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Re: nuke navy - HMS Tireless
Folks,
I was rather intrigued by Mr. Cohen's posting on the HMS
Tireless so checked up on the story. It was very
difficult to find any FACTS on the story.
This was a typical media storm, where various media
outlets were busily quoting one another. As near as I
could tell, the cross-quoting was going about three to
four levels down. When you get to the bottom layer,
the "story" is ascribed to an "unnamed source," and the
rest is rampant speculation about (highly inflammatory)
potential consquences.
As near as I could tell, the Tireless sprang a small
leak in a coolant piping joint in an unusual or awkward
location. Automated sensory/warning systems detected
and indicated the leak (i.e., the first level safety
systems functioned properly). The reactor was then shut
down (i.e., human intervention functioned properly).
The boat then sailed to Gibraltor for repairs (with
major political noise for many months during this
process). It was then repaired and returned to Great
Britain. Other boats in the class were returned to port
and were inspected for similar defects; as near as I can
determine there were none (this could be lack of
information from credible sources).
So, a crack developed, the safety systems functioned as
designed, the crew was alerted, they took protective
measures and brought the reactor to a safe shutdown.
The ship was docked, repaired, and returned to sea.
The rest is "can, would have, could have, might have,
ought to have, might of have" cross-quoting media frency
journalism at its finest based upon speculation
from "unidentified sources."
I don't pretend that the MoD of Great Britain is telling
the whole tale here, but I have to think that their
version is a tad more credible that what the popular
press was reporting. And you really had to dig to even
GET their version.
If somebody has the story of what really happened from a
source that doesn't hope to financially or politically
gain from pushing speculative end-points, I'd love to
see it.
Jim Barnes, CHP
james.g.barnes@att.net
> Hi all,
> You asked about nuclear navy. Here's one I came across. Yes its British, but the
> design is Yankee.
>
> norm
>
> Jacksha1@aol.com wrote:
>
> > November 5, 2000
> > John P. Shannon
> > 262 Jones Road
> > Saratoga Springs
> > NY
> > 12866
> > 518-587-3245
> >
> > SUBMARINE HMS TIRELESS SUFFERS PROBABLE REACTOR MELTDOWN
> >
> > It seems that by strange happenstance some nuclear submarine disasters get
> > lots of publicity, while others get none. The Russian submarine Kursk sank
> > in the Berents Sea on August 12 and has received much press coverage ever
> > since. A British hunter-killer submarine, HMS Tireless, suffered a probable
> > nuclear reactor meltdown on May 19 and has lain incapacitated in Gibraltar
> > on the southern coast of Spain ever since. Not a word has been reported on
> > this latter alarming accident by the U.S. press.
> >
> > The HMS Tireless was towed into Gibraltar after suffering a non-isolable
> > leak in its primary coolant system. This class of nuclear accident is
> > defined as a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) and is potentially disastrous
> > because uncovering of the core can result in a meltdown, with an associated
> > release of enormous quantities of radioactivity. By Nuclear Regulatory
> > Commission mandate, U.S. commercial reactors employ Emergency Core Cooling
> > Systems (ECCS) to protect against LOCAs. But because of space limitations
> > aboard submarines, neither U.S. or foreign nuclear subs are equipped with
> > this vital safety system, nor are the two nuclear submarine prototypes at
> > the Kesselring Site Operation.
> >
> > On later investigation, a crack, also described as a split, was found at a
> > critical junction of the pipes in the pressurized water reactor's cooling
> > system, where a welding fault was discovered. In discussing the crack
> > location, the British navy referred to "the trouser-leg problem", relating
> > to the narrow access ducts for the cracked pipes (note the use of plural) in
> > the nuclear coolant system. It was also stated that the initial leak was a
> > symptom of what has turned out to be a much more devastating problem, a
> > potentially catastrophic design fault. One source reported that the cracks
> > (note the use of plural) could not be in a worse position. Taken literally,
> > this may indicate that the cracks are actually below the elevation of the
> > core. Nothing could be worse than cracks in the piping beneath the core that
> > cannot be isolated on a plant that has no ECCS.
> >
> > Although the above meager information has been released about the crack
> > situation, information about the condition of the nuclear core is much more
> > closely held. One source reported that the reactor had been about to seize
> > up because of the damage. The terminology used, "seize up", may refer to the
> > fact that core damage effecting the control rod channels prevented all
> > control rods from being inserted to shutdown the reactor. It was also
> > reported that the reactor was "at the very point of failure" - in other
> > words a meltdown. Subsequently, MoD has stated that it could not disclose
> > what is wrong with the Tireless reactor "without consulting the Americans
> > first" - the reactor is based on a American design.
> >
> > Apparently it was not just that the reactor was about to seize up, or that
> > the reactor was at the point of failure, the reactor was, in fact, seriously
> > damaged. If the Tireless were submerged when the leak occurred, then the
> > reactor could not be scrammed until the boat surfaced. This would take some
> > time. Then, there are casualty procedures for locating a primary coolant
> > leak. These also take some time. It is quite possible that the time element
> > to surface and to perform the casualty procedure was of such duration that a
> > portion of the reactor core uncovered while the reactor was still at power.
