[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

RE: Estimating doses from criticality accidents



	In most jurisdiction, legislation (e.g. Labour codes, OSHA, various
nuclear and non-nuclear related acts and regulations) holds line management
ultimately responsible AND accountable for the health and safety of
employees.  This responsibility begins with the President and CEO and
extends all the way down to the first line supervisor.  The same legislation
will also impose specific duties for health and safety on workers.  While
your argument is valid that the responsibility for ensuring appropriate
criticality safety standards tends to lie with the criticality engineering
discipline, it is still management that must ensure that:

	*	there is a clear and explicit commitment to safety;
	*	clear roles and responsibilities for safety have been
assigned
	*	appropriate safety programs are place and there is
"somebody" assigned to maintaining
	 assessing/reporting program performance and improving the program;
	*	all employees, managers and responsible bodies comply with
legislation AND the safety program; 
	*	mechanisms are in place to identify and correct deficiencies
BEFORE an incident or accident occurs;
	*	program reviews are in place and their findings acted upon;
and
	*	so forth and so on.

	You can have the best program going but if compliance to the program
is not enforced at all levels, then the safety culture will deteriorate and
eventually, an accident will occur.

	I don't believe that we are in disagreement on any of the points
made to date.  However, we will have to wait for the "final" report before
knowing the whole story.

	Just my opinions.

	Cheers.

	Emelie Lamothe
	Corporate Health, Safety and Security
	lamothee@aecl.ca


>  _________________
> > 
> > > 
> > Only one minor point.  Here in the US the responsibility for criticality
> > safety does not normally lie with the radiation protection discipline,
> but
> > rather in a dedicated criticality safety engineering discipline
> (typically
> > nuclear engineering 'types').  I am not certain, but this may also be
> the
> > case in Japan.  While the radiation protection staff may not be
> completely
> > innocent, neither are they the technical experts in the subject.
> > 
> > Doug Minnema, Ph.D., CHP
> > Defense Programs, DOE
> > <Douglas.Minnema@ns.doe.gov>
> 
> ************************************************************************
> The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
> information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html
> 
************************************************************************
The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html