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RE: U.S.: 'Dirty Bomb' Danger Real

To: <radsafe@list.Vanderbilt.Edu>
Subject: RE: U.S.: 'Dirty Bomb' Danger Real
From: "Jim Hardeman" <Jim_Hardeman@dnr.state.ga.us>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 13:49:53 -0500
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 12:54:22 -0600
Reply-To: "Jim Hardeman" <Jim_Hardeman@dnr.state.ga.us>
Sender: owner-radsafe@list.Vanderbilt.Edu

Rick ?

In very broad, general terms, I agree with you ... but I would point out that when dealing with and planning for intentional, malicious acts, you always get around to having to assume that the probability of occurrence is 1, not 1E-6 (or similar probability) that we like to assume for "accidents". Thus, whether you talk about just "consequences" or "risk", you come back to the same answer ... we MUST be able to demonstrate to the citizens of this nation that we are responsibly and prudently preparing to deal with the consequences of ANY event involving the dispersal of radioactive materials. While efforts aimed at detection and interdiction of illicit radioactive materials, securing nuclear facilities and radioactive sources, and "accident prevention" are laudable, we must assume that those efforts, like all human endeavors, are not perfect, and that radiological incidents, whether accidental or intentional, can and will occur.

Unfortunately, the trend that I've seen recently doesn't appear to be heading in the right direction. I see an erosion of the national assets which we, as state radiological emergency preparedness and response personnel, would rely on to assist us in assessing the consequences of a significant radiological incident ... assets such as the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), the Aerial Measurement System (AMS), the Advisory Team for Environment, Food and Health (A-Team), etc. This erosion is due, in part, IN MY OPINION, to management indifference, neglect and even antagonism at the most senior levels of government, and in part due to "turf protection" battles between federal agencies. (imagine that!). Part of it, quite frankly, is self inflicted, in that the only significant attempts to maintain and demonstrate radiological emergency preparedness capabilities are focused on nuclear power plants. In most cases (Indian Point and similar plants aside), !

th!

ese plants are not near major metropolitan areas. There has been little "outreach" on the part of the federal government agencies involved in radiological emergency preparedness outside of those states and local government jurisdictions whose responsibility includes planning related to a commercial nuclear plant.

The trend that I'm seeing and hearing about now seems to be to replace trained, experienced radiological emergency response personnel with "toys". An example of this is a proposal to replace the rotary wing (i.e. manned helicopter) AMS capability with radiation detection equipment aboard Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). While at first this sounds like a good idea, there are a couple of strikes against it ? first, measurement sensitivity and the ability to perform spectral analysis. The rotary wing AMS capability provides spectral analysis info necessary to identify specific radionuclides, and also is sensitive enough that with limited "ground proof", my counterparts and I would have sufficient technical information upon which to base initial protective action recommendations to our elected officials. PLUS, we would have access to the expertise represented by the folks operating the system and interpreting the data. Not so with the UAV systems ... at least from what I've seen!

o far. These new systems appear to be good enough to provide a "quick and dirty" gross assessment, but would require a lot of "asses and elbows" to do all the field monitoring necessary to make even the simplest protective action recommendations. And, perhaps most importantly, the trained, experienced personnel that used to be helping us interpret data would be off somewhere else, doing something else ... unavailable to us.

If we truly believe that malicious acts involving radioactive materials are indeed a possibility, then management attention (including funding) at least equal to the current emphasis on potential chemical and biological hazards must be focused on radiological emergency preparedness at the federal, state and local level. I wish I could say that we're wasting our time and the taxpayers money in preparing to deal with the consequences of radiological incidents, but I can't.

My $0.02 worth for the day ... soapbox relinquished.

Jim Hardeman, Manager

Environmental Radiation Program

Environmental Protection Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

4244 International Parkway, Suite 114

Atlanta, GA 30354

(404) 362-2675

Fax: (404) 362-2653

E-mail: Jim_Hardeman@dnr.state.ga.us

>>> "Rick Haaker, CHP, CIH" <radpro@aqsafety.com> 11/13/2003 11:44:23 >>>

Radsafers --

In general I see too much national focus on the consequences of terrorism

and not enough on the risk, which must take into account probability and

consequences. Some sort of dirty bomb disaster is likely to occur some

day, certainly. Sure there would be fatalities, but not that many, and a

lot of economic dislocation. So, reasonable efforts to interdict and

prevent all forms of terrorism are certainly prudent.

However, and this is important, We are about as likely to die from being

struck from lightning or a peptic ulcer as from terrorism. Why aren't we

seeing the same level of concern and urgency about lightning? Maybe we

should spend trillions on a crash program to install some sort of

anti-lightning devices in a tight grid across the country. We are perhaps

a 1000 times more likely to die of heart disease than of terrorism. Why

aren't we spending a thousand times more government resources to research

heart diseases than we are spending on terrorism?

I think that our national obsession with terrorism is taking resources away

from other programs that, on a cost-benefit basis, are far more beneficial

to society.

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