Re: Comments on Nuclear Energy

[bflood@SLAC.Stanford.EDU (Bob Flood)]

OK, I'll give this a go.

>1. No satisfactory method has been found to halt nuclear proliferation or
>prevent diversion of nuclear material by subversive or terrorist elements.
>

Certainly the development of the technology to build a bomb can't be
stopped. Every nation that has tried to build one has succeeded on the first
try, so how tough can it be? Halting the distribution of fissionable
material is an entirely different problem, and one that, because of the need
for secure data, probably can't be answered in public.


>2. The costs and problems associated with decommissioning nuclear power plants
>have not been properly analysed or accounted for in the costs of nuclear power
>and governments are using taxpayers' money to subsidise nuclear power.
>
This is essentially an unknown quantity. If the process is hindered by
intervenors to the same degree as construction has been, and similar
over-protective practices are forced on the utilities, D&D costs will be
well beyond those currently being planned. If D&D is allowed to be based on
realistic protection criteria, the current planning MAY be adequate, but we
won't know either way until a large unit goes through the process.


>3. No satisfactory method has been found to guarantee safe operation of nuclear
>power plants in the event of employee negligence or sabotage.
>

Guarantee safe operation? Zero risk doesn't exist in nuclear power or
anywhere else. Quality assurance is not the same as perfection guarantee.
Can a nuclear plant be built and operated so as to present no more risk to
the community than other heavy industry? Certainly. I worked for a nuclear
utility in a service area that experienced evacuations due to bromine and
chlorine leaks (where the harm is prompt and quickly detected), but no
evacuations were required because of a nuclear incident. My own persepctive
is this: with all the creative stupidity that went into the TMI accident,
the fact that they trashed the reactor and its contents without biologically
meaningful offsite doses is sufficient evidence for me to conclude that the
construction standards are adequate to protect the public even under
accident conditions. (I am not including the stress-related problems
observed by the surrounding population; I believe they were man-made and
entirely avoidable.)

Naturally, the Chernobyl experience doesn't apply to the US power reactor
industry.

Bob Flood
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
(415) 926-3793     bflood@slac.stanford.edu
Unless otherwise noted, all opinions are mine alone.