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AOPA Concludes GA Aircraft No Threat to NPPs
AOPA-commissioned report concludes general aviation not a threat to nuclear
power plants
June 6 ? A new report commissioned by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association has concluded that general aviation aircraft do not pose a
serious threat to the nation's nuclear power plants. The report by
internationally recognized nuclear safety and security expert Robert M.
Jefferson said that the crash of a GA aircraft wouldn't cause a dangerous
release of radiation.
"Following the events of September 11, some expressed fears that a small
aircraft might 'attack' a nuclear plant," said AOPA President Phil Boyer.
"We sought out an expert to determine if those fears were real."
"The Jefferson report makes it clear that general aviation aircraft are not
effective weapons and small aircraft aren't a significant threat to the
safety of the public when it comes to nuclear power plants."
In the report, "Nuclear Security ? General Aviation is not a Threat,"
Jefferson said that if a general aviation aircraft were to crash into any
part of a nuclear power facility, the "result of such an endeavor would fail
to produce the damage necessary to cause any radiological involvement of the
public."
Jefferson concluded that:
A GA aircraft could not penetrate the concrete containment vessel
An explosives-laden GA aircraft would not likely cause the release of
radiation.
A small aircraft attack on auxiliary plant buildings would not cause a
safety failure.
A GA aircraft could not ignite the Zirconium cladding on spent nuclear fuel.
Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) submitted the Jefferson report into the
congressional record June 5 during a hearing of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, while Sen. Christopher (Kit) Bond (R-Mo.) said,
"Commercial nuclear plants are probably the most physically secure and least
vulnerable of our nation's industrial infrastructure. They are robust,
hardened facilities with numerous redundant systems designed to assure
public safety."
A GA aircraft could not penetrate the concrete containment vessel
The Jefferson study concluded that a general aviation aircraft could not
penetrate the concrete containment vessel protecting the nuclear reactor.
While few nuclear reactor facilities were designed specifically against
threats from GA aircraft, that point is misleading, according to Jefferson.
"It overlooks the fact that by their very design, nuclear power plants are
inherently resistant to such strikes," he said.
All containment vessels are designed to withstand the impact of
tornado-propelled "missiles." Tornados can pick up objects as large as cars
and hurl them against buildings with tremendous force. In one test, a power
pole was rammed into a containment wall at more than 120 mph without causing
damage to the structure. "A power pole impacting perpendicular to the
surface of the concrete is certainly a more effective missile than a light,
aluminum general aviation aircraft," said Jefferson.
In another test, a 45,000-pound F-4 Phantom jet was propelled at 450 miles
per hour into a concrete wall simulating a containment vessel. The aircraft
was destroyed; the concrete wall was "uncompromised."
(An F-4 is 18 times heavier than a Cessna 172, the most popular GA aircraft.
And even in a dive, a Cessna 172 can't go much faster than 200 mph.)
Even a large commercial airliner such as a Boeing 757 would not likely
penetrate the outer containment vessel of a nuclear power plant. But even if
it did, the reactor vessel, which contains the nuclear fuel, would remain
intact, according to Jefferson.
An explosives-laden GA aircraft would not likely cause the release of
radiation.
Some have speculated that a light aircraft loaded with explosives might lead
to a release of radiation. "The capabilities of light aircraft argue against
such an attack being successful," Jefferson said.
Most GA aircraft have payloads of less than 1,000 pounds. Any explosives
would have to be carried in the passenger or cargo compartments, far away
from the nose of the aircraft. Even if a terrorist were able to rig a
contact fuse on the nose of the aircraft, the explosion would be several
feet away from the reactor containment building. That distance would reduce
the damage to the point that even if the containment vessel were breached,
there would be little or no damage to the reactor vessel inside, according
to the nuclear expert. (Jefferson has been involved in full scale testing of
systems subjected to explosive attacks.)
A small aircraft attack on auxiliary plant buildings would not cause a
safety failure.
Nuclear power plants are designed so that a "single failure" cannot cause
the loss of critical safety systems. Support systems are not co-located at a
single point. An aircraft crash could not destroy every safety and control
system at once, Jefferson said.
"It is inconceivable that the crash of a general aviation aircraft could
accomplish such broad safety problems in a nuclear power plant," said
Jefferson.
A GA aircraft could not ignite the Zirconium cladding on spent nuclear fuel.
Spent nuclear fuel is stored in massive shielding systems or in deep pools,
covered with up to 50 feet of water. The pool walls are concrete and steel.
The pool itself is a relatively small target. Even if the aircraft could hit
the pool, it would not likely disturb the spent fuel.
To ignite the Zirconium cladding on the spent nuclear fuel, an aircraft
would have to create a fire that would burn for about 20 hours, according to
Jefferson. That would take some 176,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The
typical GA aircraft carries 60 gallons of gasoline.
Jefferson concluded that general aviation aircraft would "prove ineffective
in an attack similar to those carried out on September 11 ... The success of
these attacks was predicated on the use of large, turbine-powered commercial
aircraft with an immense fuel carrying capacity. A general aviation
aircraft, at only a fraction of the weight, speed and fuel load, would be
unable to inflict damage on the scale witnessed on that tragic day."
Robert M. Jefferson has more than 45 years experience in the nuclear field.
Currently an independent consultant, his experience encompasses full scale
testing of systems subjected to explosive attacks, full scale testing of
spent fuel shipping casks, and the development of calculation techniques for
assessing public impact of nuclear fuel cycle activities. The Sandia
National Labs employed him for 27 years in the field of reactor and
transportation safety research. He also teaches graduate-level nuclear
engineering classes.
A copy of "Nuclear Security - General Aviation is not a Threat" is available
online. [at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2002/02-2-159_report.pdf
]
The 380,000-member Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association is the world's
largest civil aviation organization. Some two-thirds of the nation's pilots,
and three-quarters of general aviation aircraft owners, are AOPA members.
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2002/02-2-160.html
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