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Re: DOE Secretary addresses "Dirty Bombs"



on 9/17/02 7:20 AM, William V Lipton at liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM wrote:



> I'm sure that you reached your conclusion that the Secretary's statement is

> "ignorant," only after careful consideration.



Right!



> To me, the statement seems a reasonable expression of concern.



But you also think "perception is reality" translated "the big lie works!"



> He talks about the "psychological disruption and economic consequences"

> of such a weapon,



But the responsible response: tell the truth instead.



> as well as the availability of the materials needed for fabrication.



So what?



> To me these seem to merit serious consideration.



Of course: "perception is reality." Buy the lie.



>You must  have access to information of which I'm not aware.



No. Just use the available information instead of pretending it doesn't

exist. Even the NRC "Fact Sheet" says there's no risk. Saddam Hussein

stopped trying to build radiological weapons because they couldn't be made

to work. But that doesn't stop our DOE (and other self-serving groups) from

pushing for more funds/authority under the guise of "rad protection."



> I'd be grateful if you could share with us the basis for this conclusion.

> 

> Since I'm just part of the "perception is reality crowd," and am obviously not

> one  of those you consider "knowledgeable," I'd also be grateful if you could

> tell us whom you have in mind.



All who know the Secretary is lying about the risk.

"It's not about dose, it's about lying about dose/effects."

 

> The opinions expressed are strictly mine.

> It's not about dose, it's about trust.

> Curies forever.



Can't be all wrong! :-)

Regards, Jim

 

> Bill Lipton

> liptonw@dteenergy.com

> 

> 

> Muckerheide wrote:

> 

>> Who are the staff that get the Secretary to make such ignorant statements!?

>> And why do the knowledgeable people keep silent? (Sins of omission!?)

>> 

>> Regards, Jim

>> 

>> on 9/16/02 1:49 PM, Susan L Gawarecki at loc@icx.net wrote:

>> 

>>> Energy Secretary Abraham Calls for International Conference to Counter

>>> the Threat of  "Dirty Bombs"

>>> http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases02/seppr/pr02186_v.htm

>>> 

>>> VIENNA, AUSTRIA – Speaking before the Forty-Sixth General Conference of

>>> the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today, Energy Secretary

>>> Spencer Abraham called for an international conference to address the

>>> threat posed by the potential misuse of radiological materials to

>>> construct Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), often referred to as

>>> “dirty bombs.”

>>> 

>>> A dirty bomb contains radioactive material, but does not use that

>>> material to produce a nuclear explosion, as is the case with a nuclear

>>> weapon. Dirty bombs are constructed of conventional explosives and

>>> radioactive material and are designed to disperse that radioactive

>>> material. Such weapons are ideal for terrorists because of their

>>> relative simplicity and the widespread availability of suitable

>>> radioactive material in medical isotopes, radiography sources, and power

>>> sources used in remote areas.

>>> 

>>> “Although these dirty bombs are not comparable to nuclear weapons in

>>> destructiveness, they are far easier to assemble and employ,” said

>>> Abraham. “While the physical destruction they would cause is comparable

>>> to conventional explosives, the disruption caused by widespread

>>> contamination is far greater. And it is disruption that terrorists

>>> seek.” In addition to the psychological disruption, use of a dirty bomb

>>> could have significant economic consequences.

>>> 

>>> Abraham’s call for an international conference builds on several earlier

>>> U.S. initiatives, some taken jointly with the Russian Federation and the

>>> IAEA. In May 2002, Secretary Abraham and his Russian counterpart,

>>> Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, agreed to work

>>> cooperatively to secure radioactive sources in Russia. Under this

>>> agreement the United States has worked with Russia to identify the

>>> specific sources of greatest concern, has committed $1 million for

>>> security upgrades at the largest radiological repository in Russia,

>>> reached agreement on upgrades at several other high priority sites, and

>>> began discussion on material consolidation.

>>> 

>>> Building on this agreement, in June 2002, the United States, Russia, and

>>> the IAEA established a tripartite working group on “Securing and

>>> Managing Radioactive Sources.” This working group will “develop a

>>> coordinated and proactive strategy to locate, recover, secure and

>>> recycle orphan sources throughout the Former Soviet Union.” It

>>> represents the first concerted international response to the threat

>>> posed by vulnerable radioactive sources in the non-Russian states of the

>>> Former Soviet Union. Under this initiative contracts were signed in

>>> August with Georgia for upgrading security for at-risk sources. In

>>> parallel with these foreign efforts, the U.S. Department of Energy and

>>> Nuclear Regulatory Commission are examining areas in which Federal

>>> resources should be directed to improve protection against radiological

>>> dispersal devices.

>>> 

>>> Plans found in Afghan bunkers revealed in detail the interest of al

>>> Qaeda in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs, or “dirty bombs”). The

>>> discovery of these plans demonstrates the importance of incorporating

>>> radiological dispersal devices into the world’s nonproliferation and

>>> counterterrorism strategy.

>>> 

>>> Under Abraham’s proposal, the United States would work closely with the

>>> IAEA to make the proposed conference a reality. As Abraham has noted

>>> elsewhere, “Safeguarding weapons usable material should always be the

>>> highest priority of the IAEA. But the organization also needs to seek

>>> ways to formally expand its scope to deal with dangers posed by lower

>>> grade nuclear materials. The international community must do more, and

>>> the IAEA is the best and most appropriate vehicle for marshalling our

>>> collective resources.”

>>> 

>>> The IAEA has the technical expertise to help states respond

>>> appropriately to this problem. The conference the United States proposes

>>> would help states understand the need to draw on that expertise to

>>> develop appropriate national standards for accounting for and tracking

>>> radiological materials.

>>> 

>>> Media Contact:

>>> Jeanne Lopatto, 202/586-4940

>>> Corry Schiermeyer, 202/586-5806

>>> 

>>> Release No. PR-02-186

>>> Release Date: September 16, 2002

>> 

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> 

> 

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