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radsafe-digest V1 #175
radsafe-digest Thursday, September 20 2001 Volume 01 : Number 175
In this issue:
Re: What can we do now??
RE: HVL's for radionuclides for Gypsum
Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Re: What can we do now??
Available RSO Position
Re: What can we do now??
Hijacked Plane Targeted Nuke Complex 29 years ago
D&D Work Hazard Assessment
Essay on Afganistan
Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Post incident assessment of radioactivity releases
Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Re: Post incident assessment of radioactivity releases
Blood Irradiation
NUREG-1608
RE: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Re: D&D Work Hazard Assessment
NUREG-1608 - Thanks
Environmentally important issues associated with electrical energ y production
Re: NUREG-1608
RE: NUREG-1608
alpha and beta efficiencies for plastic scintillators
RE: NUREG-1608
Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 09:30:16 -0600
From: "Tony Harrison" <laharris@SMTPGATE.DPHE.STATE.CO.US>
Subject: Re: What can we do now??
For many years, emergency planning around Rocky Flats used the crash of
a fully loaded 747 as the Maximum Credible Accident (MCA), resulting in
a modelled release of around 100 grams of WGPu. In the mid nineties,
while reviewing the assumptions & parameters used in the models,
Stapleton International Airport closed and Denver International Airport
opened, at a greater distance from the Site. The State of Colorado
agreed with DOE that the crash of a smaller aircraft from the local
airport was a reasonable MCA. In both MCA's, Site personnel stated
their belief that either fire could be extinguished in an hour or less.
The State didn't particularly believe this assumption, but let it slide
based on the low probability of occurrence.
Last Tuesday challenged those assumptions, to say the least. My
question for the RADSAFE community is this: Does anyone think that such
a fire, in a building full of drums & boxes of TRU, low level and mixed
wastes, some of it combustible in its own right, could be extinguished
in one hour? Does anyone have specific references to support their
opinion?
I don't want to paint a bullseye on Rocky Flats or be too tough on DOE.
To their credit, they and their contractors have moved a lot of waste
offsite, but much remains and will for the next few years. It's easy to
assume that nothing will happen between now and the Site's final
closure, but I'm not sure those of us who work on this issue can afford
that luxury.
Tony Harrison, MSPH
Colorado Dept. of Public Health & Environment
Laboratory and Radiation Services Division
(303)692-3046
tony.harrison@state.co.us
IS anyone else brainstorming where that might happen?
>Probably not. Guess we need it to happen before we take serious
>action.
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Sandy Perle
- ------------------
Are any radsafers working with governmental organizations (federal or
state)regarding planning for local terroist events?
Any other ideas?
Jim Nelson
nelsonjima@hotmail.com
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 13:13:35 -0400
From: "Jacobus, John (OD/ORS)" <jacobusj@ors.od.nih.gov>
Subject: RE: HVL's for radionuclides for Gypsum
Michael,
I have seen information on mammography and x-ray shielding, but not for
radionuclides. It can certainly be computed
- -- John
John Jacobus, MS
Certified Health Physicist
3050 Traymore Lane
Bowie, MD 20715-2024
E-mail: jenday1@email.msn.com (H)
- -----Original Message-----
From: Michael Kelly [mailto:mskell01@louisville.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2001 11:07 AM
To: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
Subject: HVL's for radionuclides for Gypsum
Has anyone seen anything in the literature about the number of HVL's that
Gypsum affords for the typical radionuclides used for imaging in Nuclear
Medicine? If so, could you please provide a reference.
. . .
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 12:06:57 -0600
From: "Fritz A. Seiler" <faseiler@NMIA.COM>
Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Joe Heckman wrote:
> For the purposes of transportation, materials with concentrations of less than
> 2 nCi/gram are not radioactive materials. --
Hi,
Strange, but I remember the reasons for and the act of setting the limit for
radioactive materials at 100 nCi per gram. I know that a lot of people want to
make it lower (so what else is new! The linear Mafia always wants it lower and
lower, down to the point of utter ridiculousness as far as the signal-to-noise
ratio is concerned!). So I usually stay away from that EPA, NRC, DOE, linear
Mafia nonsense. Well, here I go: When did that factor of 50 (2 Orders of
Magnitude!!) happen and how? And why did some people with a modicum of common
horse sense not raise hell?
Best regards
Fritz
" The American Republic will endure until the day Congress
discovers that it can bribe the Public with the Public's money."
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America
***************************
Fritz A. Seiler, Ph.D.
Sigma Five Consulting
P.O. Box 1709
Los Lunas, NM 87031, USA
Tel. 505-866-5193
Fax. 505-866-5197
e-mail: faseiler@nmia.com
***************************
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 13:00:59 -0500
From: "Michael Stabin" <michael.g.stabin@vanderbilt.edu>
Subject: Re: What can we do now??
May I remind everyone on this list that we read e-mail, they do, too. Keep
in mind that anything you post to this list is seen by ~2000 members
worldwide and may be forwarded to anyone else with e-mail capabilities, or
even printed and distributed. Please be circumspect in discussing
vulnerabilities, scenarios, etc.
Michael G. Stabin, PhD, CHP
Assistant Professor of Radiology and Radiological Sciences
Department of Radiology and Radiological Sciences
Vanderbilt University
1161 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37232-2675
Phone (615) 322-3190
Fax (615) 322-3764
e-mail michael.g.stabin@vanderbilt.edu
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 11:15:08 -0700
From: Stuart Rosenberg <stuart@SCRIPPS.EDU>
Subject: Available RSO Position
- --=====================_59254486==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The Scripps Research Institute, the nation's largest, private, non-profit
biomedical research facility, is actively recruiting a Manager of Radiation
Safety and Hazardous Waste. The selected candidate will serve as the
institution's Radiation Safety Officer and will be responsible for
overseeing a broad-scope radioactive materials license covering our
research activities. The radiation safety program encompasses
approximately 350 laboratories, in excess of one million square feet of
laboratory space, 1200 radioactive materials users, and a GCRC. The RSO is
responsible for the development and implementation of all health physics
programs (both ionizing and nonionizing) inclusive but not limited to
education, internal and external dosimetry, contamination control, laser
safety, regulatory interface, etc. The selected individual will also have
responsibility for overseeing the institution's chemical waste management
program.
This is a key management position, candidates should have an advanced
degree in Health Physics or a directly related field, five years of
professional health physics experience, certification by the American Board
of Health Physics, experience working in an academic/research facility as
well as supervisory experience. The ideal candidate will have excellent
managerial and interpersonal skills and will have a focus towards customer
service and satisfaction.
A competitive salary, an outstanding flexible benefit program, on-site
child care, a stable and challenging work environment, coupled with what
many consider to be the BEST weather in the world is offered. TSRI values
and supports diversity in its workforce/EOE/M/F/D/V. To learn more about
The Scripps Research Institute please visit our website at
http://www.scripps.edu
Interested and qualified candidates are encouraged to submit their resumes to:
The Scripps Research Institute
Attn: Human Resources
TPC-16
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
La Jolla, CA 92037
or via fax (858) 784-8071
or via email resumes@scripps.edu
If you are interested in discussing this position prior to submitting your
resume, please feel free to contact Stuart Rosenberg, Director,
Environmental Health and Safety at (858)784-8240 or by email
(stuart@scripps.edu)
Stuart D. Rosenberg
The Scripps Research Institute
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone (858)784-8240
Fax (858)784-8490
email stuart@scripps.edu
- --=====================_59254486==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
<html>
The Scripps Research Institute, the nation's largest, private, non-profit
biomedical research facility, is actively recruiting a Manager of
Radiation Safety and Hazardous Waste. The selected candidate will
serve as the institution's Radiation Safety Officer and will be
responsible for overseeing a broad-scope radioactive materials
license covering our research activities. The radiation safety
program encompasses approximately 350 laboratories, in excess of one
million square feet of laboratory space, 1200 radioactive materials
users, and a GCRC. The RSO is responsible for the development and
implementation of all health physics programs (both ionizing and
nonionizing) inclusive but not limited to education, internal and
external dosimetry, contamination control, laser safety, regulatory
interface, etc. The selected individual will also have
responsibility for overseeing the institution's chemical waste management
program. <br>
<br>
This is a key management position, candidates should have an advanced
degree in Health Physics or a directly related field, five years of
professional health physics experience, certification by the American
Board of Health Physics, experience working in an academic/research
facility as well as supervisory experience. The ideal candidate
will have excellent managerial and interpersonal skills and will have a
focus towards customer service and satisfaction. <br>
<br>
A competitive salary, an outstanding flexible benefit program, on-site
child care, a stable and challenging work environment, coupled with what
many consider to be the BEST weather in the world is offered. TSRI
values and supports diversity in its workforce/EOE/M/F/D/V. To learn more
about The Scripps Research Institute please visit our website at
<a href="http://www.scripps.edu/"; eudora="autourl"><font color="#0000FF"><u>http://www.scripps.edu</a></u></font>
<br>
<br>
Interested and qualified candidates are encouraged to submit their resumes to:<br>
The Scripps Research Institute <br>
Attn: Human Resources <br>
TPC-16 <br>
10550 North Torrey Pines Road <br>
La Jolla, CA 92037<br>
or via fax (858) 784-8071 <br>
or via email resumes@scripps.edu<br>
<br>
If you are interested in discussing this position prior to submitting your resume, please feel free to contact Stuart Rosenberg, Director, <br>
Environmental Health and Safety at (858)784-8240 or by email (stuart@scripps.edu)<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep>
Stuart D. Rosenberg<br>
The Scripps Research Institute<br>
10550 North Torrey Pines Road<br>
Mail Code BCC 078<br>
La Jolla, CA 92037<br>
<br>
Phone (858)784-8240<br>
Fax (858)784-8490<br>
email stuart@scripps.edu<br>
</html>
- --=====================_59254486==_.ALT--
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 12:48:02 -0600
From: "Fritz A. Seiler" <faseiler@NMIA.COM>
Subject: Re: What can we do now??