> > This could cause fuel elements to melt and control rod channels to
> > physically distort such that when the reactor was finally scrammed the rods
> > did not all insert. This may leave the reactor in the precarious position
> > of being shutdown while hot but incapable of being maintained at shutdown if
> > cooled down. As an alternate scenario, the commander of the Tireless may
> > have used incredibly bad judgment in an ill fated attempt to reach port on
> > nuclear power, despite the leak. Either way, the reactor damage occurred.
> > And since submarines have no ECCS, and the leak is continuing, it may be
> > that the Tireless must be kept at the dock so as to provide sufficient
> > volumes of shore water to makeup for loss from the ongoing leak. Hence, good
> > reason that the crippled Tireless has remained at Gibraltar for 5 months as
> > Britain has ruled out towing the sub back to Britain.
> >
> > The HMS Tireless is now the center of a wider safety dispute involving the
> > UK and Spain at Prime Ministerial level. SPAIN sent a rare protest note to
> > the Foreign Office berating the fact that Tireless has been stuck in
> > Gibraltar for the past five months. Spain accuses Britain of underestimating
> > the extent of the damage. Initially, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD)
> > assured Gibraltarians that it was only a "minor defect". Since then, Britain
> > recalled entire fleet (12) of strike submarines for safety checks, at least
> > three or which may never return to active duty because of their age and the
> > problems of repairing pipe work in awkward locations near the boats'
> > reactors. The British navy is now deprived of its entire strike force for at
> > least five months. U.S. submarines may be drafted to protect Britain's
> > Trident missile force while the Royal Navy's hunter-killer fleet is out of
> > action. British Naval engineers are said to be astonished to discover the
> > problem on the Tireless turned out to be so serious. The British navy's most
> > senior adviser on nuclear safety has flown to Spain. Gibraltarians face the
> > prospect of a immobile Tireless sitting off the Rock for a year.
> >
> > But, there are even more ominous overtones. The British MoD itself says that
> > the reactor is based on American design. It is quite probable that the
> > primary coolant system, with its potentially catastrophic design fault, was
> > also based on American design. If so, this means that all U.S. Seawolf
> > attack submarines are potential victims of the same LOCA and core damage as
> > the HMS Tireless. Is the U.S. Navy doing safety checks on its 57
> > nuclear-powered attack submarines? If they are, they would never admit it to
> > the media or the U.S. public. Cover-up has always been the name of the game
> > for the U.S. Navy. In any case, the HMS Tireless, provides an emphatic
> > statement as to why the two aged nuclear submarine prototypes at the
> > Kesselring Site, near Saratoga Springs, NY, should never have been operated
> > in a populated region without the two most vital safety systems known,
> > namely an Emergency Core Cooling System and a Reactor Containment System.
> > Even if the designs are not exactly the same as the HMS Tireless, this
> > disaster well illustrates why these two dangerous prototypes should be
> > immediately and permanently shutdown.
> >
> > John P. Shannon
> > Nuclear Physicist/Nuclear Engineer
> > Former Manager of Health and Safety
> > at the Nuclear Navy's
> > Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
> >
> > ps: I have now been informed that several years ago the U.S. licensed
> > Britain to use the S5W nuclear plant technology. This means that the HMS
> > Tireless employs an S5W propulsion system. As far is known, S5W reactor
> > plants are no longer used in Navy fleet operations. However, the S7G
> > prototype at the Kesselring Site is using an S5G reactor. In addition, it
> > has been learned that the two training submarines moored in the Charleston
> > SC harbor both use the S5W plant. The Charleston plants are operating on
> > their THIRD cores in a system that was initially designed for a lifetime of
> > two cores due to unpredictable damage to the pressure vessel walls from
> > neutron embrittlement. Probably not coincidentally, the operational limits
> > of power and primary system pressure have been reduced in at least the two
> > Charleston reactors. In lieu of the HMS Tireless disaster in May, I believe
> > the U.S. Navy should have immediately and permanently shutdown these three
> > Naval Reactor training plants. To do otherwise is irresponsible and
> > indefensible. The U.S. Congress should initiate an immediate investigation
> > of this reckless behavior by the U.S. Navy and by Naval Reactors.
> >
> >
>
> --
> Coalition for Peace and Justice and the UNPLUG Salem Campaign; 321 Barr Ave.,
> Linwood, NJ 08221; 609-601-8583 or 609-601-8537; ncohen12@comcast.net UNPLUG
> SALEM WEBSITE: http://www.unplugsalem.org/ COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
> WEBSITE: http://www.coalitionforpeaceandjustice.org The Coalition for Peace
> and Justice is a chapter of Peace Action.
> "First they ignore you; Then they laugh at you; Then they fight you; Then you
> win. (Gandhi) "Why walk when you can fly?" (Mary Chapin Carpenter)
>
>
>
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