Errors in NRC TMI Factsheet

[Norm Cohen <ncohen12@comcast.net>]

What’s Wrong With the NRC’s 2004 Fact Sheet on the TMI Accident?

Published by

Three Mile Island Alert - March 2004



(NRC Fact sheet available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html)



“The main feedwater pumps stopped running, caused by either a

mechanical or electrical failure, which prevented the steam generators

from removing heat.”



The problems did not start with the feedwater pumps, trouble began in the

condensate polisher system. The NRC reported this in 1979 but states that

they don’t need to know the exact cause of the condensate polisher valves

failure. No one knows why the accident began to this day.



“Signals available to the operator failed to show that the valve was still

open… In addition, there was no clear signal that the pilot-operated relief

valve was open.”



Because TMI had been falsifying reactor leak rates to the NRC in the weeks

leading to the accident, operators had learned to ignore the most obvious

sign that the PORV had stuck open and that coolant was being lost through

this pathway. The high temperature reading at the PORV drain line was a

clear indication that coolant was escaping. But, operators had become

accustomed to this anomaly because of the criminal falsification which

allowed this condition to exist for several weeks.

It should be noted that if the company had operated lawfully, the plant

would have been shutdown for repairs and there would have been no

accident on March 28th 1979.

It is also noteworthy that NRC inspectors at TMI during the weeks before

the accident failed to find or note the reactor coolant leak. Later, the

company pleaded “no contest” to federal charges of criminal falsifications

On May 22 1979, former control room operator Harold W. Hartman, Jr. tells

the NRC investigators that Metropolitan Edison- General Public Utilities had

been falsifying primary-coolant, leak rate data for months prior to the

accident. At least two members of management were aware of the practice.

NRC investigators do not follow-up or report the allegations to the

commission.

On February 29, 1984, a plea bargain between the Department of Justice and

Met Ed settled the Unit 2 leak rate falsification case. Met Ed pleaded 

guilty

to one count, and no contest to six counts of an 11 count indictment.



“In a worst-case accident, the melting of nuclear fuel would lead to a

breach of the walls of the containment building and release massive

quantities of radiation to the environment. But this did not occur as a

result of the Three Mile Island accident.”



It was only by luck that the reactor walls were not breached. The industry

conjectured that voids in the coolant prevented molten fuel from burning

through the reactor walls. It is not known if these voids will form to 

prevent

a total meltdown in future accidents. Fifteen million curies of 

radiation is a

“massive quantity.”



“The accident caught federal and state authorities off-guard.”



State officials had no means to measure radiation at the scene. They had to

take field samples and return to their laboratories. This was not an 

effective

way to acquire real-time data or collect data on gaseous releases. Their 

data

collection abilities were insufficient to determine release rates. The 

NRC no

longer monitors radioactive releases at reactor sites.



“They did not know that the core had melted, but they immediately took

steps to try to gain control of the reactor and ensure adequate cooling to

the core.”



Reactor core measurements taken during the first morning showed that fuel

might have melted. This data was cast aside because operators believed it

was not possible and therefore erroneous. During the first day, the NRC in

fact distanced itself from the company by stating it did not tell them 

how to

run their plant and that they were overseers of regulatory matters. 

Initially,

the NRC was more interested in hiding from responsibility than offering

advice to the company.



“Helicopters hired by TMI's owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear, and

the Department of Energy were sampling radioactivity in the atmosphere

above the plant by midday. A team from the Brookhaven National

Laboratory was also sent to assist in radiation monitoring.”



By mid-morning, citizens (many who had not heard about the accident) were

reporting a metallic taste in their mouths. Because the reactor had been

leaking for several weeks, the reactor drain tank was full and a pathway to

the environs had already been created by valves aligned to handle the

leaking coolant and facilitate the falsification of the leak rates.

Additionally, at the time of the accident, GPU reported that radiation

monitors went off-scale, filters were clogged and other monitoring devices

“disappeared.” Therefore, we do not know how much radiation escaped

undetected into the atmosphere. Still, the Columbia Study found increased

cancer incidence, including lung cancer, from 1975-1985.



“In an atmosphere of growing uncertainty about the condition of the

plant, the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh, consulted

with the NRC about evacuating the population near the plant. Eventually,

he and NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie agreed that it would be prudent

for those members of society most vulnerable to radiation to evacuate the

area. Thornburgh announced that he was advising pregnant women and

pre-school-age children within a 5-mile radius of the plant to leave the

area.”