Hi All,
I think we really should do some comparative risk assessment. I remember a
wide-ranging discussion like that in Switzerland a long time ago: a 747 bound
for the US - and thus full of fuel - crashes into the NPP Goesgen about 30
miles from Zuerich-Kloten airport. The four engines penetrate the containment
but the rest of the plane does not. A fuel fire starts inside and outside the
containment, but an automatic or manual scram should be successful because the
fire takes its own good time to heat the inside of the containment and cause a
total failure of the automatic or manual scram. Thus we had a hard time
conjuring up a big release and putting some people outside the power plant at
risk. But I agree with Ted, the big fear is an acute outbreak of radiophobia.
Best regards,
Fritz
Ted Rockwell wrote:
> > I think we are kidding ourselves if we say it can't happen.
>
- --
" The American Republic will endure until the day Congress
discovers that it can bribe the Public with the Public's money."
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America
***************************
Fritz A. Seiler, Ph.D.
Sigma Five Consulting
P.O. Box 1709
Los Lunas, NM 87031, USA
Tel. 505-866-5193
Fax. 505-866-5197
e-mail: faseiler@nmia.com
***************************
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------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 10:27:20 -0500
From: "Sandy Perle" <sandyfl@EARTHLINK.NET>
Subject: Hijacked Plane Targeted Nuke Complex 29 years ago
Index:
Hijacked Plane Targeted Nuke Complex 29 years ago
Pentagon recommends use of nuclear weapons in retaliation
Romanian nuke plant resumes output after stoppage
US senator queries General Dynamics' Newport bid
Lithuania says EU talks hinge on power station
Proxima Therapeutics' Radiation Therapy System for Brain tumors
IAEA opens, expected to adopt resolution to inspect N. Korea
U.S. calls for more vigilance on nuclear exports
Swedish Medical Center Adds High-Tech Heart Scanner
Lymphoma treatments expected to broaden
======================================
Hijacked Plane Targeted Nuke Complex 29 years ago
OAK RIDGE, Tenn. (AP) - Twenty-nine years ago, hijackers took over an
airliner with 27 passengers and four crew aboard and threatened to
crash into the government's nuclear weapons production complex in Oak
Ridge.
``They let us know that if we didn't have the money by X hour then we
were going to dive into Oak Ridge,'' co-pilot Harold Johnson recalled
in an interview last week from his Memphis home. ``And there was no
doubt in my mind that we would have done just that.''
Johnson would be threatened with his life and shot in the arm before
the 32-hour ordeal finally ended Nov. 12, 1972, in Havana.
Airline hijackings to Cuba were common in those days. The
commandeering of the Southern Airways DC9 with its '70ish smiley face
on the nose was one of about 30 hijackings that year.
But this was one of the few times in American aviation history -
before last week's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon - in which hijackers threatened to use an airplane as a
weapon.
Johnson, who retired in 1983, said domestic security measures were
increased after his flight. But he said the government didn't go far
enough.
``For a long, long time, it was something that I thought could happen
someday, but had just hoped and prayed that it never would,'' he
said.
Unlike the recent hijackers, the three Americans who took control of
Johnson's Memphis-to-Miami-flight had little training and virtually
no plan. They did have guns, a hand grenade and a grudge against
Detroit, where two of them had been charged with rape.
Hijacker Melvin Cale grew up in nearby Knoxville and worked in Oak
Ridge before moving to Detroit with his half brother Louis Moore,
another hijacker. Henry Jackson of Detroit completed the trio.
They commandeered the plane about 10 minutes after a stopover in
Birmingham, Ala., crashing through the cockpit door with an arm
around a flight attendant's throat and a gun to her head.
They wanted a $10 million ransom, 10 parachutes and 10 bulletproof
vests. The plane eventually reached Knoxville and began circling Oak
Ridge, site of the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant and their specific
target - a nuclear research reactor at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.
``It was surreal in a sense,'' said Jim Alexander, a former
government spokesman at Oak Ridge. ``We would look up in the sky and
see this jet airliner circling. It was high, but it never left.''
In his book, ``Odyssey of Terror,'' the plane's captain, William
Haas, wrote that the hijackers became enraged when their demands
received a lukewarm response. They forced Haas to begin a steep
descent on Oak Ridge, pulling out only when the airline said it would
comply.
Johnson, however, said the plane never got below 8,000 to 10,000 feet
and that was only so the hijackers could identify Oak Ridge.
The airline finally came up with $2 million for the hijackers, who
then forced the pilots to fly to Havana. They shot Johnson in the arm
during a shootout with FBI agents when the plane stopped to refuel in
Orlando, Fla.
The hijackers were arrested in Cuba and imprisoned for eight years.
The trio returned in 1980 to Birmingham, where they were sentenced to
20- to 25-year terms.
Haas retired in 1988 and died earlier this year. His widow said he
never would have crashed the DC9 into Oak Ridge.
``There is not a pilot in the United States that flies commercially
that would do anything like that,'' Ann Haas said. ``He might make
the hijackers think that was what he was going to do, but never,
never would they use it as a target.''
- -----------------
Pentagon recommends use of nuclear weapons in retaliation
WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (Kyodo) - The Defense Department has recommended
to President George W. Bush the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a
military option to retaliate for last week's terrorist attacks in the
United States, diplomatic sources said Tuesday.
It is unknown whether Bush has made any decision. But military
analysts said the president is unlikely to opt for the use of nuclear
weapons because doing so would generate rebuke from the international
community and could even trigger revenge from the enemy involving
weapons of mass destruction.
But the Pentagon's suggestion shows the determination of U.S.
officials to retaliate for the first massive terrorist attacks on the
U.S. mainland, the analysts said.
The recommendation appears intended to deter terrorists, they said.
On ABC television's THIS WEEK program Sunday, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld refused to rule out the use of tactical nuclear
weapons. He avoided clearly answering a simple question on whether
their use can be ruled out. To a similar question, a Pentagon
official also replied, ''We will not discuss operational and
intelligence matters.''
According to the diplomatic sources, the Pentagon recommended using
tactical nuclear weapons shortly after it became known that an
unprecedented number of civilian casualties resulted from the
terrorist attacks.
On Sept. 11, hijackers seized four commercial U.S. aircraft. Two of
the planes slammed into the twin towers of New York's World Trade
Center, while a third hit the Pentagon near Washington. The fourth
plane crashed outside Pittsburgh. More than 5,000 people were left
dead or missing in the attacks.
Tactical nuclear weapons have been developed to attack very specific
targets. The military analysts said Pentagon officials are apparently
thinking of using weapons that can reach and destroy terrorists
hiding in an underground shelter, limiting damage to non-targets.
In 1986, the U.S. conducted an air raid on Libya, attempting to
target Col. Muammar Qaddafi. In 1998, Washington fired a cruise
missile into Afghanistan in an attempt to kill Osama bin Laden, whom
the U.S. sees as behind last week's terrorist attacks.
The analysts said that since these attempts failed, it may be assumed
that U.S. officials are mulling the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
which can cause much greater destruction.
Declassified official documents show that since the mid-1990s, the
U.S. has indicated that it does not rule out the use of nuclear
weapons if a country attacks the U.S., its allies, or its forces with
chemical or biological weapons.
- -------------------
Romanian nuke plant resumes output after stoppage
BUCHAREST, Sept 19 (Reuters) - Romania's sole nuclear reactor, in
Cernavoda on the River Danube, resumed activity late on Tuesday after
it was shut down earlier this week due to a water cooling system
glitch, officials said on Wednesday.
"The plant was re-connected to the national grid late on Tuesday," a
company official said by telephone. "The glitch was resolved, with
the plant working now at about 80 percent of its capacity and likely
to reach full capacity on Thursday."
On Tuesday officials said the glitch, which posed no nuclear risks,
occured as waste from Danube waters had entered into the nuke's
cooling system.
The 750-megawatt plant already underwent the annual check and
maintenance works for this year. Cernavoda accounts for about 10
percent of Romania's total power generation.
- ------------------
US senator queries General Dynamics' Newport bid
WASHINGTON, Sept 18 (Reuters) - The senior U.S. senator from
Mississippi questioned the cost-savings predicted by General Dynamics
Corp. <GD.N> in its $2.1 billion cash offer for warship builder
Newport News Shipbuilding Inc. <NNS.N> in a letter to U.S. defense
officials made public Tuesday.
Sen. Thad Cochran, a Republican, said it seemed "illogical" that the
Pentagon would support General Dynamics' bid since it would "create a
monopoly in both nuclear and conventional shipbuilding," while a
hostile bid for Newport by Northrop Grumman Corp. <NOC.N> would not.
Los Angeles-based Northrop, which has a large shipyard in
Mississippi, in May launched a hostile takeover bid for Newport News,
which makes nuclear-fueled aircraft carriers.
