Re: TMI Root Causes

[Harold.Reynolds@rfets.gov (Harold Reynolds)]

Please consider the following in assessing the actions and attitudes at TMI-2 on
March 28, 1979.

Notification of the sticking problem with the PORV had been submitted to NRC for
distribution and was stagnant somewhere at NRC in Washington that morning.  The
TMI-2 operators had not been alerted.

All training for PWRs emphasize the catastrophic potential consequences of
having a solid condition (no bubble in the pressurizer) in a PWR.

Among all the lights and bells on that morning, the perssurizer level indicated
high and the PORV position indicator indicated that the valve was closed.  These
in combination indicated that the system was either solid or very nearly so. Due
to poor design, both indications were wrong.

When the High Pressure Injection system actuated as it should have, the other
indications said it might be injecting into a solid primary system-this would
lead to the worst possible accident. The HP Injection was secured causing the
core to be uncovered and the fuel to melt.

It's too easy to second guess and lay blame but I for one am glad I didn't have
to face that situation that morning.