Terrorism and the Nuclear Question

["Vesper, Bruce E" <BEVesper@MAIL.BHI-ERC.COM>]

> Interesting opinion from the granddaughter of Dwight D Eisenhower.......

> 

> 

> Susan Eisenhower

> President, The Eisenhower Institute

> 

> "Terrorism and the Nuclear Question"

> Address to the National Press Club

> Broadcast Live on National Public Radio and C-SPAN

> February 11, 2002

> 

> www.eisenhowerinstitute.org

> 

> President Bush declared that the war on terrorism was the first war of the

> 21st century, and we are beginning to understand what that feels like.

> While still in mourning for the victims of the September 11th tragedy,

> everyday Americans are bombarded with threat assessments that outline

> every

> conceivable and unspeakable scenario of future attack.  Yet we are told to

> go back to work and lead a normal life.  Is normal life, after September

> 11th, really possible?

> 

> If we are going to win the war on terrorism and bring life back into

> balance, we are going to have to employ some 21st century thinking, along

> with some good old-fashioned common sense. 

> 

> My generation grew up in the age of bomb shelters and duck and cover

> drills. It is not surprising, then, that among the most upsetting and

> terrifying mental images we have are thoughts of a nuclear explosion in

> one

> of our cities-an event that would make, as a colleague of mine said,

> "September 11th seem like a day at the beach."

> 

> Less than two weeks ago we were warned of possible attacks on domestic

> nuclear power plants and every day we hear scenarios about "dirty bombs"

> that could kill and contaminate, and loose nukes that might end up in the

> hands of rogue nations. Many of us may wonder why we ever converted our

> fallout shelters into storage rooms!

> 

> Having seen part of the closed Russian nuclear weapons complex, I can

> attest to the challenges facing the Russian Federation and the

> international community in curbing nuclear proliferation to assure that

> nuclear capabilities do not fall into the wrong hands. The Department of

> Energy estimates that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia

> inherited 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium

> in

> forms that make them attractive for theft. To put this into perspective,

> it

> only takes 25 kilos of HEU or 8 kilos of plutonium to build a nuclear

> bomb.

> 

> I just returned from Russia a few weeks ago, where I had the opportunity

> to

> visit a closed site run by the Russian Ministry of Defense's 12th

> Directorate, which is responsible for the transportation and storage of

> non-deployed nuclear weapons. Previously, as part of the Baker-Cutler

> Commission, I also traveled to Russia's preeminent secret nuclear weapons

> facility in the Urals-known during Soviet times as Chelyabinsk-70- to

> evaluate the effectiveness of US taxpayer programs aimed at securing

> nuclear materials and providing non-military economic opportunities to the

> country's weapons scientists.

> 

> Our programs, known broadly as Nunn-Lugar programs after the Senators who

> sponsored the legislation in the early 1990s, have met with some success.

> Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Treat Reduction programs at the Department of

> Defense have spent $3.6 billion dismantling and securing weapons and

> destroying their delivery vehicles. In addition to other programs, they

> also helped make the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus

> possible. Also, the Department of Energy has secured 32% of the nuclear

> material at risk.  However, there is still much to do. The Department of

> Energy program that is responsible for enhancing the security of these

> dangerous materials will not finish its work until 2020.

> 

> Despite this, as the General Accounting Office's report outlined, there

> are

> some needed reforms. For example, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which was

> established to provide economic alternatives to weapons scientists, spent

> 70% of its money in the United States.  Such programs need readjustment,

> especially after September 11th.

> 

> The United States also needs to look for ways to build upon Russian

> cultural assumptions. Too many of the programs I evaluated make complete

> sense to any American, but are at odds with the way things are in Russia.

> Russian "buy in" at every level is of critical importance.

> Adapting systems and plans for long-term sustainability is also crucial.

> The United States will not be engaged in this work forever.

> 

> The whole basket of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs run by the

> United

> States needs high-level political oversight and coordination-a key

> recommendation of the Baker-Cutler Commission that has yet to be

> addressed.

> During the years of the Gore-Chernomyrdin working groups, high-level

> attention was given to the development of these programs, which often

> brought an important boost when progress bogged down.  After this

> framework

> was disbanded during the second Clinton administration, bureaucratic

> logjams mounted to the point that today, hundreds of millions of dollars

> are stalled in the Department of Defense pipeline, awaiting resolution of

> a

> number of issues.