Citing reports that the Pentagon was favorably inclined toward
General Dynamics' bid, Cochran asked U.S. Defense Undersecretary Pete
Aldridge to explain what assurances General Dynamics had given that
the Newport News merger could generate the projected $2 billion in
savings over a 10-year period.
"It would be an abdication of responsiblity to base approval of a
monopoly on projected savings which cannot be credibly expected and
verified," Cochran said in a letter to Aldridge that was dated
Monday.
Cochran said closing shipyards and mass layoffs were "not acceptable
methods of achieving cost savings under antitrust guidelines, and if
permitted, would only further damage our nation's shipbuilding
capability."
He said other potential cost-saving measures, such as moving nuclear
warship repairs or submarine production to other cities, would be
difficult to implement because of political and economic realities.
Cochran urged the Pentagon to address these concerns, noting that the
General Dynamics-Newport merger -- if approved -- would create "an
irreversible monopoly and have significant impacts on the long-term
competitiveness of U.S. naval shipbuilding."
The Wall Street Journal last month reported that an internal Pentagon
review had found a General Dynamics-Newport merger could save the
U.S. Navy $3 billion to $4 billion over the next 10 years.
It said Pentagon officials had made a preliminary evaluation that
such savings outweighed concerns about loss of competition between
the Navy's only two submarine builders.
Pentagon officials have been tight-lipped about the merger and have
not confirmed the Journal report.
General Dynamics on Monday extended its offer for Newport through
Sept. 21 from its earlier expiration date of Sept. 14.
Falls Church, Virginia-based General Dynamics said around 15.9
million shares of Newport News had been tendered and not withdrawn as
of the close of business Friday, down from 22.5 million as of the
prior expiration date on Aug. 31. It attributed the drop to
disruptions in the financial markets caused by the Sept. 11 air
attacks on the U.S.
- -------------------
Lithuania says EU talks hinge on power station
VILNIUS, Sept 18 (Reuters) - Lithuania's prime minister said on
Tuesday the country's Chernobyl-style nuclear plant was a key
stumbling block to its goal of joining the European Union in 2004.
But Algirdas Brazauskas told reporters EU Enlargement Commissioner
Guenter Verheugen had given accession work in other areas a positive
assessment.
"No doubt the conclusion of EU membership negotiations is related to
Lithuania's commitment to close the Ignalina nuclear power plant...
We'll have to do that by the end of this year," Brazauskas said after
meeting Verheugen.
"I was also pleased to hear that it's absolutely realistic that
Lithuania could become an EU member in 2004," he said.
Under EU pressure, Lithuania agreed to close the first of Ignalina's
two reactors before 2005 but Brussels has made clear the timing of
the second reactor's closure must be set before entry talks can be
completed.
Lithuania wants the EU to help fund closing the plant.
"We were pleased today to hear, probably for the first time, that the
closure of both blocks of Lithuania's reactor is not only Lithuania's
problem, but a problem of the whole European Union," Brazauskas said.
The EU considers Ignalina a danger because it was built to the same
design as Ukraine's Chernobyl -- site of the world's worst civilian
nuclear disaster in 1986 -- but its closure is sensitive since it
provides most of Lithuania's electricity.
- ------------------
Proxima Therapeutics' GliaSite(R) Radiation Therapy System for Brain
Tumors Receives Certificate for Inclusion in U.S. NRC Sealed Source
and Device Registry
ALPHARETTA, Ga., Sept. 18 /PRNewswire/ -- Proxima Therapeutics, Inc.,
a privately held developer and maker of accelerated cancer treatments
using internal radiation therapy, announced today that the State of
Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has issued a sealed
source and device registration certificate for the company's GliaSite
RTS internal radiation treatment for brain tumors. Proxima received
U.S. Food & Drug Administration clearance for the GliaSite device
earlier this year.
"Because the GliaSite treatment incorporates a proprietary radiation
source, many treatment centers must amend their nuclear materials
license in order to use the product," said James Stubbs, Ph.D., vice
president, scientific affairs. "This certificate is an important
step for Proxima that clears the way for broader distribution of the
GliaSite to hospitals throughout the United States."
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Sealed Source and Device
Registry contains the results of safety evaluations performed by the
NRC and state agencies responsible for radiation safety and
radioactive material licensing. The certificate issued for the
GliaSite is based on a safety evaluation performed by the State of
Georgia DNR.
The GliaSite RTS delivers site-specific, internal radiation, treating
the target area while minimizing exposure to healthy tissue. The
device is a balloon catheter that is inserted into the cavity created
by surgical removal of the malignant brain tumor and filled with
Iotrex(TM), a proprietary liquid radiation source. Over a course of
three to seven days, GliaSite delivers radiation directly to the
tissue surrounding the cavity, where the tumors are most likely to
recur.
GliaSite is currently available at many cancer centers throughout the
country, including Wake Forest University, Johns Hopkins University,
Medical College of Virginia, Emory University, Stanford University,
University of Pennsylvania and University of Iowa.
Based in Alpharetta, Ga., Proxima Therapeutics, Inc. is a privately
held medical device company established in 1995 to develop site-
specific cancer treatment systems for breast and brain tumors.
Products include GliaSite(R) RTS for brain cancer, which was recently
cleared for marketing by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and
MammoSite(TM) RTS for early-stage breast cancer, which is awaiting
FDA clearance. Additional information is available on the company's
web site at www.proximatherapeutics.com .
- ------------------
IAEA opens, expected to adopt resolution to inspect N. Korea
VIENNA, Sept. 17 (Kyodo) - The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) opened its annual conference on Monday, with IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei requesting that North Korea cooperate with
on-site inspections of nuclear facilities.
ElBaradei made the request in an opening speech before government
representatives of 132 member states.
In a message to the IAEA, U.S. President George W. Bush urged the
agency to step up the control of all nuclear materials and ensure
that they would not end up in the hands of terrorists.
ElBaradei said the IAEA is continuing to monitor the freeze on
facilities in North Korea under a 1994 agreement between the United
States and North Korea, but that the agency is unable to verify the
accuracy of North Korea's nuclear program.
The IAEA conference, slated to run through Friday, is expected to
adopt a resolution urging North Korea to accept the inspection.
Koji Omi, Japan's state minister on science and technology policy,
also urged in a speech that North Korea cooperate in the inspection
and to mend ties with the IAEA.
''From the perspective of security in Northeast Asia, the agency's
role in the context of suspended nuclear weapons development by North
Korea is a grave one,'' he said.
''I urge North Korea to improve its relationship with the agency and
to comply with its obligation under the safeguard agreement promptly
and completely,'' Omi said.
Under the 1994 agreement, North Korea is supposed to be subjected to
an inspection before the main body of the first of two light-water
reactors to be built by a U.S.-led international consortium is put in
place.
North Korea has refused an inspection, claiming that there has been
no progress on the building of the light-water reactor and that the
country has incurred economic losses.
The IAEA conference will also examine a variety of matters, including
measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear,
radiation, transport and waste safety.
It will also examine strengthening the effectiveness and improving
the efficiency of the safeguards system, and measures to improve the
security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials, among
other issues.
At the opening of the conference, participants offered a silence
prayer to honor the victims of Tuesday's terrorist attacks in the
U.S.
Earlier Monday, IAEA spokesman David Kyd told a news conference that
if terrorists used commercial jetliners to attack nuclear power
plants in Europe, the damage could have been devastating.
Kyd said nuclear power plants could survive an accidental crash of a
commercial jetliner or a military aircraft but an airborne terrorist
attack such as what took place in New York and Washington last
Tuesday had not been anticipated.
The main body of a reactor may not explode, however, a groundwater
explosion could occur if cooling devises inside are damaged, he
added.
Kyd said it may be difficult for terrorists to attack from the air as
such nuclear power plants are small, compared with the World Trade
Center which were struck and demolished by two hijacked airplanes
Tuesday. The Pentagon was struck by a third airplane in a similar
attack.
- -----------------
U.S. calls for more vigilance on nuclear exports
VIENNA, Austria (Reuters) - U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham
called Monday for tougher controls on the export of nuclear materials
to keep them out of the hands of criminals.
Speaking at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna,
he said the 132 member countries of the world's nuclear watchdog
should not shrink from their responsibility to protect the world from
"nuclear terror."
"We cannot assume that tomorrow's terrorist acts will mirror those we
have just experienced," Abraham said, referring to last week's
attacks in New York and Washington in which more than 5,000 people
are dead or missing.
"This is why the work of the IAEA is so pivotal...We know our
security, and that of nations around the world, largely depend upon
what this agency does to prevent the proliferation and the misuse of
nuclear materials."
Abraham added: "The terrible events of last week demonstrate in the
clearest possible fashion the importance of maintaining the highest
levels of security over nuclear materials."
Existing commitments on the physical protection of nuclear materials
needed to be strengthened, "particularly those that can be converted
to weapons use," he said.
"We will work with others but we expect others to act responsibly as
well," he said. "We expect the members of this body to prohibit
nuclear exports in cases where there is a significant risk of
diversion."
- -------------------
Swedish Medical Center Adds High-Tech Heart Scanner - New EBT System
Sees Coronary Artery Disease Before it Turns Deadly; Can Save Many
Lives
SEATTLE, Sept. 19 /PRNewswire/ -- Washington state's only Electron
Beam Tomography (EBT) scanner made its debut at Swedish Medical
Center's Providence Campus on July 9, 2001. This advanced system
quickly and painlessly detects coronary calcium buildup, a highly
reliable predictor of serious heart trouble.
