RAM security

[Les Slaback <lester.slaback@nist.gov>]

Diane Case (NIH) gave an interesting summary of the recent NIH experience on RAM security at the recent Balt-Washington meeting.   They have been cited for not having trash containers on lock and key.  If just a couple of their several thousand labs are unsecured it is deemed a programmatic failure and they have been cited. [Note: These summaries are from an aging memory and may not be precise, and only partially reflect the fervor of her comments.]

[opinion follows]
As previously noted the content of recently released security infraction guidance was not what was hoped it would be.  Clearly the regulatory approach on this topic is one of an agency that does not (or can not) make a cost/risk balanced judgement (from the licensees perspective).  I presume the cost of negative publicity associated with security related events was given much more weight than the radiation exposure costs.  Dianne points out that the costs and inconveniences are already driving users to less effective and more toxic nonradiological techniques.
Question:  Before we go too far down this road is there anything to be done to point out how out-of-balance this system is?
Disclaimer:  the above are the personal musings of the author, and do not represent any past, present, or future position of NIST, the U.S. government, or anyone else who might think that they are in a position of authority.
Lester Slaback, Jr.  [Lester.Slaback@NIST.GOV]
NBSR Health Physics
Center for Neutron Research
NIST
Gaithersburg, MD  20899
301 975-5810