Re: TMI 20th Anniversary Event to Feature Federal, State and

[Niel Wald <wald+@pitt.edu>]

My question was whether EPZ hospitals actually have worked out and
included plans for the evacuation of their inpatients, including those in
critical care units, preemy nurseries, etc. in their emergency plans.  The
traditional focus of emergency plans is on the intake and care of accident
victims rather than on the transfer and relocation of seriously ill
people.

On Thu, 18 Mar 1999, Muckerheide wrote:

> Huh? Do you know a hospital in an EPZ that doesn't have an emergency plan?
> 
> Niel Wald wrote:
> > 
> > I also wonder how many hospitals in nuclear station EPZs have included
> > plans for evacuation of hospital patients and personnel in their radiation
> > emergency planning??
> > Niel Wald
> 
> Jim Muckerheide
> Mass. Emergency Mgmt Agency
> ===========================
> 
> Mike,
> 
> 
> > On Wed, 17 Mar 1999, Mike McNaughton wrote:
> > 
> > > >``We're marking the 20th anniversary of the accident because of
> > > >the lessons it taught us about how to communicate with the public
> > > >in times of crisis, and how to prevent and be prepared for similar
> > > >events,'' Seif said.
> > >
> > > If a comparable accident occurred today, would we do a better job of
> > > communicating with the public? What would we do differently?
> 
> 
> We learned slowly and painfully how to better manage plant
> design/operations/maintenance, for capacity-factor and
> cost-effectiveness, and for safety - I think we underestimate the
> reduction in plant risks vs. the TMI era. 
> 
> But we have no basis to think we would do a better job communicating
> with the public. 
> 
> We have more 'procedure' and less 'knowledge' in technical and
> communications functions; we know how to do emergency exercises and to
> 'manage' another TMI, but a next won't be (never is) the same :-) [if it
> were the same, we'd control it]. The questions and media approach would
> be very different! :-)  We can't explain minor incidents satisfactorily,
> much less a confusing set of circumstances.  We can't/don't explain
> normal operations. We have a commitment to fail built in to making
> promises that nothing can go wrong, and when it does its our fault and a
> trivial source of radioactivity is a cataclysm of abject failure.  In a
> serious event, we won't have 2-3 days to lose credibility. :-)  Look at
> Northeast Utilities' inability to explain the triviality of the early
> core off-load transiently exceeding pool minimum accident assumption
> heat load cooling rates, including having NRC concurrence.  Now, what if
> they/you had a serious event :-)  We aren't growing into the new media
> dynamic (as the Whitehouse has done :-)
> 
> I suppose I should say that this is my opinion and my Director doesn't
> necessarily agree :-)
> 
> Regards, Jim Muckerheide
> muckerheide@mediaone.net
> 
> 
> > > "Shlala gashle" (Zulu greeting, meaning "Stay safe")
> > > mike (mcnaught@LANL.GOV)
> > > ************************************************************************
> > > The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
> > > information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html
> > >
> > 
> > ************************************************************************
> > The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
> > information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html
> ************************************************************************
> The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
> information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html
> 

************************************************************************
The RADSAFE Frequently Asked Questions list, archives and subscription
information can be accessed at http://www.ehs.uiuc.edu/~rad/radsafe.html