"EBT lets us clearly see coronary artery disease, also known as
atherosclerosis, at its earliest and most treatable stages," said
Gary Oppenheim, M.D., an interventional cardiologist affiliated with
the Swedish Heart Institute. "The earlier we find a problem, the more
a person can do to avoid a possibly fatal heart attack or sudden
cardiac arrest."
Despite many recent medical advances, coronary heart disease is still
the nation's leading cause of death by far -- and it is an equal-
opportunity killer. This year, an estimated 1.1 million Americans
will have a new (650,000) or recurrent (450,000) coronary attack. And
more than 40 percent of them will die of it.
"Nearly 50 percent of men and women will die from coronary artery
disease (CAD), often without warning, and often without abnormal
stress-test findings. EBT scanning -- the gold standard for detecting
the presence of CAD -- can do so decades before the development of
symptoms," said Dr. Oppenheim, medical director of the new EBT
Program.
Initially, the equipment will be devoted exclusively to heart scans,
followed by lung-cancer screenings at a later date. In the future,
the EBT system may be used for detecting colon cancer, osteoporosis
and many other serious medical conditions. It is also capable of
performing noninvasive angiograms to reveal blood-vessel blockages.
The system Swedish selected was developed by Imatron Inc. of South
San Francisco, Calif.
Cost to the patient of an EBT cardiac scan is $550. Dr. Oppenheim
pointed out that this is significantly less than the typical cost for
other heart-screening tests such as a stress echocardiogram or
thallium scan, both of which pick up problems much later in the
disease's progression.
Who Should be Scanned?
Early diagnosis of heart disease is critical, but patients without
symptoms or multiple risk factors rarely recognize that. And, in
fact, many physicians wait until a person experiences the common
symptoms of chest pain and shortness of breath before beginning
treatment. By then, it may be too late to avoid a difficult and
expensive major medical procedure.
The Swedish Heart Institute considers an EBT scan appropriate for men
age 40 to 70 and women age 45 to 75 -- even those who are apparently
healthy -- especially if they have at least one of the following risk
factors:
- -- high cholesterol
- -- family history of early coronary disease
- -- diabetes
- -- high blood pressure
- -- history of smoking
- -- sedentary lifestyle
- -- obesity
Conventional risk factors, though, explain only about half of all
cardiac events. Fortunately, many in the baby boom generation are
taking direct, personal responsibility for their own health in an all-
out effort to "stay normal" as long as possible. And research has
shown that an EBT scan is an ideal early warning system for cardiac
problems.
"When you see an actual picture of coronary disease in your own
heart, the message to change finally gets through," said primary-care
physician Craig Wright, M.D., medical director of Swedish-affiliated
Providence Medical Group.
Based on experience at the Mayo Clinic, approximately 41 percent of
people with no symptoms of heart disease who are scanned have
moderate to high calcium scores and require further attention.
After a scan, Swedish Heart Institute clinicians connect with the
patient's primary-care physician to help make tailored care
recommendations. For those with moderate to high calcification, next
steps may include lifestyle changes such as smoking cessation, weight
loss, stress reduction, education, increased exercise and/or use of
cholesterol-lowering medications. All patients who are scanned
receive information about the array of such services -- including
cardiac rehabilitation and prevention programs -- which the Swedish
Heart Institute provides through its Center for Cardiac Health and
Wellness. People with normal scans, though, can usually be spared the
risk and expense of further diagnostic procedures and potentially
invasive studies.
"The bottom line is that EBT is helping change the course of people's
lives by giving them the opportunity to combat heart disease before
it strikes or progresses silently," said Sarah Speck, M.D.,
cardiologist and director of the Swedish Heart Institute Center for
Cardiac Health and Wellness.
How EBT Works
The EBT scanner is a diagnostic X-ray system that produces two- and
three-dimensional images of internal human anatomy. It generates a
powerful electron beam that is focused on one of four tungsten target
rings positioned beneath the patient.
The procedure is very simple for everyone involved and completely
noninvasive. A technologist applies a few electrocardiogram (EKG)
leads and the patient lies down and passes through the scanner.
Radiation exposure is minimal -- comparable to a traditional
abdominal X-ray -- and no intravenous injection of contrast dye is
required.
"We can get 40 clear images of a moving heart during one breath hold,
and the person doesn't even need to remove his or her shirt," said
Dr. Oppenheim. "The whole process takes less than five minutes."
The speed of EBT imaging is what really sets it apart from earlier
cardiac scanning technology. Images are captured in milliseconds,
resulting in amazing clarity and greater accuracy of diagnosis.
Other early adopters of EBT include the Mayo Clinic, Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center, UCLA Medical Center, Stanford University, Ohio Heart,
Beijing (China) Hospital and the Cardiology Research Centre in
Moscow, Russia.
- -----------------
Lymphoma treatments expected to broaden
LOS ANGELES, Sept 13 (Reuters) - Options for treating lymphoma, a
cancer of the immune system, look likely to broaden after Tuesday's
support by a U.S. regulatory panel of Zevalin, an experimental drug
that targets radiation to tumors.
But makers of a potential rival drug called Bexxar said Zevalin,
developed by San Diego-based Idec Pharmaceuticals Corp. <IDPH.O>,
infringes their patents for using antibody-based drugs to deliver
radiation to cancer cells.
"I don't see it affecting the launch. In the worst-case scenario,
Idec would have to pay a royalty," said Carol Werther, an analyst at
Adams, Harkness & Hill.
A Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory panel backed immediate
approval for Zevalin to treat patients with low-grade non-Hodgkins
lymphoma that has become resistant to Rituxan, a biotech drug Idec co-
markets with Genentech Inc. <DNA.N>.
The advisers then recommended the FDA set up an accelerated approval
process, involving more trials, to gauge the benefit of Zevalin in
those who have not yet tried Rituxan.
Werther, who estimates Zevalin sales of $50 million next year, said
the experimental drug is likely to cannibalize "only a portion" of
Rituxan sales.
Difficulties surrounding treatment with Zevalin include the fact that
it can be administered only at facilities approved for radioactive
products and it is not yet known if patients can be treated with the
drug more than once.
"Ultimately, it could take 20 percent of the market," Werther said.
Analysts estimate U.S. sales of Rituxan at around $750 million this
year and more than $1 billion by 2003.
The FDA, which usually follows the advice of its advisory panels, is
due to complete its review of Zevalin by Jan. 8.
If approved, Zevalin would become the first treatment to use
"radioimmunotherapy" to kill tumors. The drug looks for certain
chemicals on cancer cells. When it finds them, it attaches to the
cells and delivers a dose of lethal radiation.
Zevalin's risks include a possible reduction of infection-fighting
white blood cells.
But in one trial, 51 percent of patients who had stopped responding
to Rituxan benefited from a single dose of Zevalin.
By sending radiation throughout the body intravenously, the treatment
could seek and kill several tumor sites at once. External radiation,
which requires focusing on one tumor at a time, can also can damage
healthy cells, explained Idec Chief Executive William Rastetter.
IDEC SUED FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Idec filed this week for a declaratory judgment that Zevalin does not
infringe patents held by competitors Seattle-based Corixa Corp.
<CRXA.O> and Britain's GlaxoSmithKline Plc <GSK.L>. The two
companies, which are developing a similar lymphoma drug called
Bexxar, on Wednesday sued Idec for patent infringement. Officials at
Idec could not be reached for comment on the lawsuit.
Final application materials for Bexxar were submitted to the FDA
earlier this month, but the drug has not yet been scheduled for
review by the agency.
Both Zevalin and Bexxar have been given "orphan" status by the FDA,
meaning each will have a period of market exclusivity if approved.
Lymphoma is the term for cancers that develop in the lymphatic
system, a network of thin tubes that carry infection-fighting cells.
Lymphomas other than Hodgkin's disease are grouped together, making
up some 5 percent of U.S. cancer cases.
"Non-Hodgkin's lymphomas are a growing problem -- one of the few
types of cancers that are increasing in incidence," said Dr. Michael
Williams, professor of medicine and pathology in hematology/oncology
at the University of Virginia. High-risk groups include organ
transplant recipients and people with suppressed immune systems, such
as those infected with HIV.
Lymphomas are treated with radiation, chemotherapy, a combination of
both, and more recently with Rituxan, considered a "biological"
therapy. Patients in advanced stages of the disease may undergo bone
marrow or stem-cell transplantation.
Rituxan, introduced in 1997, is a monoclonal antibody, a class of
substances that recognize and bind to a protein on the surface of a
cell. After binding to the targeted site, the antibody can block the
growth of the tumor, recruit the body's immune system to attack the
target and make a cancer cell more susceptible to chemotherapy.
"Biological therapies are more targeted than other therapies,"
Williams said.
Williams said the hope is that targeted radiation therapies like
Zevalin will result in better response rates in patients, but the
drug can cause problems with white blood cell counts.
"I think the majority of patients will be treated unlabeled (not
radioactive) antibodies first," the oncologist said, citing safety
concerns.
Rituxan has few side effects and has positive results in nearly half
of patients using it. But, within an average of 10 to 12 months, the
disease advances.
"It is too early to say yet whether Rituxan has has had an impact yet
on survival rates," Williams said.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sandy Perle Tel:(714) 545-0100 / (800) 548-5100
Director, Technical Extension 2306
ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Service Fax:(714) 668-3149
ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. E-Mail: sandyfl@earthlink.net
ICN Plaza, 3300 Hyland Avenue E-Mail: sperle@icnpharm.com
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Personal Website: http://sandyfl.nukeworker.net
ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Website: http://www.dosimetry.com
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Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 15:05:50 -0400
From: "Dave Biela" <BielaD@wvnsco.com>
Subject: D&D Work Hazard Assessment
Does anyone out there doing D&D work, have formal guidance (Check list, procedure etc) on how they do an initial hazard analysis of a job/area that they are going to begin work on?
