RE: Political wranglings over WIPP

["Thomas E. Potter" <pottert@erols.com>]

Bill Lipton cites one book review conclusion as a key conclusion ("The book

empirically proves that public opposition to a nuclear repository stems from

lack of trust toward the government and the perceived risk.").  I would cite

the next sentence as the key conclusion ("Developing and sustaining the

culture of trust, along with bringing procedural justice into the

decision-making process, will be a critical factor in any of the

government's future efforts in nuclear waste management.").  Even if the

first conclusion is correct, the second does not automatically follow.  It

may be that some people don't trust you.  But it does not automatically

follow that anything you do can make them trust you or that you need them to

trust you.  



I haven't seen the book yet, but I seriously wonder if the book itself

states the second conclusion so clearly and unequivocally, and, if so,

whether the facts support it.  I even wonder whether the WIPP opposition

would agree with the second conclusion.  WIPP is approved and operational.

How did that happen?  Are we to believe seriously that WIPP opponents

finally came around to trusting the government?  And if WIPP opponents

remain steadfast in their opposition and distrust, WIPP's approval and

operation would seem to be an argument against the second conclusion rather

than for it. 



My belief is that WIPP operates against the desires of the opposition simply

because the government fulfilled its legal obligations and then exercised

its legal authority to impose it.  If I am not mistaken, the government's

legal obligations did not include winning over the trust of the opposition.

Nor did it include demonstration of its trustworthiness more generally.  



The government accomplished its goal only after decades and only by all

effort short of obvious divine intervention.  That such a commitment was

required testifies not so much to the power of distrust of government by the

opposition, but to the agonizingly painstaking process we have adopted to

try to assure that criticisms of the opposition are appropriately

considered.  I wouldn't argue with the goal here--democratic protection of

minority rights--but the need for balance is clear, and it's not clear to me

that we're striking it properly.



In my view, the government's commitment to such an effort testifies

primarily to the widely recognized desperate need for the facility.  The

benefits of this facility were widely perceived to be highly desirable and

far in excess of minimal risks. Had the facility not been so badly needed,

or, had the need not been so widely recognized, the effort would have been

abandoned long ago, or would never have been undertaken at all.  (One

wonders to what extent the latter may be happening more generally and to

what extent we may be suffering for it.  Part of the balance question.)



Of course, the need that I write of is a perceived need, just as the fears

of the opponents may stem from perceived risks.  The outcome in this case is

that one perception trumped another.  Some perceptions turn out not to be

reality.  



The importance of widely recognized need in successfully completing such

ventures is entirely coherent with the ideas of Howard Margolis in his book,

"Dealing with Risk."  If the need is recognized (if, in Margolis

terminology, the fungibility is clear), the trust (at least the minimal

required level of trust) will be there.  It may be limited, and it may be

conditioned on checks and balances (not altogether bad), but it will be

there.  Conversely, if the need is not recognized, all the trust in the

world is not going to move you anywhere.  Indeed, focusing excessively on

engendering trust in the hope of facilitating approval might divert one from

adequately encouraging the perception of need without which approval will be

withheld anyway.

 

Trust is good, if only for its own sake.  It is all to the good if the

actions of DOE, the US government, and the New Mexico government are finally

beginning to raise the level of trust in those entities up to the level of

trust that makes us all so comfortable with other institutions that take

actions of some risk while playing important roles in our society.  I'm

thinking here of such beloved institutions as the coal, oil, and

pharmaceutical industries among others. Oh, and Microsoft, of course.



Thomas Potter

 

-----Original Message-----

Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 12:10:02 -0400

From: William V Lipton <liptonw@DTEENERGY.COM>

Subject: "Political wranglings over WIPP"



I urge those Radsafers who have access to "Nuclear News" to read the review

with the subject title, in the October 2003 issue, starting on page 25.  It

uses the history of WIPP as a case study to point out key issues for siting

a radwaste facility.



One key conclusion: "The book empirically proves that public opposition to a

nuclear repository stems from lack of trust toward the government and the

perceived risk..."  [i.e. It' not about dose, it's about trust. Perception

is reality.]



Examples of misconceptions cited:  (a) "All we have to do is to perform a

really complete, objective analysis of the project, showing that the risk is

low and the site is good."  (b) "If we have any opposition, it must be

because they don't understand."



The opinions expressed are strictly mine.

It's not about dose, it's about trust.

Curies forever.



Bill Lipton

liptonw@dteenergy.com





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