The Swedish Nuclear Dilemma

[lars.persson@ssi.se]

From
Dr Frigyes Reisch
KTH, Royal Institute of Technology
Nuclear Reactor Engineering
SE-10044 Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: 46-8790 74 78, fax: 46-8206454
E-mail: frigyes@egi.kth.se
Tel and fax 46-87202365 (home)
E-mail: frigyes.reisch@ske.a.se (home)

Dr Lars Persson
SSI
SE-17116 Stockholm
Tel  46-87297103
Fax  46-87297108
E-mail: lars.persson@ssi.se

The Swedish Nuclear Dilemma

Barseback versus the Government in legal battle. Swedish politicians replace 
home made nuclear electricity occasionally with Russian.
A new view on the current low-dose problem in radiation protection presented 
by Dr L-E Holm, the DG of the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) 
at the recent IAEA Conference in Seville.

There are 12 power reactors in Sweden, the Forsmark and Oskarshamn sites 
with each three BWRs, the Barsebäck site with two BWRs and the Ringhals site 
with one BWR and three PWRs. Additionally, there are other types of nuclear 
facilities in operation, such as  a fuel fabrication plant, a research 
reactor and various nuclear waste facilities.

On March 14,  1997 the government issued its bill on the energy policy to 
the Swedish Parliament. The objective of the new energy policy is stated to 
be to –create the necessary conditions for an efficient use of energy and 
cost effective supply of energy with a low impact on health, environment and 
climate, and also facilitate the transformation into an ecologically 
sustainable society–. The new energy policy is backed by the social 
democrats, the left and the centre parties, together representing a majority 
in the Parliament.

The proposal included the closure of the reactor Barsebäck 1 by 1st of July 
1998 and   - provided that sufficient energy saving and/or replacement 
supply is at hand -  closure of Barsebäck 2 by 1st of July 2001.The closing 
of the first reactor shall mainly be compensated for by reduced use of 
electricity for heating. Future decisions on phasing out the other ten 
reactors should take into account safety and technical lifetime aspects, as 
well as effects of energy conservation measures and availability of 
alternative energy sources. No time limit is, however, set for operation of 
the reactors at the other nuclear power sites.

To be able to enforce the nuclear energy policy as described above, the 
government proposed a special law on the phasing out of nuclear power. The 
law was adopted by Parliament on 18th December 1997 and entered into force 
on January 1st, 1998. The proposed law empowers the government to revoke the 
operating licences of the Swedish nuclear power reactors, not, as now, only 
for safety reasons, but also in order to •facilitate the transformation into 
an ecologically sustainable society–. Siting and the age and technical 
status of the plants are among the factors to be taken into account when 
deciding the order in which the reactors shall stop operation. When the 
government revokes the operating licence, the owner of the reactor shall be 
compensated for economically.

The Swedish government has ordered closing of the reactor Barsebäck 1 from 1 
July 1998 by a decision of 2nd February 1998.

In Sweden and in its surroundings all the major reactor types are operating 
since more than a quarter of a century [1]. The Nordic countries have 
together a synchronous grid connected with DC links to the continental grid 
[2]. The Nordel organisation -  http://www.nordel.org  - is the framework 
 of the co-operation.  To close the –Baltic Ring–  - 
 http://www.balticring.com -  a Sweden Poland Link has been decided and a 
Lithuania-Poland grid connection is planed.  Northern Sweden occasionally 
has already imported electric power via Norway from the Russian VVER Nuclear 
Power Plant Kola and the Stockholm Area has imported power via Finland from 
the oldest RBMK Nuclear Power Plant near St. Petersburg . The Ignalina RBMK 
 - the largest reactor of the world - in Lithuania might be the next NPP 
east of the Baltic Sea to deliver electricity to Sweden where presently half 
of the consumption is covered by nuclear. Politicians eager to force 
Barseback to stop production are not shying to support continued operation - 
through occasional purchase of replacement electricity - at the nearby VVER 
and RBMK plants they desperately wanted to close a few years ago. Since then 
the Swedish Government together with the EU has spent many millons of ECUs 
to improve Ignalina.

The owner of Barseback - Sydkraft - on the 23 rd of February 1998 lodged a 
formal complaint with the EU againt the Government decision to close the 
Barseback 1. The issue may end at the EU Court in Luxembourg.

Another important issue from Sweden is that Dr Lars-Erik Holm - the new 
Director-General of the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute and member of 
ICRP Main Commission - in a key speech at the IAEA, WHO and UNSCEAR 
International Conference in Seville, November 17-21, 1997 gave the following 
view on the radiation protection low dose problem:

I personally feel that both epidemiology and molecular biology sometimes 
tend to rely too much on mathematical modelling as a substitute for real 
observations. Mathematical models may serve their purposes, but the results 
of such procedures are never better than the data being entered into the 
models. During this meeting, there has been an animated discussion 
concerning the relevance of the linear, non-threshold model. It is important 
to distinguish between, on the one hand, whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support or refute this model, and on the other hand, what the 
optimal tools and principles are for radiation protection purposes. There 
often seems to be a confusion between these two issues. Even though some 
people question the linear, non-threshold model to adequately describe the 
events at low doses, they may still accept the use of this concept as a 
simple regulatory tool.

I do not believe that the basic principles of radiation protection will 
change in the near future due to increased knowledge of radiation 
mechanisms. Cancer is the result of a multistage process with promoters and 
inhibitors affecting the probability of a damaged cell developing into a 
clinical cancer. At the DNA level, however, there is no reason to assume 
that there is a dose threshold below which the risk of damage is zero.

The use - or misuse - of the quantity collective dose which is related to 
the linear, non-threshold model also requires some comments. The result of 
collective dose estimates must not be perceived primarily as predictions of 
future health effects. They are intended for planning purposes, i.e. 
optimisation and limitation of the detriment. Plans for radiation protection 
measures at facilities where work involving radiation is carried out is 
often the result of an optimisation, and the proposal which, with reasonable 
cost and effort, leads to the lowest collective dose, is selected. A 
limitation of the collective dose would be one possible means of limiting 
the total detriment from a facility. The collective dose should therefore 
not be used to predict future detriments at doses of a few mSv to large 
segments of  populations.

This important statement by a leading specialist in the field can be looked 
upon as a turning point in the history of radiation protection. We are now 
looking forward to the next ICRP Main Recommendations to appear in the 
beginning of the next century.

Dr Frigyes Reisch
Dr Lars Persson


Illustrations on the Baltic Ring are available at  http://www.balticring.com 
and on Nordel at http://www.nordel.org

A map of reactors and their ages in the Baltic area can be sent by mail.


[1] Teknik & Vetenskap  3/96
[2] Elbranchen x/98