When beginning work in an area, what do you use to determine all the hazard data (chemical, radiological, industrial etc) that is available and all that will be needed so that surprises are limited during the work.
Would greatly appreciate any assistance.
Dave Biela
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Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 15:31:27 -0400
From: William Stephany <wps3@po.cwru.edu>
Subject: Essay on Afganistan
I feel this essay I received as an email today is worth sharing on the
listserver since the topic of the WTC attack still commands our attention.
So... here it is. A sobering essay forwarded by a UC Berkeley professor.
The author, Tamim Ansary, is an Afghani-American writer. This is his take on
Afghanistan and the whole mess we are in. ----
I've been hearing a lot of talk about "bombing Afghanistan back to the
Stone Age." This would mean killing innocent people, people who had nothing
to do with this atrocity, but "we're at war, we have to accept collateral
damage. What else can we do?"
Minutes later I heard some TV pundit discussing whether we "have the belly
to do what must be done." And I thought about the issues being raised
especially hard because I am from Afghanistan, and even though I've lived
here for 35 years I've never lost track of what's going on there. So I want
to tell anyone who will listen how it all looks from where I'm standing.
I speak as one who hates the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. There is no doubt
in my mind that these people were responsible for the atrocity in New York.
I agree that something must be done about those monsters. But the Taliban
and Bin Laden are not Afghanistan. They're not even the government of
Afghanistan. The Taliban are a cult of ignorant psychotics who took over
Afghanistan in 1997. Bin Laden is a political criminal with a plan. When
you think Taliban, think Nazis. When you think Bin Laden, think Hitler. And
when you think "the people of Afghanistan" think "the Jews in the
concentration camps."
It's not only that the Afghan people had nothing to do with this atrocity.
They were the first victims of the perpetrators. They would exult if
someone would come in there, take out the Taliban and clear out the
rats nest of international thugs holed up in their country. Some say, why
don't the Afghans rise up and overthrow the Taliban? The answer is, they're
starved, exhausted, hurt, incapacitated, suffering. A few years ago, the
United Nations estimated that there are 500,000 disabled orphans in
Afghanistan-a country with no economy, no food. There are millions of
widows. And the Taliban has been burying these widows alive in mass graves.
The soil is littered with land mines, the farms were all destroyed by the
Soviets. These are a few of the reasons why the Afghan people have not
overthrown the Taliban. We come now to the question of bombing Afghanistan
back to the Stone Age. Trouble is, that's been done. The Soviets took care
of it already. Make the Afghans suffer? They're already suffering. Level
their houses? Done. Turn their schools into piles of rubble? Done.
Eradicate their hospitals? Done. Destroy their infrastructure? Cut them
off from medicine and health care? Too late. Someone already did all that.
New bombs would only stir the rubble of earlier bombs.
Would they at least get the Taliban? Not likely. In today's Afghanistan,
only the Taliban eat, only they have the means to move around. They'd slip
away and hide. Maybe the bombs would get some of those disabled orphans,
they don't move too fast, they don't even have wheelchairs. But flying over
Kabul and dropping bombs wouldn't really be a strike against the criminals
who did this horrific thing. Actually it would only be making common cause
with the Taliban-by raping once again the people they've been raping all
this time.
So what else is there? What can be done, then? Let me now speak with true
fear and trembling. The only way to get Bin Laden is to go in there with
ground troops. When people speak of "having the belly to do what needs to
be done" they're thinking in terms of having the belly to kill as many as
needed. Having the belly to overcome any moral qualms about killing
innocent people.
Let's pull our heads out of the sand. What's actually on the table is
Americans dying. And not just because some Americans would die fighting
their way through Afghanistan to Bin Laden's hideout. It's much bigger than
that folks. Because to get any troops to Afghanistan, we'd have to go
through Pakistan. Would they let us? Not likely. The conquest of Pakistan
would have to be first. Will other Muslim nations just stand by? You see
where I'm going.
We're flirting with a world war between Islam and the West. And guess
what: that's Bin Laden's program. That's exactly what he wants. That's why
he did this. Read his speeches and statements. It's all right there. He
really believes Islam would beat the west. It might seem ridiculous, but he
figures if he can polarize the world into Islam and the West, he's got a
billion soldiers. If the West wreaks a holocaust in those lands, that's a
billion people with nothing left to lose, that's even better from Bin
Laden's point of view. He's probably wrong, in the end the west would win,
whatever that would mean, but the war would last for years and millions
would die, not just theirs but ours. Who has the belly for that? Bin Laden
does. Anyone else?
Bill Stephany, Ph. D., CHP
Assistant Director, D.O.E.S.
Case Western Reserve University
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Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 16:56:11 -0400
From: Susan Gawarecki <loc@ICX.NET>
Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Jerry,
I would like to have a copy of this report, if possible (or at least the
reference and executive summary). It sounds as if it would be relevant
to the current scoping effort for the programmatic EIS on the
disposition of scrap metals, the deadline for which has been extended to
Nov. 9.
Regards,
Susan Gawarecki
Jerry Cohen wrote:
> Interesting! Several years ago, I did a report for the DOE that included a
> recommendation
> to the effect that any material <1.0 nci/g could be considered de minimis,
> i.e. essentially non-radioactive, regardless of the radionuclide(s)
> involved.
> I tried to conceive a scenario (assuming Pu-239) where implementation of
> this limit could result in significantly adverse health consequences, but
> failed. Can anyone suggest such a scenario?
- --
.....................................................
Susan L. Gawarecki, Ph.D., Executive Director
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee
-----
A schedule of meetings on DOE issues is posted on our Web site
http://www.local-oversight.org/meetings.html - E-mail loc@icx.net
.....................................................
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 04:08:30 +0100
From: "julian ginniver" <julian.ginniver@lineone.net>
Subject: Post incident assessment of radioactivity releases
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
- ------=_NextPart_000_004C_01C14189.E876A860
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear all,
I am interested in learning more about the methods used to undertake =
the assessment of releases of radioactive material following =
accidents/incidents at large nuclear facilities. I am reasonably =
familiar with the methods recommended by the NRPB in the UK, but would =
like information (or directions to reference material) on other methods =
that may be used to estimate the magnitude of the release and the =
derivation of countermeasure advice.
many thanks
Julian Ginniver
- ------=_NextPart_000_004C_01C14189.E876A860
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2919.6307" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Dear all,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2> I am interested in learning more =
about the=20
methods used to undertake the assessment of releases of radioactive =
material=20
following accidents/incidents at large nuclear facilities. I am =
reasonably=20
familiar with the methods recommended by the NRPB in the UK, but would =
like=20
information (or directions to reference material) on other methods that =
may be=20
used to estimate the magnitude of the release and the derivation of=20
countermeasure advice.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>many thanks</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2> =
=20
Julian Ginniver</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>
- ------=_NextPart_000_004C_01C14189.E876A860--
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 07:30:54 -0400
From: William V Lipton <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>
Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
This must be used with caution.
The bad news:
1. Read the regulations carefully: Here are the key definitions from 49 CFR
173.403:
"Radioactive material" means any material having a SPECIFIC ACTIVIY [emphasis
mine] greater than 70 Bq per gram (0.002 microcurie per gram)(see definition of
"specific activity").
"Specific activity" of a radionuclide means the activity of the radionuclide per
unit mass of THAT RADIONUCLIDE [emphasis mine]. The specific activty of a
material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed is the
activity per unit mass of the material.
The standard, "essentially uniformly distributed" is discussed in
NUREG-1608/RADREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific Activity
Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects." It is a very rigorous standard.
(A less rigorous term, "distributed throughout," is used in some definitions.)
Distributed throughout gives you some leeway, but essentially evenly distributed
does not. Although there is no quantitative definition of these terms,
NUREG-1608 guidance states that for the material to be considered essentially
evenly distributed, the specific activity among 0.1 m3 volumes should not vary
by more than a factor of 3. Thus, materials with surface contamination cannot
be considered having their activity essentially evenly distributed.
That's the bad news.
The good news:
NUREG-1608 provides a threshold value for surface contamination, below which an
object may be shipped as nonradioactive. This was apparently inadvertently
omitted from the regulations. (see section 3.1.2): The threshold is: 2200
dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma and 220 dpm/100 cm2 alpha, averaged over 300 cm2. (I
assume this limit applies to the total of removable and fixed contamination.)
Some final bad news: If the shipment is carried out under ICAO (IATA)
regulations (eg, shipped by Fedex), the material must meet both the DOT limits,
above, and the new, ICAO radionuclide specific concentration and total quanitity
limits. This is the only time I've seen the shipper required to meet both ICAO
and DOT regulations.
As you can see, the determination that an item which cannot be free released can
be shipped as nonradioactive is not simple. I highly recommend that you fully
document all such shipments.
The opinions expressed are strictly mine.
It's not about dose, it's about trust.
Bill Lipton
liptonw@dteenergy.com
Joe Heckman wrote:
> Rodney,
> For the purposes of transportation, materials with concentrations of less
> than 2 nCi/gram are not radioactive materials. When one determines the
> material to be shipped is less than 2 nCi/gram no other consideration with
> respect to RAM is required, therefore the LSA/SCO requirements do not apply.
