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Nuclear Power Plants and Terrorism
A comment on terrorist attacks on NPPs
by Joseph L. Alvarez and Fritz A. Seiler
Hi All,
We have been increasingly irritated with the ongoing discussions about
the purported terrorist threat to nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the
media and also on the RISKANAL and RADSAFE mailing lists. What bothers
us is the one-sided discussion, looking only at NPPs and their
"terrorist promise". The comments mostly address the misinformation in
discussing the question "Are NPPs safe from terrorist attacks?" and "Has
the NRC done enough in characterizing the attack potential (707 crash vs
a 747 crash)?" This whole discussion is ridiculous, it is completely of
the anti-nukes' making, and - finally - it is part of their game plan.
They just play on the radio-phobia that they have created in the first
place, and now play it up as much as they can. The answer to the
question "Will an attack on an NPP be successful, i.e., cause panic and
large-scale publicity regardless of the outcome?" is: Yes!! The
activists have seen to that, creating a furor by asking the question in
their own inimitably biased way.
Unfortunately, the joke is on us, since we have entered into the
minutiae of the trick questions rather than investigate the physics of a
crash into an NPP. So we will take some time off from writing some more
serious papers and play two wannabe terrorists with evil designs.
Let us say that we want to induce a maximum of terror by causing
fatalities, injuries, general anxieties, and hopefully even widespread
panic. Let us also assume that we want to do some real damage not just
perceived damage in the present social climate. So we ask: What are the
highest local concentrations of hazardous materials in any urban or
suburban environment? So let's start with NPPs, if any, but let us not
forget that there are also all kinds of storage tanks of flammable or
explosive materials, chemical plants with storage tanks for highly toxic
intermediate or by-products, oil refineries, natural gas storage tanks,
and further out even oil and gas fields, CERCLA sites etc.
Now let us plan to attack them, and see how successful we can be. For
this short discussion we will look at two modes only: First, we will
consider an airplane attack of the 9/11-type, and Second, the actions of
a small group of saboteurs with explosives etc. First, let us forget
about that Fox News journalist in his private plane and a TV camera high
over Indian Point NPP last week, because his "success" really means
nothing. Now let us look at some of the more pertinent aspects:
1) Accessibility to toxic material: Access is relatively easy in all
cases, except the NPPs which are guarded better than the average
industrial installation and have two massive concrete shields for
protection of the radioactive materials. No other industrial production
plant has that kind of protection for their toxic materials.
2) Secondary effects of an NPP attack: Even a fully fueled Boeing 7X7,
launched full tilt at a NPP has most of its mass in the two or four
engines and the wing tanks. It is, therefore difficult to impart enough
momentum for the penetration of a small cylindrical object like a
containment building. Even if one engine hits it dead on, the others
will not, so what we get is a jet engine and a lot of burning fuel that
penetrate the containment. But the concrete shielded reactor is still
intact and running and can be shut down. The probability of severe
damage to the control system that would lead not to an emergency
shutdown but to a power excursion and an explosion is so minute that as
educated terrorists we would not even try it. .... The expected payoff
is far too small! The skill required to make a hit on containment
requires an experienced pilot for the chosen aircraft. The Fox
journalist should have at least flown his plane through a near ground
level bull's eye. :-)
The only reason why we would consider attacking a NPP would be to use
the overblown fears of anything to do with radioactivity that the anti
nukes have spread so successfully among the general population. So as
smart terrorists we would use the wildly exaggerated perceived risks of
radiation to spread as much terror as possible. And extend our humble
but subversive terrorist thanks to the anti nukes. ;-))
3) Other targets, that do not need an airliner as a projectile - not
even a small private airplane - are far more promising from a
terrorist's point of view. All that is needed is a local penetration of
a small group of saboteurs into a plant that has at best a defense of
some walls with multiple wire fences, a knowledge of where the most
toxic agents are kept, and how to blow their containers up. Thus, it
does not require much knowledge of industrial chemistry to create
hundreds if not thousands of Mini- and Macro-Bhopals all over the world
with all kinds of toxic agents. It is not general knowledge that quite
large quantities of hazardous and toxic substances are present in most
chemical, and in many industrial plants.
4) Yet another promising type of attack is to carry a highly toxic,
explosive or otherwise dangerous agent into an enclosed environment and
release it. This approach has been used many times in the past and is a
very effective tool for terrorists, from the release of the poison gas
Sarin in a Japanese subway to the homicidal suicide bombings in a crowd
in a Palestine restaurant. Also, high jacking some 'toxic' waste from a
remediation project and spreading it around would be a nice effort.
After all, the stuff is certified to be dangerous, and the media are
sure to play it up for all it is worth and then some!
From this simple discussion it is clear that trying to do a successful
terrorist attack on a NPP is one of the least promising courses of
action. The 9/11 attack was a large scale operation requiring a
broad-based effort of many people. After that opening shot, terrorist
aims are best served by many smaller, widespread actions with low
perpetrator risks and small efforts, each resulting in several hundreds
or thousands of victims. Thus, small terrorist attacks carried out all
the time and just about everywhere constitute the backbone of a
successful terrorist campaign, and if a ‘biggie' can be thrown in, all
the better, but it is just an acorn in the pig food, not the grist.
Now we will get back to some more serious work!!
Best regards,
Joe & Fritz
************************
Fritz A. Seiler, Ph. D.
President
Sigma Five Consulting
P.O. Box 1709
Los Lunas, NM 87031, USA
Tel. 505-866-5193
Fax. 505-866-5197
e-mail: faseiler@nmia.com
***********************
Joseph L. Alvarez, Ph.D.
Auxier & Associates
9821 Cogdill Rd. Suite 1
Knoxville, TN 37932, USA
Tel. 865-675-3669
Fax. 865-675-3677
e-mail jalvarez@auxier.com
************************
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