[ RadSafe ] ALARA

howard.long at comcast.net howard.long at comcast.net
Wed Jul 2 11:36:04 CDT 2008


If NCRP did reject Rockwell as Jacobus writes, its incest of ideas misapplies 
Rockwell's (and others') classic shielding data (which is still a guide for ALARA). 

Insofar as NCRP meetings may be for self-perpetuation, we learn more from Rockwell and others who actually did the tests and present data (instead of ignorant edicts). 

Howard Long

-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: John Jacobus <crispy_bird at yahoo.com> 

> At the NCRP meeting an NRC presentative indicated that they were not going to 
> eliminate there ALARA requirements in their regulations. So it goes. 
> 
> I thought that it was interesting when the monitor at one question session told 
> Ted Rockwell that if he did not a valid question of the panel to sit down. Sad 
> but true. 
> 
> Sorry you could not make it Dr. Long. 
> 
> +++++++++++++++++++ 
> 
> -- John 
> John Jacobus, MS 
> Certified Health Physicist 
> e-mail: crispy_bird at yahoo.com 
> 
> --- On Tue, 6/24/08, HOWARD.LONG at comcast.net wrote: 
> 
> From: HOWARD.LONG at comcast.net 
> Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] ALARA 
> To: NeilKeeney at aol.com, radsafe at radlab.nl 
> Date: Tuesday, June 24, 2008, 7:40 PM 
> 
> ALARA Supporters, 
> You have strong help from Ted Rockwell in, 
> Creating the New World: Stories and Images from the Dawn of the Atomic Age. 
> Therein, Ted relates the value of submariner perfectionism in selling and 
> making the first nuclear power plants safely. 
> 
> However, now that instrumentation and evidence that up to 20 rem/year actually 
> promotes longevity and reduces cancer, isn't it time to draw that line? 
> Prompt energy increase depends on it. 
> All would agree that great pains must be taken to assure there is no repeat of 
> Chernobyl. 
> 
> Howard Long 
> 
> -------------- Original message -------------- 
> From: NeilKeeney at aol.com 
> 
> > 
> > Gary or Joe et al: 
> > 
> > In direct response to your question, we unquestionably 'get 
> something' from 
> > ALARA. I've primarily been associated with planning and implementation 
> of 
> > major projects at commercial nuclear facilities around the country for the 
> last 
> > couple of decades. My observations and conclusions closely align with what 
> 
> > Dr. Lipton has indicated. 
> > 
> > To take it a couple of steps further, the depth and degree of planning and 
> 
> > preparation necessary to achieve some of the key objectives of ALARA, 
> which, 
> > in the aggregate result in reduced collective dose may be summarized in a 
> few 
> > points: 
> > 1. There is generally less rework necessary to be performed across our 
> > major project tasks because: 
> > 
> > a. We have workable plans that were compelled to be developed in detail 
> > in part as the result of ALARA considerations. Some of these go so far as 
> to 
> > specify the exact tools, parts and pieces necessary to perform the work. 
> In 
> > some cases they call for backup equipment or components. These variables 
> are 
> > based on the lessons-learned for the activity. I have often observed, in 
> > the 'old' days, a work group exiting the work areas because they 
> had the wrong 
> > bolt, forgot a wrench, the tool broke, the wrong gasket; on and on. That 
> > doesn't happen anymore at a facility with a good ALARA program. It 
> simply 
> > results in greater efficiency all around which, in turn, optimizes the 
> activity 
> > in terms of collective dose expenditure. 
> > 
> > b. We have superior scheduling that takes into consideration work 
> > sequences that result in avoiding unnecessary exposure. For example, if it 
> 
> > were not 
> > for the ALARA concept, there would be nothing preventing any particular 
> > project management team from draining the Steam Generator shell of 
> secondary 
> > water (shielding) thus exposing the workforce to 30,000 manhours of 
> increased 
> > dose-rates on the order of 2 - 3 times that of a filled shell. An extreme 
> > example but I've seen the results of premature drain-down. 
> > 
> > c. Via this concept, we have been able to reconcile internal and external 
> > exposure via TEDE ALARA precepts. This took thousands of people out of 
> > respirators and also greatly increased worker efficiency and, therefore 
> > improved 
> > production making us more reliable as an industry. This also compelled 
> > advances in the use and utility of engineering controls for ventilation 
> and 
> > Containment At The Source concepts for contamination control. 
> > 
> > 2. Enhanced proficiency in performing difficult or complex tasks - 
> > previously discussed. There's nothing like achieving greater reality 
> on the 
> > scope 
> > and magnitude of one's part in a complex task. It's a drill of the 
> technique 
> > and methodology and is consistent with other such practices across our 
> > society. This is how a process is debugged prior to actual execution and 
> it's 
> > a 
> > valuable element of reducing or avoiding dose. 
> > 
> > I have observed the improvements across our industry first-hand. Work 
> > implementation used to be carried out in a cavalier fashion without 
> respect to 
> > collective dose. Rework was routine. Schedules ignored shielding 
> > installation, 
> > work group interferences with one another, or water level management 
> > techniques (in PWRs). Workers were worked until they maxed-out on dose and 
> 
> > then you 
> > got another guy and did the same with him. It was pretty ugly. 
> > 
> > Well. These are a few viewpoints about the matter. There are many more but 
> 
> > I've been accused in the past of being too verbose so I will leave it 
> at 
> > this for now. 
> > 
> > Neil Keeney 
> > NRRPT 
> > Currently at CR3 SGRP 
> > 
> > 
> > In a message dated 6/23/2008 6:43:07 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
> > garyi at trinityphysics.com writes: 
> > 
> > Bill, 
> > 
> > Did Alara produce the successful facility, or did the successful 
> > facility produce doses that were Alara? 
> > 
> > In other words, if you went into a "dirty" plant and made them 
> > implement Alara, would the plant become a model facility? Or would it 
> > still be "dirty" wherever scrutiny was lacking? I agree that the 
> 
> > correlation you recall exists, but I strongly doubt that Alara is the 
> > causative factor. 
> > 
> > Unless you are willing to insist that Alara is a causative factor, 
> > your concluding statement is unfounded. I assert that the well run 
> > facilities you recall would have been just as well run (perhaps 
> > better) if Alara had never been conceived, had never been made a part 
> > of the compliance requirement. 
> > 
> > So I'm back to this: Do we get anything from ALARA that we could not 
> > have just by writing clear regs? 
> > 
> > And, this is the last I will post on this issue. I am so busy keeping 
> > things Alara that I have no more time to think about whether this is a 
> > good policy. :P 
> > 
> > -Gary Isenhower 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>


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