> The LSA/SCO proper shipping names are used primarily (when possible) because
> exceptions to the packaging requirements are given for this material.
>
> Joseph Heckman, RRPT
> Site Radiation Safety Officer
> Containerized Waste Facility
> Envirocare of Utah, Inc.
> (801) 532-1330
> jheckman@envirocareutah.com <mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com>
>
> "Communications without intelligence is noise;
> Intelligence without communications is irrelevant."
> Gen. Alfred. M. Gray, USMC
>
> ************************************************************************
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 07:34:53 -0400
From: "Leon E Brown" <lebrown@CMSENERGY.COM>
Subject: Re: Post incident assessment of radioactivity releases
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
- --=_alternative 003F9DD585256ACD_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Julian,
For general information of what the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
requires of power reactors check NUREG-0654 which is available on the
NRC's website at <<http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/NUREGS/SR0654/R1/sr0654r1.pdf>>.
Leon E. Brown
Staff Consultant
Big Rock Point Restoration Project
lebrown@cmsenergy.com
- --=_alternative 003F9DD585256ACD_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Julian,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">For general information of what the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires of power reactors check NUREG-0654 which is available on the NRC's website at <<http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/NUREGS/SR0654/R1/sr0654r1.pdf>>.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Leon E. Brown</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Staff Consultant</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Big Rock Point Restoration Project</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">lebrown@cmsenergy.com</font>
- --=_alternative 003F9DD585256ACD_=--
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 15:11:59 +0300
From: Malek Chatila <mc02@aub.edu.lb>
Subject: Blood Irradiation
ýDear RadSafers,ý
ýAllow me to start by first to express my deepest condolences to my follow
American radsafers back ýýhome about the terrible events ýýýýof the past
week. I guess no ýýwords can describe what ýýwe all are feeling. ýýWhat
really ýýsurprised me, yet gives me hope, is that most people here in
Lebanon, where I am currently ýýworking, are as horrified ýýof this
horrible crime as we are.ýý
ýI have three questions pertaining to blood irradiation that I hope you can
help me with. First, what is ýýthe standard dose that you are using to
irradiate blood and blood components at your institution? ýýSecond, the
FDA set a maximum dose of 50 Gray to blood and blood components, what is
the basis of ýýthis limit? And what is the difference in blood viability,
in any, for a dose of 40 Gray in comparison with 25 ýýGray (recommended
dose by FDA). Any refrences? ý
ýThank you in advance for your assistance.ý
ýSincerely,ý
ýMalek Chatilaý
ýAmerican University of Beirutý
ýe-mail: mc02@aub.edu.lbý
ýFax: + 961-1-749-198ý
ýPhone: + 961-1-749-199ý
************************************************************************
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 09:12:11 -0400
From: "Bauman, Rodney L. (84U) " <84u@BECHTELJACOBS.ORG>
Subject: NUREG-1608
Anyone know where I can obtain an electronic copy of NUREG-1608. I checked
the NRC's website - it skips from 1603 to 1609.
Thanks, Rodney
Rodney Bauman, CHP, RRPT
Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC
Project Health Physicist
ETTP and Y-12 Waste Operations
Y-12 Plant Bldg. 9624, MS 8222
Voice: 865.241.5344
Pager: 865.417.0561
Fax: 865.576.3946
84u@bechteljacobs.org
> -----Original Message-----
> From: William V Lipton [SMTP:liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM]
> Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 7:31 AM
> To: Joe Heckman
> Cc: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
> Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
>
> This must be used with caution.
>
> The bad news:
>
> 1. Read the regulations carefully: Here are the key definitions from 49
> CFR
> 173.403:
>
> "Radioactive material" means any material having a SPECIFIC ACTIVIY
> [emphasis
> mine] greater than 70 Bq per gram (0.002 microcurie per gram)(see
> definition of
> "specific activity").
>
> "Specific activity" of a radionuclide means the activity of the
> radionuclide per
> unit mass of THAT RADIONUCLIDE [emphasis mine]. The specific activty of a
> material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed is
> the
> activity per unit mass of the material.
>
> The standard, "essentially uniformly distributed" is discussed in
> NUREG-1608/RADREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific
> Activity
> Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects." It is a very rigorous
> standard.
> (A less rigorous term, "distributed throughout," is used in some
> definitions.)
> Distributed throughout gives you some leeway, but essentially evenly
> distributed
> does not. Although there is no quantitative definition of these terms,
> NUREG-1608 guidance states that for the material to be considered
> essentially
> evenly distributed, the specific activity among 0.1 m3 volumes should not
> vary
> by more than a factor of 3. Thus, materials with surface contamination
> cannot
> be considered having their activity essentially evenly distributed.
************************************************************************
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 06:25:40 -0700
From: "Christy, Joseph D." <jchristy@SLAC.STANFORD.EDU>
Subject: RE: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
- --Boundary_(ID_n8WwB//ChkYpY8bxVK1K3g)
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The following are excerpts taken from NUREG-1608/RAMREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific Activity Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects", (Date Published: July 1998), a guidance document jointly developed by DOT and NRC:
3.1.1 If a contaminated object is also activated, can it be categorized as an SCO?
If a contaminated object is also activated to an average specific activity level less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g), the object itself is not classified as radioactive material according to 49 CFR 173.403; however, the presence of the contamination on the object may require that it be classed as a Class 7 (radioactive) material. For such an object, if the SCO definition is satisfied, the object should then be classified as Class 7, and shipped as an SCO.
3.1.2 Is there a contamination level below which an object does not need to be categorized as an SCO or as radioactive material, n.o.s.?
International regulations contain a threshold value for contamination, below which a nonradioactive object [i.e., an object having an average specific activity level less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g)] can be shipped without regard to the radioactivity [See clarification of contamination in Section 3.2.1]. The contamination threshold value was inadvertently omitted from the 1996 DOT domestic regulatory revisions. Consequently, all objects which are themselves not radioactive, but are slightly contaminated, could still be construed to qualify as SCO-I. DOT is currently addressing this issue.
In the interim: an object with external contamination may be considered to be excepted from classification as Class 7 (radioactive) material if: (1) contamination when averaged over each 300 cm2 of all surfaces is less than 0.4 Bq/cm2 for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters, and is also less than 0.04 Bq/cm2 for all other alpha emitters; and (2) the object itself has an average specific activity less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g).
3.2.1 What is contamination?
For the purpose of complying with the SCO definitions in the domestic transportation regulations only:
Contamination is the presence of a radioactive substance on a surface in quantities in excess of 0.4 Bq/cm2 (22 dpm/cm2) for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters or 0.04 Bq/cm2 (2.2 dpm/cm2) for all other alpha emitters.
This is consistent with the definition for contamination provided in the international regulations, although a similar definition is not currently included in the U.S. domestic regulations. DOT is currently considering addition of the contamination definition to 49 CFR Part 173.
This internationally-recognized lower limit for contamination serves a function in transport regulations comparable to the limit of 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g) in the definition of radioactive material; i.e., materials having specific activities less than this limit are below the scope of the hazardous material regulations. A definition of contamination is needed in order to properly utilize the SCO category because the radioactive material definition of 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g), which is based on an activity per unit mass, is not readily or directly applicable to SCOs. For nonactivated objects, dividing the activity in the contamination by the mass of the nonactivated object (to determine whether the object as a whole should or should not be defined as radioactive material) is generally not appropriate because it opens the possibility for a massive object with significant amounts of contamination on its surfaces falling below the regulatory threshold definition of radioactive material [i.e.!
!
!
,
specific activity would be less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g)]. This situation is not consistent with the intent of the regulatory exemption limit and should be avoided.
To my knowledge, this interpretation for classifying contaminated objects (that have a specific activity below the 49 CFR 173.403 definition of radioactive material) as Class 7 (radioactive) materials is only found in this guidance document. Does anyone know if DOT has formally addressed this issue as indicated in Section 3.1.2 of the guidance above?
Joe Christy
SLAC OHP Department
LLW/MLLW Coordinator
650-926-2823
jchristy@slac.stanford.edu
- -----Original Message-----
From: Joe Heckman [ <mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com> mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2001 6:56 AM
To: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
Subject: RE: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
Rodney,
For the purposes of transportation, materials with concentrations of less
than 2 nCi/gram are not radioactive materials. When one determines the
material to be shipped is less than 2 nCi/gram no other consideration with
respect to RAM is required, therefore the LSA/SCO requirements do not apply.
The LSA/SCO proper shipping names are used primarily (when possible) because
exceptions to the packaging requirements are given for this material.
Joseph Heckman, RRPT
Site Radiation Safety Officer
Containerized Waste Facility
Envirocare of Utah, Inc.
(801) 532-1330
jheckman@envirocareutah.com < <mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com> mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com>
"Communications without intelligence is noise;
Intelligence without communications is irrelevant."