> 

> Some of the issues that created these logjams are still outstanding, such

> as access to sensitive facilities. The Russians are concerned about

> maintaining some secrecy around their most sensitive sites at the same

> time

> they are trying to provide the verification that is a prerequisite of

> Congressional funding. Valuable time is being lost. That is why new

> creative ideas need to be advanced, and I mean quickly.  Consolidated

> storage sites should be a made priority and other forms of verification,

> short of site visits, should be an acceptable compromise to these

> unreciprocated tours that we require. Flexibility needs to be a priority. 

> 

> We also need to do what it takes to move the Russians from a "paper only"

> system of nuclear accounting to using advanced modern systems that will

> manage the storage and movement of these materials. The Russian paper

> system is part of the reason the Russians have been unable to tell us

> conclusively whether or not any of their weapons are missing. Both the

> Russian Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy keep two different sets of

> paper inventories.  Implementing the US program to address this urgent

> need

> must be expedited.

> 

> With the Cold War over and with US nuclear deterrence still in place, we

> can afford to take some risks in Russia. US concerns that Russia will

> modernize its nuclear arsenal with the money they do not have to spend on

> threat reduction is "old think" and so is the government's position that

> our programs cannot provide any equipment that has dual-use potential. If

> we are concerned about using our equipment that might have dual uses, why

> not expand the use of Russian indigenous equipment?  It would not only

> help

> their economy but it would also provide sustainability over time.

> 

> New ideas should be called for and considered.  Powerful, well-placed

> non-governmental organizations like the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the

> Russian and American Academy of Sciences are making indispensable

> contributions.  But the important work that they do cannot be a substitute

> for government effectiveness. And, speaking only for the United States,

> our

> government cannot successfully engage the Russians on these most pressing

> and sensitive issues by embedding the suspicion on our side into the

> process.  Today, Russia is our ally in the fight against terrorism and the

> United States and Russia cannot afford to fight, simultaneously, both the

> remnants of the old Cold War and this new war on terrorism.

> 

> We must remember that we are not threatened today by a possible nuclear

> exchange as we once were with the Soviet Union; we are threatened today by

> terrorist or rogue nations that might be able to lay hands on these

> materials.  Logjams due to inflexibility-on both sides-ensure that nothing

> happens.  But no progress means vulnerability.  Only Russia's cooperation

> can assure Russia's assistance in securing Cold War stockpiles of weapons

> of mass destruction.  Given their sovereignty, we work on this threat to

> our national security at their will.

> 

> As hard and as controversial as it might be for Americans to see, a new

> 21st century reality is now in place-a reality that is at complete odds

> with the reality of the Cold War, when a hostile Soviet Union could

> 

> annihilate us.

> 

> Ironically, today Russia is critical to us not because of how they might

> threaten us, but because of how they can help protect the individual

> safety

> of each and every American citizen.  Indeed, Russia is now more crucial to

> our security than most of our NATO allies.

> 

> By dint of geography alone, Russia remains a pivotal force.  But their

> experience with Islamic extremism, as well as their protracted fight in

> Afghanistan, comes with insight, as well as usable intelligence. The

> United

> States has already been the beneficiary of that experience and expertise.

> The Russians provided indispensable intelligence-such as cave maps-for our

> bombing and Special Forces campaign in Afghanistan. Russian military

> assistance to the Northern Alliance was also important, perhaps even

> crucial in our fight for decisive places like Mazar-e-Sharif. 

> 

> Since September 11th, the Russians have posed no objections to the United

> States' request to base troops in Central Asia, and they have moved

> quickly

> in some areas important for the progress of Cooperative Threat Reduction,

> though mostly through Department of Energy programs.  As we speak,

> however,

> US actions could have a negative impact on our ability to manage the

> nuclear question in these ways:

> 

> ·	There is a feeling of suspicion in Moscow that the United States has

> been

> planning to "pull one over on them" when we suggested that instead of

> radical reductions in nuclear weapons, the United States might store the

> warheads as a reserve or a "hedge." In protest, Russian Minister of

> Defense, Sergei Ivanov, has called for "real radical verifiable

> transparent

> arms reductions."

> 

> ·	The US decision to abandon the ABM Treaty could create chaos in the

> nuclear area unless there is a written, legally binding, agreement

> outlining the mutually agreed upon principles. Otherwise the Russians,

> according to their law, will no longer be subject to START II. Since

> Cooperative Treat Reduction involves securing weapons scheduled for

> dismantlement, we could loose our ability, over time, to work with the

> Russians in securing their arsenal.

