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Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants




That's exactly what he did!

He tripped the reactor, and instead of shutting down, the power rose from 7% 
full power to 100 times full power within a few seconds.  The less than 
adequate design of the control rods caused the power pulse that destroyed 
the reactor.

Jerry
 ----------
From: radsafe
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Date: Wednesday, May 01, 1996 12:31PM

Just one slight disagreement:

I feel that any adequately trained Nuclear Engineer would have
recognized the danger and shut down the operation long before the
system became unsafe.  A review of the "minutes" (the operator's
chronology) of the accident shows that the tests could not be
performed without leaving the reactor in a dangerously unstable
situation.  Instead of stopping, they continued to override the
safety systems.

Wes


> Date:          Wed, 1 May 96 11:22:46 -0500
> Reply-to:      radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu
> From:          "Cuttler, Jerry" <CuttlerJ@spkb.candu.aecl.ca>
> To:            Multiple recipients of list <radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu>
> Subject:       Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants

>  The operating procedures did not forbid such operation.
>  Had this mode of operation been analyzed in advanced, this weakness would
> have been identified.  Hindsight is 20/20.
>
> Jerry Cuttler
> Canadian Nuclear Society

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Wesley M. Dunn, C.H.P.                     512-834-6688
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