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Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants
That's exactly what he did!
He tripped the reactor, and instead of shutting down, the power rose from 7%
full power to 100 times full power within a few seconds. The less than
adequate design of the control rods caused the power pulse that destroyed
the reactor.
Jerry
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From: radsafe
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Date: Wednesday, May 01, 1996 12:31PM
Just one slight disagreement:
I feel that any adequately trained Nuclear Engineer would have
recognized the danger and shut down the operation long before the
system became unsafe. A review of the "minutes" (the operator's
chronology) of the accident shows that the tests could not be
performed without leaving the reactor in a dangerously unstable
situation. Instead of stopping, they continued to override the
safety systems.
Wes
> Date: Wed, 1 May 96 11:22:46 -0500
> Reply-to: radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu
> From: "Cuttler, Jerry" <CuttlerJ@spkb.candu.aecl.ca>
> To: Multiple recipients of list <radsafe@romulus.ehs.uiuc.edu>
> Subject: Re: Design of Nuclear Power Plants
> The operating procedures did not forbid such operation.
> Had this mode of operation been analyzed in advanced, this weakness would
> have been identified. Hindsight is 20/20.
>
> Jerry Cuttler
> Canadian Nuclear Society
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Wesley M. Dunn, C.H.P. 512-834-6688
Deputy Director, Licensing 512-834-6690 (fax)
(Texas) Bureau of Radiation Control wdunn@brc1.tdh.state.tx.us
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