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Problems with SC-46 Quote
Radsafers,
I was also puzzled by the quotation given by Mr. Shadis from
this draft document. I also found it difficult to obtain on the
web, although a partial copy, stopping at page 51 is out there.
It doesn't include appendix A, though. One reference to it said
it was not to be quoted or referenced, though. I would very much
like to see the full document.
My problem with the material as quoted is that it does not
provide nough information to determine the risk to any
individual. It is stated that so much activity dispersed under
thus and such conditions would result in a *dose* of 600 rem.
There was no indication of expected "occupancy." In other words,
the [effective] dose would presumably be quite different if one
were passing though the area in a fast train as opposed to lying
there unconcious for two days.
So what is this 600 rem? Is it really 600 rem/hour? 600 rem/24
hours or 600 rem/lifetime? Could it be 600 man-rem for some
postulated population with a modeled occupancy in an area having
a given dose rate? Without the details of SC 46-14, which no
longer seem to be publicly available, we cannot judge what this
number means.
I do not want to cast aspersions, but Mr. Shadis' use of these
numbers without sufficient parameters to draw conclusions from
them does not add to the discussion.
Joel Lazewatsky, Ph.D.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Medical Imaging
The opinions expressed herein are mine alone and do not
necessarily represent those of my employer.
Radsafers:
I received a reply [copied below] from a New England area
anti-nuclear activist, Ray Shadis of Maine, who has
posted at times to Radsafe to the post I made to DOEWatch about
sabotage warnings by the FBI regarding
natural gas and oil industries.
Mr. Shadis, as noted below, makes much of some content he
states was included in NCRP Draft Report SC
46-14 " Radiation Protection Issues Related to Terrorist
Activities That Result in a Dispersal of Radioactive
Material, " September 2000. I believe reference was made to
this draft document in earlier discussions on
Radsafe. However, not having either the draft or final reports
at hand [or a copy of the earlier posts on this
subject], I am not able to respond specifically to Mr. Shadis'
claims about dispersal of radioactivity from 100 kg
of 5 year old fuel by 1000 lbs of TNT [equivalent] and what was
assumed in the calculation. I would assume that
this calculation makes the initial assumption that the fuel was
not in a cask, but I'm not sure.
Does someone have the details of what was assumed in coming up
with the dose estimate claimed in the post
by Mr. Shadis as having been in the Draft NCRP Report SC
46-14??
If this information has been posted earlier to Radsafe, perhaps
someone could email me a copy. It would seem
informative to critique Mr. Shadis' claims if there are serious
flaws in fact or emphasis both in reply to
DOEWatch [which I could post until I get thrown off their
"discussion" group.], or to the distribution for his post
below.
Thanks for any help in clarifying these rather extreme claims
of nuclear plant vulnerability
Stewart Farber, MSPH
Public Health Sciences
email: SAFarberMSPH@cs.com
----------------
Forwarded Message:
Subj: Re: [DOEWatch] Oil and Gas Energy infrastructure a
terrorist target-FBI Warning
Date: 11/26/01 4:10:08 PM Pacific Standard Time
From: shadis@ime.net (Raymond Shadis)
Reply-to: shadis@ime.net (Raymond Shadis)
To: nrc_concerns@yahoogroups.com (NRC CONCERNS),
doewatch@yahoogroups.com (DOEWATCH),
radiumproj@cs.com
Dear Mr. Farber,
Please reconcile your notion of limited offsite
consequences for
radiological sabotage with the offsite dose estimates and dose
distributions
in appendix A of the NCRP Draft Report SC 46-14 " Radiation
Protection
Issues Related to Terrorist Activities That Result in a
Dispersal of
Radioactive Material, " September 2000.
Graphs in that document show some extraordinary doses ( 600
REM) at about
110 kilometers 24 hours Post-Blast for 100 kg of 5 year old
fuel distributed
by 1000 lbs of TNT ( equivalent). As near as I can tell the
estimates were
modeled by Tom Dahlstrom of Bechtel in Nevada. The graphs and
accompanying
tables were thrown out in the final report NCRP 138,October 24,
2001, as
was the title.
138 avoids quantification of radioactive material dispersal and
dose and is
accordingly retitled, "Management of Terrorist Events Involving
Radioactive
Material."
Some interesting, though strained, language remains in NCRP 138
on page 16,
" Spent nuclear fuel elements could also be targeted, but they
contain much
less radioactive material than an operating reactor plant
because of the
rapid decay fission products.
Concerning the affected area, health hazards would be similar
to that which
occurred at Chernobyl, but on a significantly smaller
scale...Areas at risk
from high-level radioactive waste dispersed by a large
explosive device can
be many miles from the source. With a smaller amount of source
material and
explosive, the area of concern is more in the range of several
city blocks
or a few miles from the target area."
Coincidently, I had lunch today with a CNO from a large nuclear
utility who
stated quite emphatically that he did not disagree with the
consequence
figures in the SC 46-14 Draft. Could you please put a rosy hue
on all this
so that I don't engage in too much hand-wringing?
Thanks for all your diligent work in protecting the public
health from
radiation hazards, minimal though they may be.
Raymond Shadis
Friends of the Coast
Staff
Advisor
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