[ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial Spent NuclearFuelStorage: P...

Tue Mar 26 13:16:20 CDT 2013

Hmmmmm,

     A well-trained terrorist would put spent fuel  bundles into a 
shielding container and would then move the spent fuel  bundles.  Processing the 
bundles later on might be tricky.  Hope they  at least go through some sort of 
gastrointestinal phase of radiation  sickness...

    Joe Preisig

In a message dated 3/26/2013 2:01:20 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
cary.renquist at ezag.com writes:

Ahh, but  one must assume that there are an infinite number of terrorists
to carry  the fuel bundle...

---
Cary  Renquist
cary.renquist at ezag.com

-----Original Message-----
From:  radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu
[mailto:radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu]  On Behalf Of Brennan, Mike
(DOH)
Sent: Tuesday, 26 March 2013 9:34  AM
To: The International Radiation Protection (Health Physics)  MailingList
Subject: Re: [ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of Commercial  Spent
NuclearFuelStorage: Public Report

" The book explains it would  be difficult for terrorists to steal enough
spent fuel to construct a  significant radiological dispersal device."

I would love to see how far  the terrorists get, trying to carry a fresh
spent fuel bundle.  I  don't think they actually make it all the way to
the parking lot before  they start feeling not-so-good. 

-----Original  Message-----
From:  radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu
[mailto:radsafe-bounces at health.phys.iit.edu]  On Behalf Of Cary Renquist
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 9:25 AM
To:  radsafe at health.phys.iit.edu
Subject: [ RadSafe ] Safety and Security of  Commercial Spent Nuclear
FuelStorage: Public Report

NAS report on  safety and security of spent fuel:
http://j.mp/YRHuFU

All NAS  documents can now be downloaded for free.

In response to a request from  Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Homeland  Security sponsored a National
Academies study to assess the safety and  security risks of spent nuclear
fuel stored in cooling pools and dry casks  at commercial nuclear power
plants. The information provided in this book  examines the risks of
terrorist attacks using these materials for a  radiological dispersal
device. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent  Nuclear Fuel is an
unclassified public summary of a more detailed  classified book. The book
finds that successful terrorist attacks on spent  fuel pools, though
difficult, are possible. A propagating fire in a pool  could release
large amounts of radioactive material, but rearranging spent  fuel in the
pool during storage and providing emergency water spray systems  would
reduce the likelihood of a propagating fire even under severe  damage
conditions. The book suggests that additional studies are needed  to
better understand these risks. Although dry casks have advantages  over
cooling pools, pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power  plants
to store at least the recently discharged fuel. The book explains  it
would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel  to
construct a significant radiological dispersal device.

Congress  requested that the National Academies produce a classified
report that  addresses these charges within 6 months and also provide an
unclassified  summary for unlimited public distribution. The first
request was fulfilled  in July 2004. This report fulfills the second
request.

The  highlights of the report are as follows:

Spent fuel pools  are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants
to store recently  discharged fuel.

The committee judges that successful  terrorist attacks on spent fuel
pools, though difficult, are  possible.

If an attack leads to a propagating zirconium  cladding fire, it
could result in the release of large amounts of  radioactive material.

Additional analyses are needed to  understand more fully the
vulnerabilities and consequences of events that  could lead to
propagating zirconium cladding fires.

It  appears to be feasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium
cladding  fire by rearranging spent fuel assemblies in the pool and
making provision  for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the
fuel, even if the  pool or overlying building were severely damaged.

Dry  cask storage has inherent security advantages over spent fuel
pool storage,  but it can only be used to store older spent fuel

There  are no large security differences among different  storage-cask
designs.

It would be difficult for  terrorists to steal enough spent fuel from
storage facilities for use in  significant radiological dispersal devices
(dirty  bombs).

Cary
--
Cary.renquist at ezag.com
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