Gen. Alfred. M. Gray, USMC
************************************************************************
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<TITLE></TITLE>
<META content="MSHTML 5.50.4611.1300" name=GENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<P><FONT size=2><SPAN class=081575412-20092001>The
following are excerpts taken from
</SPAN><STRONG>NUREG-1608/RAMREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low
Specific Activity Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects",</STRONG>
(Date Published: July 1998), a guidance document jointly developed by DOT
and NRC<SPAN class=081575412-20092001>:</SPAN></FONT><FONT
size=2><BR></FONT><FONT size=2><BR></FONT><FONT size=2><STRONG>3.1.1 If a
contaminated object is also activated, can it be categorized as an
SCO?<BR></STRONG><BR>If a contaminated object is also activated to an average
specific activity level less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g), the object itself is not
classified as radioactive material<SPAN class=081575412-20092001> according to
49 CFR 173.403</SPAN>; however, the presence of the contamination on the object
may require that it be classed as a Class 7 (radioactive<SPAN
class=081575412-20092001>)</SPAN> material. For such an object, if the SCO
definition is satisfied, the object should then be classified as Class 7, and
shipped as an SCO.<BR><BR></FONT><FONT size=2><STRONG>3.1.2 Is there a
contamination level below which an object does not need to be categorized as an
SCO or as radioactive material, n.o.s.?<BR></STRONG><BR>International
regulations contain a threshold value for contamination, below which a
nonradioactive object [i.e., an object having an average specific activity level
less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g)] can be shipped without regard to the radioactivity
[See clarification of contamination in Section 3.2.1]. The contamination
threshold value was inadvertently omitted from the 1996 DOT domestic regulatory
revisions. Consequently, all objects which are themselves not radioactive,
but are slightly contaminated, could still be construed to qualify as
SCO-I. DOT is currently addressing this issue.<BR><BR>In the interim: an
object with external contamination may be considered to be excepted from
classification as Class 7 (radioactive) material if: (1) contamination when
averaged over each 300 cm2 of all surfaces is less than 0.4 Bq/cm2 for beta and
gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters, and is also less than 0.04
Bq/cm2 for all other alpha emitters; and (2) the object itself has an average
specific activity less than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g).<BR><BR></FONT><FONT
size=2><STRONG>3.2.1 What is contamination?<BR></STRONG><BR>For the purpose of
complying with the SCO definitions in the domestic transportation regulations
only:<BR><BR></FONT><FONT size=2><EM>Contamination is the presence of a
radioactive substance on a surface in quantities in excess of 0.4 Bq/cm2 (22
dpm/cm2) for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters or 0.04
Bq/cm2 (2.2 dpm/cm2) for all other alpha emitters.<BR></EM><BR>This is
consistent with the definition for contamination provided in the international
regulations, although a similar definition is not currently included in the U.S.
domestic regulations. DOT is currently considering addition of the
contamination definition to 49 CFR Part 173.<BR><BR>This
internationally-recognized lower limit for contamination serves a function in
transport regulations comparable to the limit of 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g) in the
definition of radioactive material; i.e., materials having specific activities
less than this limit are below the scope of the hazardous material
regulations. A definition of contamination is needed in order to properly
utilize the SCO category because the radioactive material definition of 70 Bq/g
(2 nCi/g), which is based on an activity per unit mass, is not readily or
directly applicable to SCOs. For nonactivated objects, dividing the
activity in the contamination by the mass of the nonactivated object (to
determine whether the object as a whole should or should not be defined as
radioactive material) is generally not appropriate because it opens the
possibility for a massive object with significant amounts of contamination on
its surfaces falling below the regulatory threshold definition of radioactive
material<SPAN class=081575412-20092001> [i.e., specific activity would be less
than 70 Bq/g (2 nCi/g)]</SPAN>. This situation is not consistent with the
intent of the regulatory exemption limit and should be
avoided.<BR><BR></P></FONT>
<P><SPAN class=081575412-20092001><FONT size=2>To my knowledge, this
interpretation for classifying contaminated objects (that have a
specific activity below the 49 CFR 173.403 definition of radioactive
material) as Class 7 (radioactive) materials is only found in this guidance
document. Does anyone know if DOT has formally addressed this issue
as indicated in Section 3.1.2 of the guidance above?</FONT></SPAN></P>
<P><FONT size=2>Joe Christy<BR>SLAC OHP Department<BR>LLW/MLLW
Coordinator<BR>650-926-2823<BR>jchristy@slac.stanford.edu<BR><BR><BR>-----Original
Message-----<BR>From: Joe Heckman [</FONT><A
href="mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com";><FONT
size=2>mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com</FONT></A><FONT size=2>]<BR>Sent:
Wednesday, September 19, 2001 6:56 AM<BR>To:
radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu<BR>Subject: RE: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles -
Turkey Point<BR><BR><BR>Rodney,<BR>For the purposes of transportation, materials
with concentrations of less<BR>than 2 nCi/gram are not radioactive materials.
When one determines the<BR>material to be shipped is less than 2 nCi/gram no
other consideration with<BR>respect to RAM is required, therefore the LSA/SCO
requirements do not apply.<BR>The LSA/SCO proper shipping names are used
primarily (when possible) because<BR>exceptions to the packaging requirements
are given for this material.<BR><BR>Joseph Heckman, RRPT<BR>Site Radiation
Safety Officer<BR>Containerized Waste Facility<BR>Envirocare of Utah,
Inc.<BR>(801) 532-1330<BR>jheckman@envirocareutah.com <</FONT><A
href="mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com";><FONT
size=2>mailto:jheckman@envirocareutah.com</FONT></A><FONT
size=2>><BR><BR>"Communications without intelligence is
noise;<BR>Intelligence without communications is irrelevant."<BR>Gen. Alfred. M.
Gray,
USMC<BR><BR><BR><BR>************************************************************************<BR>You
are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,<BR>send an
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"unsubscribe<BR>radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 09:58:35 -0400
From: "Leon E Brown" <lebrown@CMSENERGY.COM>
Subject: Re: D&D Work Hazard Assessment
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
- --=_alternative 004CC5E185256ACD_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Dave,
At the Big Rock Point Restoration Project, D&D work activities are
controlled through the use of formal decommissioning work packages (DWPs)
as prescribed by procedure. As part of the DWP preparation process, DWP
job planners are required to perform a job walkdown. A checklist is
provided to document this walkdown. The checklist contains a listing of
potential hazards to look for during the walkdown such as: environmental
challenges, lead paint, energized conduits and circuits, etc. The
checklist also identifies permits that will be required such as: tagging,
fire, confined space, combustible loading, and radiation work permit.
Leon E. Brown
Staff Consultant
Big Rock Point Restoration Project
231-547-8419
lebrown@cmsenergy.com
- --=_alternative 004CC5E185256ACD_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Dave,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">At the Big Rock Point Restoration Project, D&D work activities are controlled through the use of formal decommissioning work packages (DWPs) as prescribed by procedure. As part of the DWP preparation process, DWP job planners are required to perform a job walkdown. A checklist is provided to document this walkdown. The checklist contains a listing of potential hazards to look for during the walkdown such as: environmental challenges, lead paint, energized conduits and circuits, etc. The checklist also identifies permits that will be required such as: tagging, fire, confined space, combustible loading, and radiation work permit.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Leon E. Brown</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Staff Consultant</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Big Rock Point Restoration Project</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">231-547-8419</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">lebrown@cmsenergy.com</font>
- --=_alternative 004CC5E185256ACD_=--
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 10:25:29 -0400
From: "Bauman, Rodney L. (84U) " <84u@BECHTELJACOBS.ORG>
Subject: NUREG-1608 - Thanks
Thanks to all the quick replies. I got a nice pdf version from
www.rampac.com. Rodney
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bauman, Rodney L. (84U)
> Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 9:12 AM
> To: 'William V Lipton'; Joe Heckman
> Cc: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
> Subject: NUREG-1608
>
> Anyone know where I can obtain an electronic copy of NUREG-1608. I
> checked the NRC's website - it skips from 1603 to 1609.
>
> Thanks, Rodney
>
************************************************************************
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 10:28:45 -0400
From: "Tankersley, Bill" <TankersB@ORAU.GOV>
Subject: Environmentally important issues associated with electrical energ y production
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Radsafers,
Would very much appreciate assistance with gathering of info in preparation
of symposium for secondary school students. We want to present a fair and
accurate body of information related to health and environment on the
products/byproducts/wastes and physical hazards associated with electrical
energy production by nuclear powered generators, coal-fired generators, wind
turbines, and solar cells. Have seen this comparison information in the
past, but don't have it on hand.
In advance, your assistance is greatly apppreciated and will provide our
final program to any who are interested.
Respectfully,
Bill Tankersley
Oak Ridge Associated Universities/Center for Epidemiologic Research
423-576-3141
FAX: 423-576-9557
tankersb@orau.gov
- ------_=_NextPart_001_01C141E0.8E40B690
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charset="iso-8859-1"
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<META content="MSHTML 5.50.4522.1800" name=GENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2>Radsafers,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Would
very much appreciate assistance with gathering of info in preparation of
symposium for secondary school students. We want to present a fair and
accurate body of information related to <U>health</U>
and <U>environment</U> on the products/byproducts/wastes and physical
hazards associated with electrical energy production by nuclear powered
generators, coal-fired generators, wind turbines, and solar cells.