The NRC’s agreed upon conditions of a reactor which would require

evacuation of nearby communities had already been met two days earlier on

Wednesday the 28th. Governor Thornburgh complained often about the

conflicting and confusing data coming from the plant and the NRC.

“….even though it led to no deaths or injuries to plant workers or

members of the nearby community.”

In August 1996, a study by the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,

authored by Dr. Steven Wing, reviewed the Susser-Hatch study (Columbia

University; 1991). Dr. Wing reported that "...there were reports of 

erythema,

hair loss, vomiting, and pet death near TMI at the time of the accident...

Accident doses were positively associated with cancer incidence.

Associations were largest for leukemia, intermediate for lung cancer, and

smallest for all cancers combined... Inhaled radionuclide contamination

could differentially impact lung cancers, which show a clear dose-related

increase."

Findings from the re-analysis of cancer incidence around Three Mile Island

is consistent with the theory that radiation from the accident increased

cancer in areas that were in the path of radioactive plumes. "This cancer

increase would not be expected to occur over a short time in the general

population unless doses were far higher than estimated by industry and

government authorities," Wing said. "Rather, our findings support the

allegation that the people who reported rashes, hair loss, vomiting and pet

deaths after the accident were exposed to high level radiation and not only

suffering from emotional stress.”

Even under normal operating circumstances nuclear plants release radiation.

The NRC acknowledged that 12 people are expected to die as a direct result

of normal operation and releases for each commercial nuclear reactor that is

granted a license extension of 20 years.

The admission came in a correction to its 1996 relicensing regulation, which

was published in the Federal Register on July 30 1996. According to the

Federal Register notice, each relicensing is expected to be responsible for

the release of 14,800 person-rem of radiation during its 20-year life

extension. The figure includes releases from the nuclear fuel chain that

supports reactor operation, as well as from the reactors themselves. The

NRC calculates that this level of radiation release spread over the 

population

will cause 12 cancer deaths per reactor.



“But new concerns arose by the morning of Friday, March 30. A

significant release of radiation from the plant’s auxiliary building,

performed to relieve pressure on the primary system and avoid curtailing

the flow of coolant to the core, caused a great deal of confusion and

consternation.”



This was not by accident or design. The release was perpetrated by a lone

operator acting on his own and without permission or consultation with

anyone else. There were no regulatory repercussions resulting from his

actions.



“Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down and defueled, with

the reactor coolant system drained, the radioactive water decontaminated

and evaporated, radioactive waste shipped off-site to an appropropriate

disposal site, reactor fuel and core debris shipped off-site to a Department

of Energy facility, and the remainder of the site being monitored.”



The reactor was destroyed. No one knows how much fuel remains in the

reactor core debris. Some estimates have placed it at 20 tons of uranium.

Unit #2 is still releasing small amounts of radiation to the air and water.



“The accident was caused by a combination of personnel error, design

deficiencies, and component failures.”



Also add to the list: criminal activity, the NRC’s failure to disseminate

safety data, NRC inspection and enforcement failures, failure to fix

problems noted by control room operators, sloppy control room

housekeeping and economic gain placed above safety.



“Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment

requirements. This includes fire protection…”



A reactor safety division specifically created to spot problem trends in the

wake of the TMI accident was abolished by NRC executives in 1999.

According to the NRC’s Office of Inspector General, only half of NRC

employees feel it is safe to bring up new safety problems in 2003. One

former NRC employee stated those who do have their careers harmed by

NRC executives.

For more than a decade, the NRC was aware that the fire protection material

Thermolag was defective and burned at the same rate as plywood. The NRC

was aware that Thermolag’s manufacturer has falsified test results yet did

nothing to fix the problem. Finally the NRC asked TMI to remove

Thermolag. Two years after that request, TMI was again asked to remove

Thermolag. The NRC and TMI were very slow to act.



“Expansion of NRC's resident inspector program - first authorized in 1977

- whereby at least two inspectors live nearby and work exclusively at each

plant in the U.S to provide daily surveillance of licensee adherence to NRC

regulations…”



At Davis Besse, there was no chief inspector for a year. Inspectors find 

less

than 2% of problems identified at the plants. The NRC has decreased total

inspection man-hours in recent years.



