
> > respirators and also greatly increased worker efficiency and, therefore
> > improved
> > production making us more reliable as an industry. This also compelled
> > advances in the use and utility of engineering controls for ventilation
> and
> > Containment At The Source concepts for contamination control.
> >
> > 2. Enhanced proficiency in performing difficult or complex tasks -
> > previously discussed. There's nothing like achieving greater reality
> on the
> > scope
> > and magnitude of one's part in a complex task. It's a drill of the
> technique
> > and methodology and is consistent with other such practices across our
> > society. This is how a process is debugged prior to actual execution and
> it's
> > a
> > valuable element of reducing or avoiding dose.
> >
> > I have observed the improvements across our industry first-hand. Work
> > implementation used to be carried out in a cavalier fashion without
> respect to
> > collective dose. Rework was routine. Schedules ignored shielding
> > installation,
> > work group interferences with one another, or water level management
> > techniques (in PWRs). Workers were worked until they maxed-out on dose and
>
> > then you
> > got another guy and did the same with him. It was pretty ugly.
> >
> > Well. These are a few viewpoints about the matter. There are many more but
>
> > I've been accused in the past of being too verbose so I will leave it
> at
> > this for now.
> >
> > Neil Keeney
> > NRRPT
> > Currently at CR3 SGRP
> >
> >
> > In a message dated 6/23/2008 6:43:07 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> > garyi at trinityphysics.com writes:
> >
> > Bill,
> >
> > Did Alara produce the successful facility, or did the successful
> > facility produce doses that were Alara?
> >
> > In other words, if you went into a "dirty" plant and made them
> > implement Alara, would the plant become a model facility? Or would it
> > still be "dirty" wherever scrutiny was lacking? I agree that the
>
> > correlation you recall exists, but I strongly doubt that Alara is the
> > causative factor.
> >
> > Unless you are willing to insist that Alara is a causative factor,
> > your concluding statement is unfounded. I assert that the well run
> > facilities you recall would have been just as well run (perhaps
> > better) if Alara had never been conceived, had never been made a part
> > of the compliance requirement.
> >
> > So I'm back to this: Do we get anything from ALARA that we could not
> > have just by writing clear regs?
> >
> > And, this is the last I will post on this issue. I am so busy keeping
> > things Alara that I have no more time to think about whether this is a
> > good policy. :P
> >
> > -Gary Isenhower
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
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