Re: TMI root causes -Reply

["Sandy Perle" <sandyfl@earthlink.net>]

> I really think that the major difference between a SALP 1 plant and having the keys 
> taken away is  the SAFETY CULTURE that management encourages, and the worker bees 
> just do out of well-taught habitual thinking patterns. 

One of the problems you pose here is one of economics. Back in the 
80's, a utility expended a significant number of $$ to attain and 
then maintain a SALP 1 rating, as well as an INPO level 1 plant 
rating. Now, utility management has come to the conclusion that the 
extra $$ that are needed to maintain SALP 1 levels is unwarranted in 
the "electricity competition" world. The decision by most is to spend 
less, and be satisfied with the SALP 2 Level. 

> On the one hand you've got, say,
> Clinton, where the plant manager refused to let the operators shut down when
> recirc pump leakage exceeded specs, because "the grid needs power". Contrast
> that to Monticello, shut down in the middle of the peak load season to fix an
> ECCS concern that they could have (maybe) pencil-whipped until the next
> refuel.

The above statement does not take into the account risk versus 
benefit. You imply that NOT shutting down is a serious issue. One 
could consider that shutting down to fix a problem that for all 
practical purposes, could have been fixed later, and, without risk to 
people or the environment. While the above is your example, this 
could be said for many problems worked every day within a nuclear 
utility. The fact that a spec was exceeded does not mean that there 
is any serious consequence. Now, let's assume that the unit did not 
shutdown. What would that shutdown have done to the grid? Would the 
shutdown have placed a larger strain on the grid, causing unnecessary 
problems to the majority of homes requiring that power? What time of 
the year was it? These are all factors that you are second-guessing. 
As far as the ECCS problem, as you said, it could have, perhaps, been 
taken care of during the next shutdown. I guess what I am saying is, 
that one need not shutdown immediately, for every individual problem 
faced on a daily basis. To do that could cause serious repercussions, 
both financially, and, to the expectation of the customers, i.e., to 
have reliable and available power. each item must be assessed on its 
own merits, and that is where good, knowledgeable and positive 
management is required.

> Process controls and systems are futile if they are routinely blown off in the
> name of expediency or the almighty buck. Sometimes short-sighted (or
> technically incompetent) managers make decisions based on short-term economic
> pressures, compromising safety. I certainly cannnot speak definitively on
> this, but it is my humble impression that the NRC looks very closely at the
> culture of a plant's management and workforce during an inspection.

They damn well do!!!!  Just look at all of the management changes 
taking place in the industry. I believe that more than a dozen large 
utilities have changed out the top management. The NRC DOES do a good 
job in this area. Now I am not here to defend the NRC, but having sat 
in on many NRC inspection meetings and exits, culture and management 
is a key factor that they do look at. I had seen management in my 
previous company changed out due to "NRC concerns" ...

Charles has seen a lot out there. That is one of the benefits of a 
"road warrior" .... Observations are important. One of the problems 
with the US nuclear industry is ... that we fail to learn from one 
and other. Yes, there are industry meetings, such as ALARA PWR and 
BWR Committees. But I found most of them to be all show without much 
substance. NOT because the workers didn't care, or attempt to bring 
back the knowledge gained, but because management (see, I am using 
that key element again) .. refused to incorporate the lessons 
learned. To grow, one must incorporate the good things from others, 
institutionalize the good, and standardize. We haven't done much of 
this. The Europeans do, for the most part. And, an added benefit of 
standaradization is, cost effectiveness.
------------------
Sandy Perle
Technical Director
ICN Dosimetry Division
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Office: (800) 548-5100 x2306 
Fax:    (714) 668-3149
  
sandyfl@earthlink.net
sperle@icnpharm.com

Personal Website: http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/1205
        
ICN Dosimetry Website: http://www.dosimetry.com

"The object of opening the mind, as of opening 
the mouth, is to close it again on something solid"
              - G. K. Chesterton -