“The installing of additional equipment by licensees to mitigate accident

conditions, and monitor radiation levels and plant status…”



The NRC no longer monitors radiation at the plants. On many occasions, the

communication lines from the control room computers to the NRC are found

to be inoperable.



“Employment of major initiatives by licensees in early identification of

important safety-related problems, and in collecting and assessing relevant

data so lessons of experience can be shared and quickly acted upon…”



Oh, if this were only true. Drastic employee cutbacks and overburdened

workers and engineers have little time and are reluctant to raise safety new

issues. TMI Alert has learned of TMI employees who simply “up and quit”

due to the excessive work load.



“July 1980 Approximately 43,000 curies of krypton were vented from the

reactor building.”



For 11 days, in June-July, 1980, Met Ed illegally vented 43,000 curies of

radioactive Krypton-85 (beta and gamma; 10 year half life) and other

radioactive gasses into the environment without having scrubbers in place.

In November 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia ruled that the krypton venting was illegal.

By 1993, TMI-2 evaporated 2.3 million gallons of accident generated

radioactive generated water, including tritium a radioactive form of

hydrogen (half life; 12.5 years), into the atmosphere despite legal 

objections

from community-based organizations.



Postscript:

The NRC fails to point out that it had ignored for more than a year prior to

the accident, a newly discovered safety problem which did occur at TMI.

Voids in the coolant created by a poor design of piping caused reactor

pumps to cavitate and vibrate violently. These vibrations threatened to

destroy the pumps. The coolant pumps had to be turned off during the height

of the accident.

The NRC’s role in the accident is one of tacit permissiveness. The 

attitude of

the industry was criticized by the President’s Commission above all other

factors. Three Mile Island Alert has observed that safety conditions and

attitudes are returning to the level evidenced by the industry in 1979.

Many of the so called “permanent” changes have been downgraded since the

time of their installation. The NRC inspectors have little confidence in the

newly implemented regulatory process according to a January 2000 GAO

investigation. The new regulatory process handcuffs the ability of 

inspectors

to pursue safety problems at the plants. Unless a suspicious condition is

deemed clearly dangerous, the new process doesn't allow the implementation

of other than routine inspections.

The Davis Besse near miss is a prime example. The NRC did not have a

resident inspector there for one year. Although there was clear evidence 

of a

leaking reactor, the NRC initially denied possession of the “smoking gun” –

a picture of the red crud which had formed on the outside of the reactor

vessel. The NRC had in fact ignored the problem to allow the plant to

continue operating.1 Determining that something is clearly dangerous is

apparently still a subjective skill at the NRC.

There are many outstanding safety issues identified by the NRC following

the accident which have still not been corrected. One example is the

vulnerability of electrical cables during an accident which can electrically

short circuit. Another example is the PORV valve which released the coolant

during the accident – it is still not rated as a “safety item.”

Three Mile Island Alert - March 2004

1 “When nuclear regulators fixed blame for failing to notice that there 

was a hole in the lid of the

Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio, they spent little time criticizing the role 

played by their new oversight

rules.

Those rules, seeking to reduce overly burdensome regulations, in 2000 

replaced the subjective,

nit-picky set of guidelines that had governed power plant inspections 

for years.

But documents obtained by a watchdog group show that a special Nuclear 

Regulatory

Commission task force last year had in fact intended to blame the new 

regulatory system in part

for the slipshod inspections at Davis-Besse. Before the task force's 

report was complete,

however, NRC staff had removed a section on the shortcomings of the 

NRC's new reactor

oversight process.

The final report - an indictment on the agency and plant owner 

FirstEnergy Corp. - did list

possible improvement to the oversight process. But it was far less 

sweeping and less critical than

the earlier suggestions.”

Plain Dealer, 5/16/03



-- 

Coalition for Peace and Justice (http://www.coalitionforpeaceandjustice.org); and the UNPLUG Salem Campaign (http://www.unplugsalem.org); 321 Barr Ave., Linwood, NJ 08221; 609-601-8583/37; ncohen12@comcast.net. The Coalition for Peace and Justice is a chapter of Peace Action (http://www.peace-action.org). "You can say I'm a dreamer, but I'm not the only one" (Lennon). "Don't be late for your life" (Mary Chapin Carpenter).







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