[ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial SpentNuclearFuelStorage: Public Report

Tue Mar 26 17:29:09 CDT 2013

It also wouldn't surprise me if somewhere in the plans for responding to
something like this, military aircraft become involved, with Rules of
Engagement that will be debated by Civil Libertarians for some time to
come.   

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu
[mailto:radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu] On Behalf Of Victor
Anderson
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:56 PM
To: 'The International Radiation Protection (Health Physics)
MailingList'
Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial
SpentNuclearFuelStorage: Public Report

Good Afternoon,

In addition to that pesky radiation thing, there is a problem of weight.
Most commercial nuclear bundles are about 15 feet long and weigh a few
hundred pounds.  Transport has to be by truck.  Interestingly enough,
the military researched the issue of incapacitation via radiation dose.
It gets very interesting in a horrid sort of way.  The number given was
about 5,000 rad (50 Gray) to cause someone to lose consciousnesses.  Of
course, this number is only an estimate and is subject to the usual
disclaimers about biological variability, etc.  Another interesting
issue with "whole body"
doses above 1,000 rad (10 Gy) received in a short time is the quick
onset of radiation prodrome.  The effects are similar to seasickness and
have similar disabling effects.  Besides having to deal with security
guards, the spent fuel "snatch" team has to assure radiation levels are
low enough so that they can function.  But wait, it gets worse for the
bad guys. Because of all of the radiation detectors in use, the spent
fuel bundles need to be shielded down to as close to background as
possible (ACBP :) in order to transport them to the secret hideout for
processing.).  All of this means trucks and containers and so forth.
Add in a security team, an assault team and you have a large operation.
Hard to conceal, much less pull off.  Life is so darn hard for
terrorists.  For analysis of theft by diversion, do you own.  GRIN.

Victor

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu
[mailto:radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu] On Behalf Of Brennan, Mike
(DOH)
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 9:34 AM
To: The International Radiation Protection (Health Physics) MailingList
Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial Spent
NuclearFuelStorage: Public Report

" The book explains it would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough
spent fuel to construct a significant radiological dispersal device."

I would love to see how far the terrorists get, trying to carry a fresh
spent fuel bundle.  I don't think they actually make it all the way to
the parking lot before they start feeling not-so-good. 

-----Original Message-----
From: radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu
[mailto:radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu] On Behalf Of Cary Renquist
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 9:25 AM
To: radsafe at health.phys.iit.edu
Subject: [ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear
FuelStorage: Public Report

NAS report on safety and security of spent fuel:
http://j.mp/YRHuFU

All NAS documents can now be downloaded for free.

In response to a request from Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Homeland Security sponsored a National
Academies study to assess the safety and security risks of spent nuclear
fuel stored in cooling pools and dry casks at commercial nuclear power
plants. The information provided in this book examines the risks of
terrorist attacks using these materials for a radiological dispersal
device. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel is an
unclassified public summary of a more detailed classified book. The book
finds that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools, though
difficult, are possible. A propagating fire in a pool could release
large amounts of radioactive material, but rearranging spent fuel in the
pool during storage and providing emergency water spray systems would
reduce the likelihood of a propagating fire even under severe damage
conditions. The book suggests that additional studies are needed to
better understand these risks. Although dry casks have advantages over
cooling pools, pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants
to store at least the recently discharged fuel. The book explains it
would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel to
construct a significant radiological dispersal device.

Congress requested that the National Academies produce a classified
report that addresses these charges within 6 months and also provide an
unclassified summary for unlimited public distribution. The first
request was fulfilled in July 2004. This report fulfills the second
request.

The highlights of the report are as follows:

    Spent fuel pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants
to store recently discharged fuel.

    The committee judges that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel
pools, though difficult, are possible.

    If an attack leads to a propagating zirconium cladding fire, it
could result in the release of large amounts of radioactive material.

    Additional analyses are needed to understand more fully the
vulnerabilities and consequences of events that could lead to
propagating zirconium cladding fires.

    It appears to be feasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium
cladding fire by rearranging spent fuel assemblies in the pool and
making provision for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the
fuel, even if the pool or overlying building were severely damaged.

    Dry cask storage has inherent security advantages over spent fuel
pool storage, but it can only be used to store older spent fuel

    There are no large security differences among different storage-cask
designs.

    It would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel from
storage facilities for use in significant radiological dispersal devices
(dirty bombs).

Cary
--
Cary.renquist at ezag.com
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