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Radiation protection support criticality safety

My consideration is based in the following  IAEA docs.
 
a) Method for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents, IAEA TECDOC 953, 1997;
 
b) Generic Assessment Procedures  for Determining Protective Actions During a Reactor Accident, IAEA TECDOC 955, 1997
 
c) Intervention Criteria in a nuclear or Radiation Emergency, IAEA Safety Series 109, 1994
 
d) Generic Procedures for Assessment and Response During a Radiological Emergency, IAEA TECDOC 1162, 2000
 
I do believe you can find them in your library.
 
Resume
 
1) Fuel Fabrication Uranium -  No potential for doses in excess of urgent level GILs off site from criticality accidents.
On site: Potential for deterministic health effects and doses in excess of urgent level GILs off site from criticality accidents.
 
2) Fuel Fabrication Pu -  No potential for doses in excess of urgent level GILs off site from criticality accidents. Large fires or explosions could result in doses off site in excess of urgent level GIL near the facility. This will be function of inventory.
On-site:Potential for deterministic health effects and doses in excess of urgent level GILs from criticality accidents. Fires and explosion could result in doses in excess of urgent level GILs on site from inhalation.
 
The operator has three principles responsibilities during a accident first to prevent or mitigate a release, second to assess the severities of the accident and notify offsite officials and recommend actions and thirdly assure the on-site responders  are provided adequate radiation protection.
Radiation Protection Activities - In order to provide adequate radiation protection (on site and off site) to emergency workers the pathways of importance must be know and some method must be provided to monitor or estimate the dose received by workers by theses pathways.  The emergency workers must be provided clear instruction concerning dose levels that should not be exceeded when performing various emergency functions.  Emergency workers can also be provided protective clothing, respiratory protection, thyroid blocking drugs (if the case), or other protective measures.  However the crucial element in emergency workers is the ability to measure or estimate the dose received by the workers. 
This must include exposure limits for the expected response activities such as: assess control, assisting in evacuation, monitoring, decontamination,  accident assessment and providing medical  assistance. These guideline (limits) must be consistent (c - Safety Series 109).    In addition provision must be made to  monitor the dose of the workers to include self-reading dosimeters, exposure rate meters or other means to assure that the exposure of  workers can be monitored.  Monitoring must be provided that will remain on scale under severe accident conditions.  Where possible methods to reduce the exposure of  workers such as respiratory protection, protective clothing and provision to practice  and use of special tools in very high dose areas.
 
The general principles for radiation protection involvement applied to
criticality accident, is also applied to other accident, not necessary involving criticality, like the Radiological
Accident in Goiania,  as example. The complexity makes the level of training and response.
For instance, the emergency response to Goiania Accident was more complex
than the Tokaimura Accident.

As General coordinator to respond the Radiological Accident in Goiania
several lessons learned applied to Radiological situation and Radiation Protection involvement, were:

a) Instrumentation should be capable of being adjusted to withstand field
conditions, so that it can be used in high humidifies, high temperatures and
unstable environmental conditions;
b) Personal using instruments should be trained to be able to obtain a clear
indication of dose rate response, for a wide range of doses; and to know the
most suitable equipment in different conditions and its calibration factors;
c) Training to  interact the different groups and organization to respond
the emergency and Radiation protection support many of such groups;

There are others, however I'll not mention because I do believe will not
apply  to USA, due its capability to immediate response, e.g to collect, segregate and transport
waste from affected environmental area to a Repository, which is not the
case of many countries, including Brazil.

In Goiania the Radiation Protection Group was involved in:

Procedures to work according with situation identified
Medical support
Supporting Civil Defence (we have no fire)
Supporting army's special group during houses demolishing
Terrestrial and aerial survey
Radiation monitoring and sampling
Population monitoring
Decontamination of People
Personal monitoring
Decontamination of areas
Decontamination of vehicles and equipment
Radioactive Waste management (including transport)
Record data
Accident reconstruction and dose estimation
 
If you wish I can send 4 or 5 slides (ppt presentation) of the radiation protection activities in Goiania
 
Hope this helps.
 
Jose Julio Rozental
joseroze@netvision.net.il
Israel




----- Original Message -----
From: Minnema, Douglas <Douglas.Minnema@nnsa.doe.gov>
To: Radsafe (E-mail) <radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2002 6:49 AM


Dear RADSAFEr's,

I am preparing to give a workshop entitled "The Health Physics Aspects of
Criticality Safety"  at the upcoming ANS Radiation Protection Division
meeting in Santa Fe.  Although the presentation, based on material I
developed from our long-past RADSAFE discussions on the Tokaimura accident,
is well under way, I thought that I would ask you all a question:  what do
you think a health physicist needs to know about criticality safety?  I
would appreciate your thoughts, which would help 'calibrate' my
presentation, and I'll try to get answers for your questions back to you as
well.

Please respond directly to me at the address below.  If anybody will be in
Santa Fe, please stop by and visit.

Thanks,

Doug Minnema, Ph.D., CHP
Radiological Control Program Advisor for the National Nuclear Security
Administration
<Douglas.Minnema@nnsa.doe.gov>

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