RE: Dateline NBC TMI story - A different evaluation

["Bob Hearn" <rah@AMERICA.NET>]

Sandy-



During the days following the pressurizer valve failure at TMI there was

much information available to media and anti's that was either ignored due

to the fact that it was from nuclear industry sources that were viewed with

a jaundiced eye, or was misconstrued or twisted to matched preconceived

notions or agendas.  I too was highly involved in assisting utilities to

develop approaches to compliance with a steadily evolving ("ratcheting")

plethora of regulations and guides in the years prior to the TMI incident. I

do not think that anyone involved would dispute many of the shortcomings

that were cited in regards to communications, emergency planning and

instrumentation to monitor parameters of significance in an accident

scenario.



The question at hand, Sandy, is "Why resurrect fears that were exaggerated

to extremes over 2 decades in the past when, as you mentioned, major

provisions were established in the aftermath and maintained to the present

to avoid the many problems encountered with the situation at TMI, including

improvements to address scenarios far above and beyond that of TMI or even

possibility!?"



This production was clearly a politically motivated effort to induce further

unfounded fears of a beneficial technology that has been improved vastly

beyond that which actually worked (despite human intervention to override

its controls) prior to the improvements implemented post-TMI!



Bob Hearn

rah@america.net



-----Original Message-----

From: owner-radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu

[mailto:owner-radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu]On Behalf Of Sandy Perle

Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 11:37 PM

To: radsafe@list.vanderbilt.edu

Subject: Re: Dateline NBC TMI story - A different evaluation





> Sure there was confusion, but the enviro groups and the anti-nukes did

> their best to enhance it.



Seems that all groups do this. If you have a pint of view, you're

going to do whatever it takes to support that view. When the

contrary occurs, you're going to use it as well. Seems there are

many here on Radsafe that do this. I guess it can't be all that bad a

strategy. Right!



> Moreover, what disaster that has occurred has not been immediately

> followed by confusion and confusion of responsibility, to be followed

> right away by finger-pointing and blame?



Immediate confusion can be expected. After a week? I don't think

so. No matter what you say Ruth, the process that occurred at TMI

was flawed. Period. You can't re-write history here. The problems

were real, the confusion was due to lack of appropriate training,

lack of appropriate and detailed procedures, accountability for

communications not determined before-hand, and an apparent lack

of general understanding of the very instrumentation the plant staff

were using to make decisions. Power plants had always conducted

emergency planning drills. My first one as a utility employee was in

1975. For all practical purposes, it was a joke. In the corporate

offices, sitting in the Exec. VP's office, there were 6 of us. We had

2 graphs of met data and dose curves to make decisions on. The

only thing that was actually accomplished ws, that we had a drill,

and took credit for it. If you don't believe my impression of what we

all did back then, there are many other power reactor workers here

on Radsafe who can attest to the fact that emergency planning, for

all practical purposes, was for show only. The other problem was,

from management's perspective, why spend $$$ on emergency

planning, when nothing was going to happen. We can't increase

the cost to the customer .. god forbid! The regulators went along

with this charade. TMI opened up a lot of eyes. The industry is

better for it, as has been tested in the few Emergency

Classifications that have occurred during the past few years. There

are REAL plans, REAL procedures and a REAL emergency

planning staff designated.



Over-reaction? I think not. Were the scathing Lessons Learned

published also a figment of the anti's perception? How many tens

of millions do you think were spent on hardware, software and

facility upgrades due to TMI? SIGNIFICANT. No, those who say

there were problems aren't over-reacting. We're simply telling it like

it was. No matter how hard you try, you simply can not re-write the

history books. The documentation of what happened is too

extensive, and, it is quite accurate.





**************************************************************************

Sandy Perle					Tel:(714) 545-0100 / (800) 548-5100

Director, Technical				Extension 2306

ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Service		Fax:(714) 668-3149

ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.			E-Mail: sandyfl@earthlink.net

ICN Plaza, 3300 Hyland Avenue  		E-Mail: sperle@icnpharm.com

Costa Mesa, CA 92626



Personal Website: http://www.geocities.com/scperle

ICN Worldwide Dosimetry Website: http://www.dosimetry.com

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