Have seen this comparison information in the past, but don't have it on
hand.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>In
advance, your assistance is greatly apppreciated and will provide our
final program to any who are interested.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=010090414-20092001><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Tahoma size=2><SPAN
class=010090414-20092001>Respectfully,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>
<P><B><I><FONT face="Brush Script MT" size=6>Bill
Tankersley</FONT></I></B><I></I> <BR> </P>
<P><SPAN class=010090414-20092001></SPAN><FONT face=Arial><FONT size=2>Oak Ridge
Associated Universities<SPAN class=010090414-20092001>/</SPAN>C<SPAN
class=010090414-20092001>enter for Epidemiologic
Research</SPAN></FONT></FONT><BR><FONT face=Arial size=2>423-576-3141</FONT>
<BR><FONT face=Arial size=2>FAX: 423-576-9557</FONT> <BR><FONT face=Arial
size=2>tankersb@orau.gov</FONT> </P></DIV></BODY></HTML>
- ------_=_NextPart_001_01C141E0.8E40B690--
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 11:00:54 -0400
From: William V Lipton <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>
Subject: Re: NUREG-1608
I'm not aware of any electronic copies. This can be ordered, at a reasonable
cost, from the Public Documents Room. Send inquiry to: pdr@nrc.gov
Bill
"Bauman, Rodney L. (84U)" wrote:
> Anyone know where I can obtain an electronic copy of NUREG-1608. I checked
> the NRC's website - it skips from 1603 to 1609.
>
> Thanks, Rodney
>
> Rodney Bauman, CHP, RRPT
> Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC
> Project Health Physicist
> ETTP and Y-12 Waste Operations
> Y-12 Plant Bldg. 9624, MS 8222
> Voice: 865.241.5344
> Pager: 865.417.0561
> Fax: 865.576.3946
> 84u@bechteljacobs.org
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: William V Lipton [SMTP:liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM]
> > Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 7:31 AM
> > To: Joe Heckman
> > Cc: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
> > Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
> >
> > This must be used with caution.
> >
> > The bad news:
> >
> > 1. Read the regulations carefully: Here are the key definitions from 49
> > CFR
> > 173.403:
> >
> > "Radioactive material" means any material having a SPECIFIC ACTIVIY
> > [emphasis
> > mine] greater than 70 Bq per gram (0.002 microcurie per gram)(see
> > definition of
> > "specific activity").
> >
> > "Specific activity" of a radionuclide means the activity of the
> > radionuclide per
> > unit mass of THAT RADIONUCLIDE [emphasis mine]. The specific activty of a
> > material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed is
> > the
> > activity per unit mass of the material.
> >
> > The standard, "essentially uniformly distributed" is discussed in
> > NUREG-1608/RADREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific
> > Activity
> > Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects." It is a very rigorous
> > standard.
> > (A less rigorous term, "distributed throughout," is used in some
> > definitions.)
> > Distributed throughout gives you some leeway, but essentially evenly
> > distributed
> > does not. Although there is no quantitative definition of these terms,
> > NUREG-1608 guidance states that for the material to be considered
> > essentially
> > evenly distributed, the specific activity among 0.1 m3 volumes should not
> > vary
> > by more than a factor of 3. Thus, materials with surface contamination
> > cannot
> > be considered having their activity essentially evenly distributed.
> ************************************************************************
> You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,
> send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu Put the text "unsubscribe
> radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 08:08:42 -0700
From: "Christy, Joseph D." <jchristy@SLAC.STANFORD.EDU>
Subject: RE: NUREG-1608
Rodney:
NUREG-1608 can be viewed at the following website:
http://www.rampac.com/NRCinfo/nrc_info_notices_and_bulletins.htm
Joe Christy
SLAC OHP Department
LLW/MLLW Coordinator
650-926-2823
jchristy@slac.stanford.edu
- -----Original Message-----
From: Bauman, Rodney L. (84U) [mailto:84u@BECHTELJACOBS.ORG]
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 6:12 AM
To: 'William V Lipton'; Joe Heckman
Cc: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
Subject: NUREG-1608
Anyone know where I can obtain an electronic copy of NUREG-1608. I checked
the NRC's website - it skips from 1603 to 1609.
Thanks, Rodney
Rodney Bauman, CHP, RRPT
Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC
Project Health Physicist
ETTP and Y-12 Waste Operations
Y-12 Plant Bldg. 9624, MS 8222
Voice: 865.241.5344
Pager: 865.417.0561
Fax: 865.576.3946
84u@bechteljacobs.org
> -----Original Message-----
> From: William V Lipton [SMTP:liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM]
> Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 7:31 AM
> To: Joe Heckman
> Cc: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu
> Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
>
> This must be used with caution.
>
> The bad news:
>
> 1. Read the regulations carefully: Here are the key definitions from 49
> CFR
> 173.403:
>
> "Radioactive material" means any material having a SPECIFIC ACTIVIY
> [emphasis
> mine] greater than 70 Bq per gram (0.002 microcurie per gram)(see
> definition of
> "specific activity").
>
> "Specific activity" of a radionuclide means the activity of the
> radionuclide per
> unit mass of THAT RADIONUCLIDE [emphasis mine]. The specific activty of a
> material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed is
> the
> activity per unit mass of the material.
>
> The standard, "essentially uniformly distributed" is discussed in
> NUREG-1608/RADREG-003, "Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific
> Activity
> Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects." It is a very rigorous
> standard.
> (A less rigorous term, "distributed throughout," is used in some
> definitions.)
> Distributed throughout gives you some leeway, but essentially evenly
> distributed
> does not. Although there is no quantitative definition of these terms,
> NUREG-1608 guidance states that for the material to be considered
> essentially
> evenly distributed, the specific activity among 0.1 m3 volumes should not
> vary
> by more than a factor of 3. Thus, materials with surface contamination
> cannot
> be considered having their activity essentially evenly distributed.
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 08:26:10 -0700
From: CARL SPEER <speercl@EARTHLINK.NET>
Subject: alpha and beta efficiencies for plastic scintillators
I am interested in learning what the typical alpha and beta efficiencies are for handheld surface contamination survey instruments and swipe counters at DOE facilities. I am particularly interested in ZnS coated plastic scintillator probes such as the Eberline HP-380AB and the NE Technology DP6 probes. What isotopes are used for calibration sources and if geometry factors, transmission factors and backscatter factors are considered in the calibration process? At what distance are these probes from the calibration source? I am aware of the stated efficiencies from the manufacturers but I have seen the efficiencies vary by 100% at different facilities. Please respond to speercl@earthlink.net unless you think the info would be beneficial for all.
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------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 11:53:52 -0400
From: "Frame, Paul" <FrameP@ORAU.GOV>
Subject: RE: NUREG-1608
Try http://www.orau.com/ptp/infores.htm and click on NUREGs. Unfortunately,
this version of 1608 is a scanned pdf document i.e., it is not easily
searchable.
Paul Frame
Professional Training Programs
ORAU
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 12:27:43 -0400
From: William V Lipton <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>
Subject: Re: Contaminated Scaffold Knuckles - Turkey Point
I see the irony, here, but you may be taking statements out of context.
(1) Table 1 of RG 1.86 applies to final surveys for releasing a premises, i.e.,
terminating a license. It does NOT apply to releasing material from a
licensee's restricted area. The NRC provides interpretations of free release
criteria in HPPOS-072, "Guide on 'How Hard You Have to Look' as Part of
Radioactive Contamination Control Program." This states, "The regulations
applicable to nuclear power reactor licensees do not provide for release of
materials for unrestricted use that are known to be radioactively contaminated
at any level..." It's subtle and sometimes confusing, but there's a difference
between releasing items from a licensed facility and releasing a facility from
the requirements of a license.
Regardless of the required sensitivity, if any contamination due to licensed
material is detected, an item cannot be free released. However, an item with
detectable radioactivity below the NUREG-1608 thresholds can be shipped to an
authorized receiver without regard to its radioactivity. This is why it's
important to document these "nonradioactive shipments." Each such shipment must
meet 2 fundamental requirements: (1) activity, both distributed and surface
contamination, below applicable thresholds (may include IATA limits), and (2)
shipment must be to an authorized recipient. I've shipped radioactive waste as
nonradioactive material.
As a practical matter, if you are free releasing material to an unlicensed
landfill or scrapyard, keep in mind that many of these facilities now have
portal radiation monitors. These are often set as close to background levels as
the operator can get the setpoint. (The usual technique is to bring the
setpoint down to where the monitor alarms and then gradually raise it until the
alarm stops.) Thus, even if you have legitimately free released material, the
shipment may still alarm the monitor, and will be rejected. You are especiallly
vulnerable to this if you release materials in small batches, which are then
combined in a bulk container. Although the individual batches do not alarm your
monitors, the aggregate may have enough ram to alarm the monitor at the
receiving facility.
The NRC has been trying to establish free release levels, but has been meeting
fanatical public opposition. The scrap metal industry also tends to oppose
release limits, since they may get stuck with unmarketable material. Good or
bad, this is something we have to live with.
Just keep in mind that any screwup by any licensee hurts all of us.
The opinions expressed are strictly mine.
It's not about dose, it's about trust.
Bill Lipton
liptonw@dteenergy.com
"Redmond, Randy R. (RXQ)" wrote:
> "NUREG-1608 provides a threshold value for surface contamination, below
> which an
> object may be shipped as nonradioactive. This was apparently inadvertently
> omitted from the regulations. (see section 3.1.2): The threshold is: 2200
> dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma and 220 dpm/100 cm2 alpha, averaged over 300 cm2. (I
> assume this limit applies to the total of removable and fixed
> contamination.)"
>
> Interesting. Reg Guide 1.86 permits me to free release items in certain
> radionuclide categories if they are less than 5000 dpm/100 cm2 total and
> less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 removable.
> Randy Redmond
> BWXT Y-12 L.L.C.
> Y-12 National Security Complex
> Radiological Control Organization
> Email: rxq@Y12.doe.gov
> Phone: 865-574-5640
> Fax: 865-574-0117
>
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