> 

> ·	As expansion of NATO goes forward, there are concerns that the

> United

> States is withdrawing from earlier suggestions that Russia might be

> incorporated into some kind of European security framework. Failure to do

> so makes Russia, like it or not, more reliant on nuclear weapons,

> especially tactical nuclear weapons.

> 

> ·	US talk of pre-emptive action against the "axis of evil" has also

> created

> tensions, not only with Russia, but also with our allies.  Even during the

> Cold War the United States stepped back from political pressure to take a

> preemptive strike against the Soviet Union while we were still in sole

> possession of the bomb.

>     

> We should think long and hard about the costs and the benefits of each one

> of the steps we are advancing and ask ourselves if they are worth

> jeopardizing our relationships with Russia and the international

> coalition,

> especially at this time.

> 

> I would now like to say a word about good old-fashioned common sense.

> This

> great attribute always seems to be in short supply when we feel either

> overwhelmingly threatened or we take our good luck or good fortune for

> granted.  Panic has made us conclude that simply throwing money at the

> problem of security will buy us safety.  Common sense tells us that there

> is no such thing as absolute security and, by the way, no such thing as

> limitless resources.  To meet the challenges of this "war," especially

> over

> the long haul, we will have to be smarter, more diplomatic, and better

> able

> to prioritize the use of our resources. How long can we, for instance,

> sustain military expenditures at the currently proposed level before

> Americans demand money for other priorities such as the coming baby-boom

> retirement bombshell and the related health care crisis that will

> accompany

> it-or any number of other long deferred issues?  And how will our economy

> adapt to the loss of efficiency brought about by time-consuming security

> precautions that are, in some cases, gratuitous and sometimes illogical?

> 

> In order to assign priorities, we need to place the potential for a

> nuclear

> attack-or any other attack-into a common sense matrix that will help

> determine where, on a scale of potential threats, it rests. This will help

> us to make choices. 

> 

> To undertake any nuclear attack successfully would require knowledge,

> capacity and opportunity.  Fortunately, so far it appears that the

> terrorists have only a rudimentary understanding of nuclear bomb making,

> which in turn depends on the existence of a nuclear infrastructure and a

> sophisticated knowledge of physics and engineering.  Like the cooperation

> we have with Russia, we must work hard with the countries that have these

> capabilities to ensure that they remain on our team, especially Pakistan. 

> 

> Also fortunate is the fact that dirty bombs are difficult to successfully

> deploy, both for reasons of stealth and physics.  But since we know that

> terrorists will use whatever means they have at their disposal, there are

> still significant immediate concerns:

> 

> ·	The United States and Russia must begin the difficult but necessary

> effort to reduce and secure the most dangerous of all nuclear devices:

> tactical nuclear weapons. They can be small, mobile and vulnerable to

> theft.

> 

> ·	The United States must also take measures to develop a system to

> protect

> America's nuclear power plants-installations that marry the destructive

> potential of nuclear power with a ready-made target for any hijacked

> commercial airliner.

> 

> ·	Most important of all, we have limited resources over time and will

> therefore not be able to go the course without leveraging the efforts of

> others to maximize our security.  Ultimately, this means that the most

> powerful weapon we have in our own arsenal is our ability to retain and

> strengthen the international coalition. Without our allies, it is hard to

> imagine how we would be able to gather intelligence, police borders, and

> operate globally with any efficiency.

> 

> This is the first time in our history that I can think of when we have had

> all of the world's major players on our team. Teamwork only succeeds when

> members understand the objective, when they are treated with respect, and

> when they are allowed to feel a stake in the outcome.  That is why the

> United States has to reassure the international community that we have a

> focused mission. We also have to convey that we understand the

> difficulties

> that they face and convince them that a unified effort will bring peace

> and

> stability to everyone, not just the United States.  As long as we retain

> our influence with others, we can shape thinking and engage in cooperative

> efforts.  Holding together the coalition is within our conscious

> decision-making power.  

> 

> This commitment to the coalition might curtail at least some of the

> administration's new objectives.  It may also require a course correction

> on some of the issues that I have mentioned here. But ultimately, it could

> be worth it.  We cannot win this war on terror without the help of the

> international community, including countries that have not been our

> traditional allies.  And we cannot prevail as a society without the

> bravery

> of ordinary citizens and the political will to trust others, and to take

> chances on that trust.  In the first war of the 21st century, we have no

> other options.

> 

> ******

> 

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