NCI on NPPs as Terrorist Targets

["Jim Hoerner" <jim_hoerner@HOTMAIL.COM>]

[Apologies if this was already posted to RadSafe; I receive the digest - JH]



http://nci.org/02NCI/08/pr9202002.htm



Statement on the Science article “Nuclear Power Plants

and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets”





Dr. Edwin S. Lyman

President



Nuclear Control Institute







September 20, 2002







The authors of the article appearing in today’s issue of Science (Douglas 

Chapin et al., “Nuclear Power Plants and their Fuel as Terrorist Targets,” 

Science 297, 20 September 2002) claim that it is virtually impossible for 

terrorists to cause a massive release of radioactivity by attacking nuclear 

power plants or spent fuel shipments, and that even if such a release of 

radioactivity were to occur, the public has nothing to fear because of a 

“large body of scientific evidence” showing that low levels of radiation are 

not harmful.  To support their argument, the authors rely on misquotations, 

unsupported assertions, misinterpretations of data, and unpublished 

references that have not been peer-reviewed.







The authors are also firmly in the camp of the small group of dissidents who 

believe in a dose threshold for the carcinogenic effects of radiation.  This 

controversial “threshold” theory has support among neither the established 

radiation protection authorities nor the scientific community at large.  On 

the contrary, numerous recent studies have observed a so-called “inverse 

dose-rate effect,” in which the carcinogenic potential of ionizing radiation 

is actually greater at low doses and dose rates than at high doses.  The 

Science article displays a lack of awareness of up-to-date technical 

literature that is especially surprising given the authors’ apparent belief 

that they are fully in command of all relevant  “simple scientific and 

engineering truths.”  In fact, the technical issues raised by the authors 

are not simple, and their complexities are trivialized by the oversimplified 

treatment in the article.







Contrary to the authors’ assertions, credible mechanisms do exist by which 

terrorists could cause large radiological releases by sabotaging nuclear 

power plants, nuclear research reactors or spent nuclear fuel shipments.  In 

a series of force-on-force exercises on U.S. nuclear power plants, mock 

attackers were able to gain access to the plant and simulate the destruction 

of enough safety equipment to cause a meltdown nearly 50% of the time.  In 

many of those exercises, the attackers also used explosives to breach the 

containment building.  Terrorists with some basic knowledge of how nuclear 

power plants function could design their sabotage strategy to maximize the 

severity of the meltdown and guarantee the occurrence of a large 

radiological release into the environment.







The 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 has little bearing on this 

scenario because core cooling was restored before the core became fully 

molten.  With time, a molten core mass will indeed cause failure of the 

reactor vessel --- an event which was recently observed in tests at Sandia 

National Laboratories --- and the ensuing steam or hydrogen explosions could 

cause violent dispersal of the core materials into the containment.  If the 

containment is breached either deliberately by the terrorists or is ruptured 

as a result of the accident, a large radiological release into the 

atmosphere would occur.  In contrast to the sequence of events at TMI-2, if 

terrorists are able to seize the control room --- or if they have 

infiltrated it by posing as employees --- they could prevent anyone from 

taking corrective actions until it is too late.







With regard to the aircraft threat, the authors cite an unpublished 

industry-sponsored report and a videotape on the Internet of a plane 

crashing into a concrete block to support their claim that an aircraft 

attack cannot cause enough damage to a nuclear plant to cause a meltdown.  

In fact, straightforward engineering calculations, utilizing empirically 

derived formulas, demonstrate that such penetration is plausible.  The 

videotape in question actually provides no information regarding the 

question of whether a fully fueled commercial jet plane can penetrate a 

concrete containment wall.  The video documents a test at Sandia National 

Laboratories in which an F-4 fighter jet, with considerably lighter engines 

than a commercial jet like a 767, collided with a concrete block that was 

not fixed to the ground but was actually floating on an air cushion.  The 

purpose of the test was to measure the impact force, not to measure the 

maximum penetration of the target.  According to the test report, “the major 

portion of the impact energy went into movement of the target and not in 

producing structural damage.”  Real-world nuclear power plant containments 

are anchored to the ground.  Sandia National Laboratories, the sponsor of 

the video, has said that the nuclear industry is misrepresenting the results 

of the test.







Moreover, there are parts of a nuclear plant that are even more vulnerable 

than the containment.  The control room, spent fuel pool and auxiliary 

building are not as well protected as the reactor core, yet causing severe 

damage to any of those locations could well result in a severe radiological 

release.  The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) study referred to in 

the article concedes that a plane could penetrate the auxiliary building, 

according to a set of talking points on the report distributed to the press. 

  (Note that the conclusions of the report have been provided to the press, 

but not the underlying report.)







Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) calculations utilizing the standard 

radiological consequence code MACCS2 indicate that a large radiological 

release from a nuclear power plant could lead to exposures to radioactive 

iodine exceeding FDA-recommended thresholds for potassium iodide prophylaxis 

at distances hundreds of miles downwind of the site.  This is of particular 

concern for young children.  Yet the authors of the Science article, instead 

of calling for greater protection for children, callously dismiss the more 

than 2000 childhood thyroid cancers --- a more than hundred-fold excess --- 

that are almost certainly attributable to radioactive iodine released from 

the Chernobyl accident.



This is a clear indication of their extremist views regarding radiation 

exposure --- views that put them well outside of a scientific mainstream 

that is built on a century of research on the health effects of radiation.  

Their chief reference on this subject is a database on the web site of an 

advocacy group (of which one of the authors is the vice-president) that 

claims there is a massive conspiracy to cover-up the health benefits of 

exposure to low-level radiation.  The database contains links to bizarre 

papers such as those purporting to demonstrate the therapeutic effects of 

radon spa therapy.







On the issue of spent fuel transport, there are mechanisms by which a spent 

fuel cask could be attacked to release a significant fraction of its 

radioactive contents.  For instance, if a heat source were introduced into a 

spent fuel cask breached by a shaped charge, a self-sustaining zirconium 

fire could result, releasing a large part of the cask inventory of 

radioactive cesium.  If this event were to occur in a densely populated area 

--- which could be considered a severe version of a dirty bomb attack --- 

MACCS2 calculations indicate that more than ten thousand cancer deaths would 

eventually result.  Concern about the potentially high consequences of this 

event was most likely behind the recent issuance of an order by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) reportedly requiring that armed escorts 

accompany spent fuel transports at all times.







NCI has argued that the security around nuclear power plants and nuclear 

transports is not commensurate with the magnitude of the post September-11 

terrorist threat and that the NRC must act to augment protection from armed 

commandos, truck bombs, aircraft and malevolent insiders.  The costs of such 

measures are small in comparison to the benefits to the public.  The authors 

of the Science article, many of whom bear responsibility for contributing to 

the creation of a widely distributed nuclear power infrastructure in this 

country that is vulnerable to terrorist attack, should take a realistic 

approach to these risks and help to mitigate the threat to the public posed 

by the situation that they have created, rather than continuing to deny its 

potential for grave harm.







Further information about the risks of nuclear terrorism and sabotage is 

available on Nuclear Control Institute’s website, http://www.nci.org/



--

Hold the door for the stranger behind you.  When the driver a 

half-car-length in front of you signals to get over, slow down.  Smile and 

say "hi" to the folks you pass on the sidewalk.  Give blood.  Volunteer.











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