RE: Estimating doses from criticality accidents

["Minnema, Douglas" <Douglas.Minnema@ns.doe.gov>]

Emelie,

Very well stated, we have complete agreement.  I did not mean to discount
the ultimate responsibility of line management, for that truly is where the
buck should stop.  I was only noting that there is a safety discipline out
there with direct expertise and responsibility for criticality safety
concerns that should be added to Mr. Rozental's list.

Doug Minnema

> -----Original Message-----
> From:	Lamothe, Emelie [SMTP:lamothee@aecl.ca]
> Sent:	Tuesday, November 09, 1999 4:41 PM
> To:	Multiple recipients of list
> Subject:	RE: Estimating doses from criticality accidents
> 
> 	In most jurisdiction, legislation (e.g. Labour codes, OSHA, various
> nuclear and non-nuclear related acts and regulations) holds line
> management
> ultimately responsible AND accountable for the health and safety of
> employees.  This responsibility begins with the President and CEO and
> extends all the way down to the first line supervisor.  The same
> legislation
> will also impose specific duties for health and safety on workers.  While
> your argument is valid that the responsibility for ensuring appropriate
> criticality safety standards tends to lie with the criticality engineering
> discipline, it is still management that must ensure that:
> 
> 	*	there is a clear and explicit commitment to safety;
> 	*	clear roles and responsibilities for safety have been
> assigned
> 	*	appropriate safety programs are place and there is
> "somebody" assigned to maintaining
> 	 assessing/reporting program performance and improving the program;
> 	*	all employees, managers and responsible bodies comply with
> legislation AND the safety program; 
> 	*	mechanisms are in place to identify and correct deficiencies
> BEFORE an incident or accident occurs;
> 	*	program reviews are in place and their findings acted upon;
> and
> 	*	so forth and so on.
> 
> 	You can have the best program going but if compliance to the program
> is not enforced at all levels, then the safety culture will deteriorate
> and
> eventually, an accident will occur.
> 
> 	I don't believe that we are in disagreement on any of the points
> made to date.  However, we will have to wait for the "final" report before
> knowing the whole story.
> 
> 	Just my opinions.
> 
> 	Cheers.
> 
> 	Emelie Lamothe
> 	Corporate Health, Safety and Security
> 	lamothee@aecl.ca
> 
> 
> >  _________________
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > Only one minor point.  Here in the US the responsibility for
> criticality
> > > safety does not normally lie with the radiation protection discipline,
> > but
> > > rather in a dedicated criticality safety engineering discipline
> > (typically
> > > nuclear engineering 'types').  I am not certain, but this may also be
> > the
> > > case in Japan.  While the radiation protection staff may not be
> > completely
> > > innocent, neither are they the technical experts in the subject.
> > > 
> > > Doug Minnema, Ph.D., CHP
> > > Defense Programs, DOE
> > > <Douglas.Minnema@ns.doe.gov>
> > 
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