[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: Government Is Slow to Offer Safety Plans



Crediting Sandy Perle with the correct assessment of the conditions, Dr.

Rozental continues to provide the erroneous "answers" that cause conditions

like Tokaimura. Use of extreme "rules" and "programs" that make no sense,

because people "can be trained like monkeys to follow, with only a little

more punitive actions by 'regulators'" will always fail.



The IAEA/ICRP et al. rules are almost entirely devoid of good practice

outside of the very pragmatic core of good practices that are outside of the

"policy" arena that are the domain of self-serving politician leaders, They

are the equivalent of putting a speed limit of 15 km per hour on the German

autobahn. The workers at Tokaimura circumvented the design/controls just

like anyone does when the rules are stupid and frustrating. When the "rules"

have enough force of law, the penalty for following them simply leads

rational people to abandon the effort. The costs to society would be

enormous, and people would take non-autobahn roads, and kill more people, if

the rules were simply more rigidly enforced by a militant cadre of

bureaucrats. 



This defines the IAEA, and the failure to build more nuclear power plants,

to the great benefit of the fossil fuel industries of the leading countries

if IAEA, and the morticians of the world, especially the third world whose

deaths are at the hands of the Rozental of the IAEA and ICRP/NCRP.



This used to include UNSCEAR, but in taking on an independent voice on

behalf of the science since the 1994 report, the countries supporting IAEA,

ICRP/NCRP, etc. have attempted to terminate it (initially to get it under

ICRP control), and are now killing it by cutting its funds. Just as they

killed the radium dial painter studies, and got RERF under control following

the US DOE aborted attempt to assign it to a highly biased director at

Columbia, but failing that, assured the direction of its efforts through a

"blue ribbon committee" led by that "independent expert," Roger Clarke - I

thought this was especially appropriate since "blue ribbons" is what they

award to the prize pigs at the "county fairs" - to produce the falsified

results wanted by the rad protection policy-makers, or die.



Regards, Jim





on 8/8/02 8:09 AM, J. J. Rozental at joseroze@netvision.net.il wrote:



> 

> This topic was discussed after the Tokamura incident, where officials

> evacuated individuals where there wasn't the remotest possibility of

> a public exposure. My opinion was that any govt. official who orders

> an evacuation, knowing full well that there is no exposure, but does

> it to make the public "feel good" is simply negligent, and, in the

> long run, may actually cause more injuries, due to moving large

> populations and the hysteria surrounding the order. Unfortunately,

> there were many on this list who said that it would be OK to do this,

> knowing that there is no risk, no exposure, simply to make the public

> feel that something was being done.

> 

> And,, we continue to shoot ourselves in the foot, promoting a risk

> that is non-existent.

> 

> Dear colleagues,

> We can understand Chernobyl errors in large spectrum, obsolete reactors, and

> non-democratic country at that time, etc.

> What we can't understand is so stupid mistakes in the Tokaimura Accident,

> considering the Japanese high technology and elevated culture to follow

> orders and procedures. These are our legacy on lack of credibility.

> I'll not comment the USA capability or European Community, most of them high

> rank countries, my comment is about countries that follow the IAEA

> recommendations on Emergency. IAEA have published many Documents on Generic

> procedures for assessment and response during a radiological or nuclear

> emergency, if countries have or not capability to implement such

> recommendations is another story. The fact is documents were written, and

> also training was provided. IAEA has offered many Regional and International

> training on Emergency to developing countries, many of them in USA held at

> Argonne Nat. Lab. Division of Training.

> About the Sandy's comment above, the protective measures on sheltering,

> administration of stable iodine, evacuation, relocation need to be  based on

> the Generic Intervention Level (averted dose) and according with the IAEA

> Intervention Criteria in a Nuclear or Radiation Emergency, Safety Series 109

> is: Sheltering 10 mSv in two days, Evacuation 50 mSv in a week, Relocation

> 10 mSv in 1st month for six month and Permanent Resettlement 1 Sv in a

> lifetime, all this is technical consideration, however, politically country

> can consider approach like Sandy's remark. This has happened in the Goiania

> Accident, were  the dose criterion adopted was that the dose to the critical

> group in the first year should not exceed 5 mSv. Actions levels were derived

> from this criterion, and with value as follow:

> a) Inside houses (external exposure) 1 mSv;

> b) Outside houses (pathways from contaminated soil) 4 mSv, broken down into

> 3 mSv due to external irradiation and 1 mSv due to internal exposure, such

> as via contaminated fruit and produce

> On the other hand we have learned that mental distress and anxiety will be

> associated with any accident, regardless of whether an actual dose has been

> received or not, this is attributable to the perception of a risk to health,

> and depends in part on whether people have confidence that the authorities

> are competent and trustworthy and have taken prompt and effective action to

> control radiation doses.

> Finally we can understand by errors, Chernobyl, Tokaimura and many

> radiological accidents that Communication with Public and Media and Social

> and Psychological Attendance need more and more be implemented and these

> past accidents have shown that failure to have adequate arrangements in

> place and the commitment of resources at the time of the emergency can

> seriously delay actions to bring the emergency under control.

> 

> I have learned a lot in Goiania dealing with the Radiological Accident in

> the Center of the City, with many situations that I never have learned in

> any emergency literature.

> 

> Jose Julio Rozental

> joseroze@netvision.net.il

> Israel

> 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> ************************************************************************

> You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,

> send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the text "unsubscribe

> radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.

> You can view the Radsafe archives at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/

> 



************************************************************************

You are currently subscribed to the Radsafe mailing list. To unsubscribe,

send an e-mail to Majordomo@list.vanderbilt.edu  Put the text "unsubscribe

radsafe" (no quote marks) in the body of the e-mail, with no subject line.

You can view the Radsafe archives at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/